Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources by Royster, Judith V.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 3 Energy Symposium 
Spring 1994 
Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal 
Control over Mineral Resources 
Judith V. Royster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral 
Resources, 29 Tulsa L. J. 541 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss3/3 
This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For 
more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN




I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 542
II. TRIBES AS PROPRIETORS: OWNERSHIP OF THE MINERAL
ESTATE .................................................... 544
A. Tribal Trust Lands .................................. 545
B. Allotted Lands ....................................... 548
C. Fee Lands ........................................... 550
III. TRIBES AS LESSORS: EXPLOITATION OF THE MINERAL
ESTATE .................................................... 552
A. Mineral Leasing in the Allotment Era ............... 552
B. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 .................. 557
C. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 ................. 558
1. Uniformity of Laws .............................. 559
2. Tribal Self-Government .......................... 560
3. Economic Development ......................... 565
a. Income Guarantees ........................... 566
b. Trust Relationship ............................ 568
c. State Taxation ................................ 572
4. Conclusion ....................................... 580
IV. TRIBES AS PARTICIPANTS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MINERAL ESTATE ......................................... 580
A. Dissatisfaction with Mineral Leasing ................. 582
* Copyright 1993, Judith V. Royster.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. Work on this article was supported by
a grant from the Mineral Law Section of the Oklahoma Bar Association, and an earlier version
of this article was presented to the Sixth Institute for Natural Resources Law Teachers. I would
like to thank Professor Nell Jessup Newton for her valuable comments on an earlier draft, and
Michelle Lang for her equally valuable research assistance. All opinions and errors are solely
my responsibility.
1
Royster: Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Co
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
B. Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 ............ 584
1. Mineral Agreements ............................. 585
2. Trust Relationship ............................... 589
3. State Taxation ................................... 592
4. Conclusion ....................................... 594
C. Federal Oil & Gas Royalty Management Act ........ 594
D. Indian Energy Resources Act of 1992 ............... 596
E. Conclusion .......................................... 601
V. TRIBES AS REGULATORS: CONTROL OF THE MINERAL
ESTATE .................................................... 602
A. Taxation of Mineral Production ..................... 606
B. Environmental Controls ............................. 612
1. Environmental Effects of Mining ................ 614
2. Environmental Impact Assessment .............. 617
3. Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act ..... 619
4. Federal Environmental Statutes ................. 624
a. Air Pollution ................................. 628
b. Water Pollution ............................... 629
c. Waste Management ........................... 631
d. Remediation .................................. 633
5. Conclusion ....................................... 636
VI. CONCLUSION .............................................. 636
I. INTRODUCTION
By the late nineteenth century, mining had proved essential to
economic growth, to industrialization, to urbanization, and to the non-
Indian settlement of the American West.' "Without mining-from
coal to iron to gold-the United States could not have emerged as a
world power by the turn of the century, nor could it have successfully
launched its international career of the twentieth century."'2 But if
mining has been crucial to national growth, tribal mineral resources
have been crucial to the mining industry.
Indian tribes, collectively, are the third largest owners of mineral
1. DUANE A. SMITH, MINING AMERICA: THE INDUSTRY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 1800-
1980 25 (1987).
2. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 29:541
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resources3 in the nation.4 Indian lands are estimated to contain three
percent of the nation's known oil and gas reserves,5 30 percent of the
coal west of the Mississippi,6 and up to a third or more of the coun-
try's uranium,7 as well as smaller quantities of a host of other mineral
resources.' The market value of minerals produced on Indian lands
exceeds $1 billion.9
The history of mineral development in Indian country,' ° the roles
of the Indian tribes, and the evolution of those roles over time present
a microcosm of the history of federal-tribal relations during the last
century. As federal policy moved from assimilating Indians into the
majority society to encouraging tribal self-government and ultimately
to promoting government-to-government relations, tribal control over
mineral development strengthened. This article traces the various
roles the tribes play in mineral development - owner, lessor, devel-
oper, and regulator - in their historical context.
The first and foundation role for tribes is that of owner, and dur-
ing the allotment era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, the battle to retain the tribal mineral estate mirrored the larger
3. To avoid awkwardness, the term "mineral" will be used to refer to both oil and gas and
other minerals. where different provisions apply to oil and gas than to other mineral resources,
specific terms will be used.
4. MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BoNDs: INDIAN CONTROL OF ENERGY DE-
VELOPMENT 74 (1990). Only the federal government and the railroads hold larger mineral
reserves.
5. Id. Some 40 reservations are estimated to contain 4.2 billion barrels of oil and 17.5
trillion cubic feet of gas. IL
6. Id. Thirty-three reservations hold as much as 200 billion tons of coal. Id. Another
source states that 25 tribes own approximately 15 percent of the nation's coal, including one-
third of the low-sulfur coal in the west which can be strip mined. Douglas Richardson, What
Happens After the Lease Is Signed?, 6 AMER. INDIAN J. 11, 11 (Feb. 1980).
7. Estimates range from 16 to 37 percent. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 74.
8. Other minerals produced on Indian lands as of 1989 included chat, copper, gypsum,
helium, limestone, phosphate, sand and gravel, scoria, silica sand, and sulfur. UNITED STATES
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, MINERAL REVENUES 1989: REPORT ON RECEIPTS FROM
FEDERAL AND INDIAN LEASES 72-73.
9. Id. at 73. Almost half that amount is attributable to coal production. Id. at 72.
10. Indian country is statutorily defined, in the federal criminal code, as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patents, and including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
... and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). This definition of Indian country has been generally accepted in the
civil context as well. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). The
Supreme Court has recently clarified that § 1151(a) encompasses both "formal" and "informal"
reservations: that is, "lands set aside by whatever means for the residence of tribal Indians under
federal protection". Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S.Ct. 1985, 1991,
1993 (1993) (quoting FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 34 (Rennard
Strickland, ed. 1982)).
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war over Indian lands and Indian policy. The second role for tribes,
chronologically, is that of lessor. Throughout most of the history of
mining in Indian country, federal law confined the tribes to the part of
passive lessors. During the allotment era, leasing tribal mineral re-
sources to non-Indian companies reflected a national policy of assimi-
lating Indians into the mainstream. Once the allotment policy was
replaced by an era celebrating tribal self-government, however, min-
eral leasing reflected the new policy of according tribes increased con-
trol over their resources. With the advent in recent decades of a
stronger federal Indian policy of self-determination and government-
to-government relations, however, tribes have taken on a third role.
As active developers of the mineral estate, tribes exercise a far greater
degree of control over mineral development on Indian lands. Finally,
Indian tribes are governments: sovereign entities separate from the
states, with the rights to regulate and tax mineral production within
their borders. The onset of tribal assertions of police powers over
mineral development mirrors the increased sovereign activity of tribes
during the self-determination era of federal Indian policy. Each of
these roles will be explored below.
II. TRIBES AS PROPRIETORS:
OWNERSHIP OF THE MINERAL ESTATE
Tribal ownership of mineral resources is critical from economic,
environmental, and regulatory perspectives. Indian country with sig-
nificant mineral resources is often remote territory with high rates of
unemployment and poverty. For those tribes, the mineral estate rep-
resents the best, if not the only, hope for economic development of
the reservation. Not only are the mineral reserves valuable in them-
selves, but their development represents income, jobs, and the vitality
of reservation economies.
In addition to the economic potential, ownership of the mineral
resources means that tribes control, at least to some degree, the deci-
sion whether to develop the minerals and the extent of permissible
exploration and mining activities.'1 Title to the minerals permits the
choice not to develop the resource as well as the choice to exploit the
11. The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations noted that transna-
tional corporations are considerably more sensitive to environmental and other concerns on na-
tive lands in the United States than in other countries. UNrrED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
Mn NoarES, WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS; TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENTS
AND OPERATIONS ON THE LANDS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: REPORT OF THE UNrFED NATIONS
[Vol. 29:541
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mineral wealth. Ownership also means that tribes control mining ac-
tivities which affect the surface estate and the environment of Indian
country. And finally, ownership may affect the assertion of sovereign
regulatory powers such as environmental controls and taxing author-
ity.'" Thus consolidating subsurface and surface ownership in the
hands of the sovereign guarantees territorial integrity and simplifies
tribal assertions of sovereign power.
Nonetheless, mineral estate ownership in Indian country is com-
plicated by the land tenure patterns arising from wholesale shifts in
federal Indian policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. As a result of the half-century federal allotment policy, Indian
country today consists not only of tribal trust lands, but may include
individual trust allotments, land owned in fee by Indian and non-In-
dian individuals, and land held by the state or federal governments.
As is true elsewhere, the surface and subsurface estates of Indian
couitry may be unified in one owner or split, but the permutations are
complex. 3 In the simplest form, of course, the tribe holds both the
minerals and the surface lands. But where the surface and mineral
estates have been severed, either or both may be owned by individual
Indians, either in trust or in fee, by private parties in fee, or by the
federal government. The effect of the land tenure patterns on tribal
mineral ownership is explored in the sections that follow.
A. Tribal Trust Lands
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, federal Indian pol-
icy focused on removing tribes westward, out of the way of encroach-
ing white settlement. By the mid-1840s, however, federal policy began
CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPoRAIoNs 22-23, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/Sub.2IAC.4/19911Misc.1
(1991).
The critical difference in TNC performance, in these cases, appears to be the legal
status of indigenous lands rather than corporation policy or corporate culture. Indige-
nous people in the U.S. and parts of Canada have been able to insist on participating in
TNC activities because they have secure land and resource rights. In contrast, the in-
digenous territories in Ecuador, Panama and Chile which have been adversely im-
pacted by mining and logging are treated as part of the national estate, and indigenous
peoples have no legally-protected rights to prevent their use.
Id. at 23-24.
12. Tribal authority over non-Indian lands may be more limited than tribal authority over
Indian lands. See infra text accompanying notes 403-422.
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to shift to reserving for the tribes pockets of their aboriginal territo-
ries, 14 with the intent to ease conflicts between Indians and whites,
prevent the destruction of the tribes, and eventually transform the In-
dians into Christian agriculturalists. 15 The federal reservation policy
continued throughout the remainder of the century, but reached its
heyday in the years from the Civil War to the onset of the new federal
policy of allotment and assimilation in the late 1880s.16
When Indian lands are reserved or otherwise set aside as home-
lands for the tribes,' 7 the United States takes title to the land in trust
for the tribe or tribes that occupy the territory. 8 Under the trust sys-
tem for land ownership, the United States holds the fee and the tribes
retain beneficial ownership of their territories. Trust lands may not be
alienated, encumbered, or otherwise restricted without the express
consent of Congress.19 Today, virtually all tribal land of federally rec-
ognized Indian tribes is held in trust status.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, tribal
ownership of minerals and other natural resources on reservations
was not a settled question. In 1873, the Supreme Court stated that
timber cut from Indian lands belonged to the federal government,
"discharged of any rights of the Indians therein."20 Tribal rights to the
land and its resources, the Court indicated, were equivalent to those
of a life tenant.21 During these decades, however, both Congress and
14. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 315-18 (1984).
15. Id. at 317.
16. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 146-47
(3d ed. 1991).
17. Most reservations were set aside by treaties, but after treaty-making with the tribes was
ended in 1871, see 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988), reservations continued to be set aside through agree-
ments ratified by Congress. Numerous reservations were also created by executive order be-
tween 1855 and 1919. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 493 (Rennard
Strickland, ed. 1982).
18. while the notion of the trust relationship is traceable to the guardian-ward analogy first
proposed by Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831),
the trust status of Indian lands is more generally credited to nineteenth century views of superior
and unrestrained federal "plenary" power with respect to Indian tribes. See Russel L. Barsh &
James Y. Henderson, Contrary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and
After Montana v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REv. 627, 645 (1981); Milner S. Ball, Constitution,
Courts, Indian Tribes, 1987 A.B.F. RES. J. 1, 63.
19. Trade and Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988) (first enacted in 1790). See, e.g.,
Black Hills Institute of Geological Research v. United States Dep't of Justice, 12 F.3d 737 (8th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a dinosaur fossil named "Sue" found embedded within Indian trust land
could not be removed and sold without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior).
20. United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 594 (1873).
21. Id.
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the Department of the Interior generally treated the tribes as the ben-
eficial owners of the mineral estate.2 And in 1938 the Supreme Court
concurred, repudiating the contrary interpretation of its 1873 opin-
ion23 and recognizing tribal ownership of the subsurface mineral
estate.
Subsurface minerals, the Court declared in United States v. Sho-
shone Tribe of Indians, are "constituent elements of the land itself. 2 4
When the land was set aside as a homeland for the tribe, the tribe
acquired all "beneficial incidents" in the land, including beneficial
ownership of the natural resources.' Moreover, the Court noted, the
Shoshone Reservation was known to contain valuable mineral depos-
its, and yet the federal government included no language in the treaty
even suggesting that it intended to retain any interest in those miner-
als.26 Therefore, the Court held, interpreting the treaty to the benefit
of the tribe and resolving any doubts concerning ownership in the
tribe's favor,27 beneficial ownership of the mineral resources vested in
the tribe.28
Under the rule established in Shoshone Tribe, then, the mineral
resources of tribal lands belong to the tribes, absent an express provi-
sion reserving a federal interest in the mineral estate. When lands
22. Primary evidence is provided by the series of mineral leasing acts discussed infra at
section II.A. See also 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 181, 189 (1924) (noting that as a "practical matter" the
treaties and legislation recognized tribal ownership of the mineral reserves); JANET A. McDON-
NELL, Trm DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1887-1934 55 (1991) (describing the 1927
leasing act as "one of the most significant pieces of legislation concerning Indians passed in the
1920s because it recognized the Indians' title to executive order lands and their rights to the
proceeds of mineral leases"). The 1927 Act is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 86-95.
23. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). The decision in
Cook, the Court now said, determined only that the United States was entitled to replevy from
the purchaser logs cut by unauthorized tribal members: "That case did not involve adjudication
of the scope of Indian title to land, minerals, or standing timber . I. " d.
24. Id. at 116.
25. Id. at 115-16.
26. Id. at 117. The Shoshone Reservation, today the Wind River Reservation of the Sho-
shone and Arapaho Tribes, contained valuable deposits of gold, oil, coal, and gypsum. Id. at 114.
27. Id. at 117. The Court read the Shoshone Treaty in light of the judicial canons of con-
struction for treaties and agreements with the Indian tribes. The canons of construction mandate
that treaties be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, that any ambiguities be resolved in
favor of the tribe, and that treaties be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them.
See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 221-22; Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman,
Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the
Earth" - How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 617-20 (1975). For a study of the
Marshallian origins of the canons, and the Supreme Court's sporadic (at best) use of the canons
in modern Indian law decisions, see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1993).
28. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. at 117.
1994]
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were set aside for Indian tribes, whether by treaty, agreement, or ex-
ecutive order, the minerals underneath the lands were also reserved
for the tribes.
B. Allotted Lands
In 1887, as the cornerstone of the first federal drive to assimilate
the Indians, Congress enacted the General Allotment Act.29 The pur-
pose of the Act was to break up the reservations into private owner-
ship, with the underlying belief that individual ownership would turn
the Indians from a tribal life to one of agriculture, Christianity, and
citizenship.30 To that end, the Act allotted to individual Indians a cer-
tain number of acres, to be held in trust for the individual for 25 years
and then patented in fee.31 Although the General Allotment Act
specified only the allotment of grazing and agricultural lands,32 the
Act was largely implemented through specific allotment acts for par-
ticular reservations, many of which parcelled out mineral lands into
individual ownership as well.33 Prior to 1934, when Congress formally
ended allotment and extended indefinitely the trust status of existing
allotments,34 millions of acres of reservation lands had been allotted.35
Today, Indian allottees hold more than 9 million of the 53 million
acres held in trust. 6
The ownership of subsurface minerals below allotted lands varies,
however. In general, unless Congress provided otherwise in a specific
allotment act, the mineral estate followed the surface estate.37 Since
one purpose of allotment was to privatize land ownership, the allottee
was eventually to receive fee title to the allotment. Perfect fee title
necessarily included the mineral estate as well as the land and other
29. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-358 (1988)).
30. See 2 PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 661 (citing Senator Richard Coke, chairman of the
Committee on Indian Affairs).
31. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5,24 Stat. 388,389 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331
(1988)). For the most part, allotments consisted of 80 acres of farm land or 160 acres of grazing
land. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
32. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
33. PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 867 (noting that the specific allotment acts "were generally in
favor of allotting the mineral lands to the Indians" rather than preserving those lands for the
tribes)..
34. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1988)).
35. COHmN's HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 613 n.10. While the allotment policy was wide-
spread, a number of reservations, particularly in the Southwest, escaped allotment altogether.
Id. at 613 n.9.
36. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 145. Approximately one-third of Indian mineral revenue
comes from allotted lands. Id. at 146. Both these statistics refer to the lower 48 states.
37. United States v. Bruisedhead, 248 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D. Mont. 1966).
[Vol. 29:541
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natural resources.3 s Thus, when land was allotted under the General
Allotment Act, the mineral rights as well as the surface rights be-
longed to the allottee, subject to the same trust status as the land.
Nonetheless, Congress could, and sometimes did, provide other-
wise in a specific allotment act. In some instances, the mineral estate
of allotted lands was expressly reserved to the tribe.3 9 In other cases,
allotment acts reserved the mineral estate to the tribe for a period of
time, providing that the minerals "shall become" the property of the
allottees at a specified future date.4° Where these acts made the allot-
tees' future rights contingent upon congressional control, however,
the Supreme Court has held that the allottees acquired no vested
rights to the mineral estate.41 Instead, Congress retained full power to
extend tribal ownership for an additional period of years or even in-
definitely,42 without creating a claim for just compensation under the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.43
Tribal reservation of mineral resources underlying allotments be-
gan in the early 1900s and increased throughout the first decades of
the twentieth century. 44 In part, that trend may have reflected a grow-
ing national unease with the allotment policy.45 In other instances,
38. 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 181, 189 (1924).
39. See AMBLER, supra note 4, at 44 for a listing of the allotment acts which expressly re-
served mineral rights to the tribes. The policy was not uniform. "Some reservations had already
been allotted, and this mineral policy applied only to new allotments. In several cases, to keep
later options open, it provided for tribal mineral ownership for a limited period." Id.
40. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 651 (1976) (quoting § 3 of the
Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act of 1926); Adams v. Osage Tribe of Indians, 59 F.2d 653, 654
(10th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 652 (1932) (quoting § 2 of the Osage Allotment Act of
1906).
41. Northern Cheyenne, 425 U.S. at 658-60. See also Adams, 59 F.2d at 656-57. The Osage
Allotment Act expressly provided that the allottees would take title to the minerals "unless
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress." Id. at 654. The Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act
was less clear. It provided that Congress retained control and management of the "unallotted
lands" of the reservation, a term which the Court interpreted as including the unallotted mineral
estate underlying allotted lands. Northern Cheyenne, 425 U.S. at 659-60.
42. In the case of the Northern Cheyenne, Congress terminated the allottees' rights in 1968
and reserved the minerals in perpetuity to the tribe. Northern Cheyenne, 425 U.S. at 652. In the
case of the Osage, Congress passed a series of acts extending tribal ownership well beyond the
original 25 year period, Adams, 59 F.2d at 655, and finally extended tribal ownership into
"perpetuity." See Act of October 21, 1978, 92 Stat. 1660.
43. Northern Cheyenne, 425 U.S. at 651-52, 658-60.
44. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 44, 46. The Osage Allotment Act, reserving the minerals for a
period of years for the tribe, was enacted in 1906. See Adams, 59 F.2d at 654. The first act to
reserve minerals unconditionally to the tribe was at Fort Berthold in 1912. AMBLER, supra, at
44; see Act of Apr. 3, 1912, 37 Stat. 631.
45. Beginning in the late 1920s, federal Indian policy began to depart from its half-century
assimilationist stand. In particular, publication of the Meriam Report in 1928 highlighted the
economic and social destruction caused by the allotment policy. See ComN's HANDBOOK, supra
note 17, at 144.
9
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reservation of the mineral estate in favor of the tribes represented
acquiescence to the tribe's wishes,46 protection of non-Indian lease-
holders, or prevention of monopoly acquisition of allottees' interests
by non-Indians.47
C. Fee Lands
For the most part, fee lands within reservation boundaries are an
outgrowth of the allotment era. Between 1887 and 1934, when allot-
ment ended, Indian tribes as a whole lost approximately two-thirds of
their reservation lands.4 Some 90 million acres of tribal trust land
passed into fee ownership49 in two ways: fee patents to allottees and
the sale of the "surplus" lands.
Before the practice of allotment ceased in 1934, thousands of pat-
ents in fee were issued to Indian allottees.5 ° Once a patent in fee was
issued, all restrictions on alienation and encumbrance of the land were
lifted.51 Many Indian owners subsequently sold their land voluntarily;
many others lost their lands to repossession or sales for back taxes.52
In all, approximately 27 million acres - two-thirds of the total land
allotted - passed by sale from the Indian allottees.53
Once the Indian allottee received a fee patent to the land, unless
the subsurface minerals had been reserved to the tribe, the individual
also owned the mineral estate in fee. When the fee-patented land was
subsequently sold, the mineral rights were conveyed as well. Concom-
itantly, when patented lands were lost involuntarily, any subsurface
estate held by the surface owner was lost as well. In most instances,
purchasers of Indian allotments were non-Indians, and thus the non-
Indian purchaser generally acquired the mineral resources as well.
Through the allotment process, then, significant tribal mineral hold-
ings passed not only into individual fee ownership, but in most cases
into non-Indian hands.
46. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1976).
47. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 44-45.
48. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK supra note 17, at 614.
49. Id. at 138.
50. The liberality with which patents were issued varied over time, but during some of the
more liberal periods, a thousand or more patents could issue in a single year. For example, 2,676
patents issued between 1906 and 1909; 3,400 between 1909 and 1912; and 17,176 between 1917
and 1920. Id. at 136-37.
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 348, 349 (1988). See also County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S.Ct. 683 (1992).
52. For example, 2,676 patents were issued between 1906 and 1909. At least 60 percent of
those Indian owners disposed of their lands. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 136.
53. Id. at 138.
[Vol. 29:541
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Of the 90 million acres lost to tribes during the allotment years,
some two-thirds - 60 million acres - were ceded to the federal gov-
ernment for sale to non-Indian homesteaders.54 Under the General
Allotment Act, once allotted lands had been parceled out, the remain-
der of the reservation was deemed "surplus lands" - lands over and
above the needs of the Indians - and opened to non-Indian settle-
ment.55 The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to negotiate with
the tribes for federal purchase of the surplus lands, although the
Supreme Court held in 1903 that tribal consent to the loss of surplus
lands was not required. 6
In general, tribal mineral rights were ceded along with the surplus
lands, and thus subsequently alienated to non-Indian homesteaders.
Both Congress and the courts recognized that cession of the land in-
cluded loss of the mineral resources, and compensated tribes for the
value of the surplus lands attributable to minerals and other resources
as well as to the surface area. 7
In some instances, however, only the surface estate of ceded
lands was opened to non-Indian settlement, with the tribe retaining
rights to the subsurface minerals.5 For example, in 1904 the Crow
Tribe ceded over one million acres to the United States. 9 The federal
government conveyed only the surface estate to non-Indians, retaining
the subsurface minerals for the benefit of the tribe;60 full beneficial
ownership of the minerals underlying the ceded strip was subse-
quently restored to the Tribe in 1958.61
The ravages of fee patents and surplus lands sales halted in 1934
54. Id.; WILCOMB E. WAsHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND / WHITE MAN'S LAW 145 (1971).
55. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90 (1887).
56. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The Kiowa and Comanche Tribes had
concluded a treaty which provided that any cession of reservation lands required the written
consent of three fourths of the adult males. In 1892, less than the required percentage signed an
agreement for allotment and sale of the surplus lands, and that agreement was enacted into law
by Congress in 1900. The Supreme Court held that abrogation of the treaty provision calling for
written consent was within the plenary power of Congress acting as the Tribes' trustee, and could
not be reviewed by the judiciary. This latter aspect of the Lone Wolf doctrine has since been
repudiated. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 409-16 (1980).
57. 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 181, 189 (1924).
58. See AMBLER, supra note 4, at 44, 47.
59. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 916 (1982) (Crow 1).
60. Id.
61. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem, 484
U.S. 997 (1988) (Crow 11). For a more detailed explanation, see David H. Anderson, Strip Min-
ing on Reservation Lands: Protecting the Environment and the Rights of Indian Allotment Own-
ers, 35 MoNT. L. REv. 209, 217-18 (1974).
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with passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).62 The IRA ex-
pressly prohibited future allotments,63 extended indefinitely the trust
status of any allotments not yet patented in fee,64 and authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to restore to tribal ownership any remaining
surplus or ceded lands that had not passed into private ownership.65
Nonetheless, the effects of the allotment policy on mineral ownership
were profound. On millions of acres of trust allotments, the underly-
ing mineral estate was held in trust for the individual allottee and not
the tribe. Perhaps more important is the fact that vast tribal mineral
resources had passed into private, often non-Indian, ownership.
Despite the havoc of the allotment years, however, tribes
emerged in the third decade of the twentieth century with secure own-
ership rights to the subsurface estate that remained to them. Mineral
ownership, in turn, placed tribes in the congressionally-chosen role of
lessors as non-Indian producers began mining Indian lands. Congress
initiated leasing of tribal mineral resources in 1891, and leasing there-
after dominated mineral development for 90 years.
III. TRIBES AS LEsSORS: EXPLOITATION OF THE MINERAL ESTATE
Until the 1980s, virtually the only role that Indian tribes had with
regard to their mineral estates was a passive one. The tribes, as bene-
ficial owners of the minerals, were restricted to the role of lessor, and
for the most part a lessor with little say in the lease provisions. Leas-
ing of the mineral estate began during the allotment years, with major
reformations of the leasing laws in the 1930s as federal policy swung
away from assimilation and toward encouragement of tribal self-gov-
ernment. Nonetheless, for the first 90 years of mineral development
of Indian lands, the tribes played only a restricted role in the exploita-
tion of their mineral estate.
A. Mineral Leasing in the Allotment Era
The tribal mineral estate, like tribal land, is held in trust by the
federal government. And like the land, the minerals may not be alien-
ated or encumbered without the consent of Congress. Thus, absent
62. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. § 461-494
(1988)).
63. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
64. The IRA "hereby extended and continued" any existing period of trust "until otherwise
directed by Congress." 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1983). While the IRA thus ended automatic fee pat-
ents, any allottee over 21 years of age may still apply for a fee patent. 25 C.F.R. § 152.4 (1993).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 463(a) (1988).
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congressional authorization, Indian lands are not open to mining by
non-Indians.66 During the allotment era, however, Congress author-
ized alienation of the minerals in a series of mineral leasing acts for
Indian lands. Non-Indian development of the mineral resources, pol-
icy makers believed, would constitute an efficient and wise use of In-
dian lands67 and "provide the Indian landlords with an object lesson in
civilized behavior. 68
In 1891, four years after the General Allotment Act, Congress
enacted the first general consent to mineral leasing of tribal lands.69
The 1891 Act permitted 10 year mineral leases on lands "bought and
paid for" by Indians,70 a stipulation that was generally interpreted to
restrict the Act to reservations set aside by treaty or agreement.71
Tribes could lease out only those lands not needed for individual allot-
ments or agricultural purposes. 72 All mineral leases under this first
leasing act required the consent of the tribe and were subject to ap-
proval by the Secretary of the Interior.73
Allotted lands not needed for grazing or agriculture could also be
leased for mineral development under the 1891 Act, although allot-
ment leases were generally available only when the allottee was
deemed unable to work the land by reason of age or other disability.7 4
66. Trade and Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988); see also United States v. Cook,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873) (timber). Mineral trespass, of course, was a continuing prob-
lem. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 356, 377-78 (1980) (describing
trespass by gold prospectors in the Black Hills).
67. McDoNNELL, supra note 22, at 50; FREDERICK E. HoxiE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE
CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 168 (1984) (Indian Commissioner Francis
Leupp believed that Indians were " 'grossly wasteful of their natural resources.' Leasing would
provide a remedy for this malady by turning the Indians' lands over to efficient white
businessmen.").
68. HoxIE, supra note 67, at 168.
69. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1988).
70. Id.
71. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 180 (1989). The primary
distinction was between reservations set aside by treaty and reservations set aside by executive
order. As a result, reservations set aside by agreement after the cessation of treaty-making in
1871, see 25 U.S.C. § 71, were also considered to be lands "bought and paid for." See British-
American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 164 (1936).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1988).
73. Id.
74. See DELOS S. OTIS, THE DAWES Acr AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 111-21
(1934) (U. Okla. Press 1973). Nonetheless, leasing of allotments (for all purposes, not just min-
erals) exploded during the 1890s. In 1893, only four leases were approved; the next year, 295
were approved; by 1897, the number was nearly 1300; and in 1900, some 2500 leases were ap-
proved. Id at 118, 120, 121. By 1920, approximately 40,000 allotment leases were entered into,
covering 4.5 million acres. McDoNNELL, supra note 22, at 48. On the special issues involving
mineral development of allotted lands, see generally AMBLER, supra note 4, at 145-71.
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Because of those restrictions, most leasing of allotments was accom-
plished under the broader authority of the Act of 1909, which author-
ized allottees to lease their lands for mining purposes, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior.75 Neither the 1891 nor the
1909 legislation provided for tribal consent or consultation, even as to
allotments within reservation boundaries.
In 1919, as the national demand for mineral production grew,76
Congress expanded leasing of tribal lands. The 1919 Act authorized
leases on any tribal lands in nine Western states for the purposes of
mining gold, silver, copper, and "other valuable metalliferous miner-
als. ' '77 The law was amended in 1926 to permit mineral leases as well
for nonmetalliferous minerals other than oil and gas.78 Leases of tri-
bal lands in the nine states were issued for a term of 20 years, with the
lessee holding a "preferential right" to renew for successive 10-year
periods. 79 Lessees paid rents and royalties (minimums were specified
in the Act) into the United States Treasury, and Congress was author-
ized to appropriate those funds for the benefit of the Indians.80 More-
over, the 1919 Act preserved for the states "any rights which they may
have" to tax the production, property, or assets of the lessees.,
In contrast to the 1891 Act, the 1919 Act eliminated tribal con-
sent to leasing. Leasing was at the discretion of the Secretary of the
75. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1988); see also 25 C.F.R. pt. 212 (1993). The allotment leasing act
expressly excludes the Osage and the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma. The mineral estate of
the Osage is entirely reserved to the tribe, see supra notes 42-43, and leasing of Osage minerals is
governed by 25 C.F.R. pt. 214 (1993) (minerals other than oil and gas) and pt. 226 (oil and gas).
Allotments of the Five Civilized Tribes can be leased pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1908, ch.
199, § 2, 35 Stat. 312, which authorizes the Secretary to regulate leasing. The regulations are
found at 25 C.F.R. pt. 213 (1993).
76. The 1919 Act was justified in part as increasing mineral output necessary for the war
effort. See McDONNELL, supra note 22, at 51; HoxiE, supra note 67, at 186.
77. 25 U.S.C. § 399 (1988) (amended 1921, 1926, and 1976). The nine states were Arizona,
California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. Metal-
liferous minerals are those "yielding or producing metals." A DICrIONARY OF MININO, MIN.
ERAL, AND RELATED TERMS 697 (Paul W. Thrush & U.S. Bureau of Mines, eds., 1968). The Act
consequently excluded oil and gas, as well as other non-metal mineral resources, although it
expressly provided that "metalliferous" should be construed to include magnesite, gypsum,
limestone, and asbestos. 25 U.S.C. § 399 (1988).
78. 25 U.S.C. § 399 (1988).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. By 1919, the states' right to tax non-Indian lessees of Indian lands was limited by the
federal instrumentality doctrine. See infra text accompanying note 90. The 1919 Act did not
create any state taxing rights, but only preserved whatever rights the states then had.
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Interior, who was charged with protecting "the interests of the Indi-
ans."82 Even so, the Secretary's discretion was limited by the provi-
sion of the Act that mining claims could be located on Indian lands in
the same manner as under the general mining laws for public domain
lands. As a result, if a mining company properly located its claim and
complied with all laws and regulations of the Interior Department, the
Secretary was forced to award the lease even in the face of tribal
opposition.83
The 1919 Act was closely followed by amendments to the 1891
leasing act in 1924 and 1927 providing for oil and gas leases on tribal
lands.84 The 1924 amendments applied to tribal lands within treaty
reservations, 85 and the 1927 amendments applied to tribal lands within
reservations created by executive order.86 Both amendments permit-
ted the Secretary of the Interior to lease tribal oil and gas resources
following competitive bidding, for a term of 10 years and "as much
longer as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities."'87 Both
amendments also retained the 1891 requirement of tribal consent to
leasing, ensuring at least some limited measure of tribal control over
oil and gas development. 88
Nonetheless, despite the nod to tribal consent, both acts under-
mined tribal control by expressly authorizing state taxation. As a gen-
eral principle, states may not tax Indians or Indian interests within
Indian country.89 Moreover, in the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, the federal courts invalidated state taxes on non-Indian lessees
on the grounds that the lessees were federal instrumentalities which
the states could not tax under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
82. 25 U.S.C. § 399 (1988).
83. Under the 1919 Act, neither the Department nor the tribes were "in a position to pre-
vent the acquisition of a lease after the lands have been declared open to prospecting and lease,
and the Indians at no time have any voice in the granting of such leases." S. REP. No. 985,75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938).
84. These leasing acts for unallotted lands applied as well to the mineral estate reserved for
the tribe underneath allotted lands. When the mineral estate beneath allotted lands is reserved
to the tribe, "it is tribal land." British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299
U.S. 159, 165 (1936).
85. 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1988). The Supreme Court held that the 1924 Act also applied to lands
set aside by agreement ratified by Congress. See British-American Oil, 299 U.S. at 164. The
unallotted lands of the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage in Oklahoma were expressly exempt.
25 U.S.C. § 398 (1988).
86. 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-398e (1988). See MCDONNELL, supra note 22, at 51-55 (describing the
legislative battle to open executive order lands to mining).
87. Id. §§ 398 and 398a.
88. Id.
89. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1867); The New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1867). See
also Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Indian Nation, 113 S.Ct. 1985, 1993 (1993).
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immunity.90 Accordingly, absent congressional consent, the states had
no authority in the 1920s to impose taxes on either the Indian or non-
Indian interests in mineral development.
The 1924 and 1927 amendments represented express congres-
sional consent to state taxation. Congress intended to bring taxation
of mineral production on Indian lands into line with taxation of min-
eral production on federal lands, by permitting the states to tax "the
entire output" of mineral production. 91 To that end, the amendments
authorized the states to tax oil and gas production on all tribal lands,
as well as the production of "other minerals" on tribal lands set aside
by treaty or agreement.92 Although the taxes were ostensibly im-
posed on the lessees, the taxes were to be paid from the tribes' share
of the proceeds. The 1924 amendment directed the Secretary of Inte-
rior to pay any assessed state taxes out of the tribe's royalty inter-
ests;93 the 1927 amendment provided that production taxes could be
levied against the tribe's bonuses, rents, and royalties, and directed
the Secretary to pay the state taxes out of the tribal funds in the fed-
eral Treasury. 94 The burden of the state taxes consequently fell upon
the tribal lessors regardless of the legal incidence of the tax. Although
both acts prohibited state taxes from becoming an encumbrance on
tribal lands,95 the taxes nonetheless diminished the economic benefits
of tribal mineral development.
None of these mineral leasing acts fully superseded any other.
Instead, as the allotment era drew to a close, mineral leasing on tribal
lands was governed by a hodge-podge of laws. Oil and gas leasing on
90. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922) (invalidating state tax on non-
Indian lessee's income from oil and gas leases on restricted Osage and Creek lands). By the
mid-1930s, however, the Supreme Court began to uphold state taxes on non-Indian lessees, and
ultimately expressly overruled Gillespie and other cases applying the federal instrumentality doc-
trine to lessees of Indian lands. See Helvering v. Mountain Prod. Corp., 303 U.S. 387 (1938)(overruling Gillespie); Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
91. "[T]he entire output of oil and gas will be taxed by the States, the producer upon his
share and the Indians upon the share obtained for them." H.R. REP. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1927). The Department of the Interior supported the taxation of lessees, and "offer[ed]
no objection" to state taxation of the tribes' interests. H.R. REP. No. 386, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1924); S. REP. No. 546, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924).
92. 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1988) (authorizing state taxation of "oil and gas and other minerals" on
lands subject to leasing under the 1891 Act: that is, tribal lands set aside by treaty or agreement);
id. § 398c (authorizing state taxation of oil and gas leases on executive order reservations). The
inability of states to tax mineral production other than oil and gas on executive order lands was
of limited importance, since most mineral leasing on those lands was for oil and gas.
93. Id. § 398.
94. Id. § 398c.
95. The amendments provided that state taxes "shall not become a lien or charge of any
kind against the land or other property" of the tribes. Id. §§ 398, 398c.
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all tribal lands fell under the 1924 and 1927 amendments. Leasing of
minerals other than oil and gas on all tribal lands in nine Western
states fell under the 1919 Act. And other leasing of tribal lands on
treaty reservations fell under the 1891 Act. No legal authority existed
for mineral leases other than oil and gas on executive order reserva-
tions outside the nine western states specified in the 1919 Act.96
Moreover, this multitude of leasing laws offered no uniformity.
Oil and gas leases and any remaining leases under the 1891 Act re-
quired tribal consent; other leases did not. All oil and gas leases, and
other mineral leases on tribal lands set aside by treaty or agreement,
were subject to state taxation; other leases were not. Leases under the
1891 Act were for a term of 10 years; oil and gas leases ran for 10
years and as long thereafter as oil and gas were produced in paying
quantities; and leases under the 1919 Act ran for 20 years, with op-
tions to renew for 10-year periods. The complexity of the leasing
laws, and the extremely limited role accorded the tribal mineral own-
ers, generated increasing dissatisfaction with the allotment-era ap-
proach to mineral development.
B. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
The allotment era - the political climate that spawned the welter
of mineral leasing acts - formally ended in 1934 with the passage of
the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).97 Federal policy, for more than
half a century directed toward assimilating Indians, now was oriented
toward the promotion of tribal self-government. To that end, the IRA
authorized tribes to organize constitutional governments and to ob-
tain charters of incorporation from the Secretary of the Interior.98
Tribes which organized IRA governments were vested with the power
to prevent any lease of tribal lands and assets without the consent of
the tribe.99 Tribes which received charters of incorporation were au-
thorized to manage and dispose of tribal property, although the IRA
96. See S. REP. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1872,75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 1 (1938).
97. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
98. Id. §§ 476 (government), 477 (charters of incorporation). Tribes in Oklahoma and
Alaska were exempted from the IRA, see id. § 473, although the provisions of the IRA were
subsequently extended to them in the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, see id. § 503, and
the Alaska Act of 1936, see id. § 473a.
99. The statute provided:
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the
following rights and powers: ... to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance
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limited leasing authority to a period not to exceed 10 years.100
The IRA provided that it would not apply to any reservation
where a majority of the adult Indians voted to reject the Act.1 1 While
the majority of tribes voted to accept the IRA,102 77 tribal govern-
ments rejected it.103 Among these were some of the largest mineral-
holding tribes, including the Navajo, the Crow, and the Shoshone and
Arapaho of the Wind River Reservation."°4 Having rejected the IRA,
these tribes were without its protection and authority for mineral
leasing.
In keeping with the philosophy behind the IRA, however, Con-
gress determined to expand the role of all tribal governments in min-
eral leasing, including those tribes which had not accepted the IRA.
At the same time, Congress proposed to correct the problems caused
by the profusion of allotment-era leasing laws. Accordingly, in 1938
Congress enacted the Indian Mineral Leasing Act. 0 5
C. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938
The 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act arose from the need to con-
solidate and simplify leasing provisions and to provide tribes with an
increased voice in the development of tribal mineral resources. To
those ends, Congress enacted the 1938 Act with three stated purposes:
to achieve uniformity in mineral leasing laws governing Indian lands;
to help achieve the goal of the IRA to revitalize Indian tribal govern-
ments; and to promote tribal economic development by ensuring the
greatest return on tribal minerals. 0 6
of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the
tribe....
25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
100. Id. § 477.
101. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 18, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (1934).
102. More than 180 of the eligible tribes voted in special elections to come under the provi-
sions of the IRA. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 150 n.48 (189 tribes voted to accept); 2
PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 964-65 (within two years after passage, 181 tribes voted to accept, and
14 more "came under the act because they did not hold elections to exclude themselves from its
operation"). Within 10 years of the IRA's enactment, 93 tribes had adopted IRA constitutions
and 73 were issued chartert of incorporation. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 968.
103. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 150, n.49; 1 PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 324.
104. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 18.
105. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1988); see also 25 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1993).
106. S. REP. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 1-3 (1938); see also Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (Crow 1).
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1. Uniformity of Laws
The first purpose of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act was to meld
the profusion of allotment era laws into one coordinated leasing sys-
tem. To achieve that goal, the Act established a single set of leasing
procedures applicable to all mineral development on all tribal lands.
All leases of tribal land would require tribal consent and the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior.10 7 All leases would issue for the same
term: a period not to exceed 10 years and "as long thereafter as miner-
als are produced in paying quantities."'1 8 Additionally, all leases
would be granted on the basis of competitive bidding and payment of
a bonus consideration, although if no satisfactory bid was received,
the Secretary of the Interior could authorize private negotiations.109
Nonetheless, the 1938 Act contained gaps and exceptions. First,
the Act excluded certain tribes and tribal lands from its coverage." 0
Second, the Act expressly preserved the right of IRA tribes to lease
lands for mining in accordance with their IRA charters or constitu-
tions."' Although this exception appears to have been little used by
IRA tribes,"' it nonetheless permits those tribes to supersede Interior
Department regulations for the mining of tribal lands." 3 Third, the
1938 Act did not repeal any of the allotment era leasing acts, although
107. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1988). This aspect of the 1938 Act is discussed infra at section II.B.2.
108. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1988); 25 C.F.R. § 211.10 (1993).
109. 25 U.S.C. § 396b (1988); 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (1993). Although the Act applies these pro-
visions only to oil and gas leases, the Department of the Interior has extended them by regula-
tion to all other mineral leases. Id. § 211.2.
110. The Act originally excluded the Papago, Crow, and Osage Reservations, the ceded
lands of the Shoshone [Wind River] Reservation, and the coal and asphalt lands of the
Oklahoma Choctaw and Chickasaw. 25 U.S.C. § 396f (1988). During the 1950s, Congress re-
scinded the exclusion of the Papago Reservation and provided for mineral leasing on Shoshone
and Crow lands in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act. Act of
May 27, 155, ch. 106, § 2, 69 Stat. 67 (Papago); Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-780, § 1, 72
Stat. 935 (Wind River); Act of Sept. 16, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-283, 73 Stat. 565 (Crow). Leasing
of the Osage mineral reserve is governed by 25 C.F.R. pt. 214 (minerals other than oil and gas)
and pt. 226 (oil and gas) (1993).
111. The Act expressly provided that it would "in no manner restrict" the leasing rights of
tribes organized or incorporated under the IRA. 25 U.S.C. § 396b (1988).
112. See Indian Mineral Development: Hearings on S. 1894 Before the Senate Select Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-63 (1982) (statement of Joe McKay, Member, Black-
feet Tribe of Montana) [hereafter Indian Mineral Development Hearings]; Russel L. Barsh &
James Youngblood Henderson, Tribal Administration of Natural Resource Development, 52 N.
DAK. L. Rv. 307, 311 (1975) (noting that "in practice [IRA] tribes are generally afforded only
the opportunity to veto Bureau [of Indian Affairs] leasing plans").
113. The implementing regulations for the 1938 Act specifically provide that any regulation
in 25 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1993) (leasing of tribal lands for mining) may be superseded by a tribal
constitution or charter issued pursuant to the IRA, the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, or the
Alaska Act, or by any tribal law authorized by such a constitution or charter. 25 C.F.R. § 211.29
(1993). But see Peter C. Maxfield, Tribal Control of Indian Mineral Development, 62 ORE. L.
RFv. 49, 60 (1983) (questioning the "significance" of this provision).
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it did contain a general repealer clause for inconsistent provisions. 114
Inconsistent practices thus continued for leases issued under the previ-
ous leasing acts, although any leases granted after passage of the 1938
Act would be governed by its provisions.115
Finally, the 1938 Act did not generally include leases of allotted
lands." 6 Many of its provisions, however, have been made applicable
to allotment leases through the Interior Department's regulations. 117
For example, while the 1909 Act permits leases "for any term ofyears" deemed advisable by the Secretary of the Interior,"" regula-
tions restrict allotment leases to the same terms as tribal land leases:
ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying
quantities. 119 Provisions for competitive bidding, privately negotiated
leases, and payment of rents and royalties are all similar to those for
leases of tribal lands. 20 Like the 1909 Act, however, the regulations
do not call for tribal consent or even consultation prior to issuance of
a mineral lease for allotted lands.
Despite the multiple exceptions and exclusions, however, the
1938 Act did introduce considerable uniformity into the leasing pro-
cess. The confusion of the allotment-era leasing laws was replaced by
predictable and consistent procedures, allowing both Congress and
the tribes to focus their attention on issues of tribal self-government
and economic development.
2. Tribal Self-Government
The second purpose of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act was to
help achieve the IRA goal of revitalizing tribal self-government. To
that end, the Act promoted self-government by requiring tribal con-
sent to any mineral lease of tribal lands.' 2' Leasing authority was
placed with the tribal council, subject to the approval of the Secretary
114. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985).
115. See id. at 767-68. See also United States v. 9,345.53 Acres of Land, 256 F. Supp. 603,
605, 607-08 (W.D.N.Y. 1966) (post-1938 leases that do not comply with the 1938 Act are void).
116. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1988). Certain provisions of the 1938 Act, such as the requirement
that lessees post surety bonds and the ability of the Secretary to designate lease approval author-
ity, were also expressly applicable to leases of allotted lands. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396c, 396e (1988).
117. 25 C.F.R. pt. 212 (1993).
118. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1988).
119. 25 C.F.R. § 212.12 (1993) (referencing § 211.10).
120. Id. §§ 212.4-212.6, 212.14-212.18.
121. As noted previously, universal tribal consent also promoted the 1938 Act purpose of
uniformity of leasing laws.
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of the Interior.'22 Tribal consent was also required before the Secre-
tary could authorize a mineral lease by private negotiations rather
than competitive bidding.'" Moreover, mineral lessees were required
to allow the tribes, as well as the Department of the Interior, access to
leased premises for purposes of inspection. 24
Despite these statutory provisions, tribal self-government in min-
eral leasing remained a limited concept. First, the Department of the
Interior developed a standard lease form with standardized clauses
and terms. Although tribes could incorporate other requirements into
a lease through stipulations, all leases were at least based on one stan-
dard form."z Moreover, tribal consent is generally required only for
the initial decision to lease tribal lands for mineral development.
Once a tribe has consented to lease its mineral resources, its ability to
control the mining process is limited.'26 For example, the Secretary of
Interior is not required to obtain tribal consent to the specific tracts
put up for bid, so long as the tribe has previously authorized bids on
an area which includes those tracts. 27 Similarly, tribal consent may
not be necessary before an oil and gas communitization agreement is
approved by the Secretary, despite express language in the regulations
requiring tribal consent."2
Communitization agreements may have the effect of extending
122. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1988); 25 C.F.R. § 211.2 (1993). As noted, the Act also expressly
permitted IRA tribes to continue mineral leasing under the authority of their IRA charters or
constitutions. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
While secretarial approval may protect tribal interests, see infra section II.B.3.b, it also un-
dercuts tribal self-government by placing ultimate authority with the federal government rather
than the lessor tribe. See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 112, at 319 ("The veto power of the
Bureau [of Indian Affairs] merely gives tribes an opportunity to make for themselves those
decisions the agency considers correct."). Compare Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of
Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77, 128-29
(1993) (arguing that while most requirements of secretarial approval should be eliminated "as
part of the decolonization of federal Indian law," the restraint on alienation of land and federal
approval of substantial interests in land, such as "long term mineral leases which would interfere
with other surface uses, such as leases facilitating strip mining" should be retained).
123. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3(b) (1993).
124. Id. § 211.18.
125. See Charles J. Lipton, The Pros and Cons of Petroleum Agreements, 6 AMER. INDIAN J.
2, 6 (1980); Quentin M. Jones, Note, Mineral Resources: Tribal Development of Reservation Oil
and Gas Resources Through the Use of a Nontaxation-Based Tribal Joint Development Program,
9 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 161, 161-62 (1981).
126. NRG Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 51, 56 (1991).
127. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 n.4 (1982) (asserting that the
regulations requiring tribal consent for leasing "cannot be stretched to support such a
proposition").
128. 25 C.F.R. § 211.21(b) (1993) provides that oil and gas leases are subject to communitiza-
tion agreements, with the "prior approval of the Secretary of the Interior and consent of the
Indian tribe affected."
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leases of oil and gas lands. Under an agreement, oil and gas lands are
organized into unit areas, 129 and the agreement provides that drilling
anywhere within the unit area constitutes drilling on each lease within
that area and that production anywhere within the unit area consti-
tutes production from each tract.130 Accordingly, production within a
unit area, even if it is not occurring on tribal lands, may be sufficient
to extend the lease of tribal lands beyond the initial 10 year term.131
Despite that potential effect, leases issued under the 1938 Act often
contained a clause that the parties agreed to abide by any communi-
tization agreement adopted by a majority operating interest in the
unit area and approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 32  That lease
clause may operate to override Interior's regulations calling for tribal
consent to each communitization agreement.133
Attempts by the Secretary of Interior to expand tribal consent
powers during the mining process have met with little success. In the
late 1970s, the Department refused to approve a mining plan submit-
ted by United Nuclear Corporation absent tribal approval. 34 The
mining plan is the third stage that requires secretarial approval in the
129. These unit areas may include tribal lands, allotted lands, or fee lands, or any combina-
tion, depending upon the location of the mineral resources.
130. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States, 966 F.2d 583, 585 (10th Cir.
1992), cert denied sub nom., Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 113 S.Ct.
1642 (1993); Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 384 (10th Cir. 1982).
131. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 585. In addition, the leases at issue in this case
included a commence drilling clause, which extended the lease if drilling was commenced during
the initial 10 year lease term. Id. The effect is exacerbated by the provision that a communitiza-
tion agreement is timely submitted if it is submitted before the expiration of the primary 10-year
term, even if only four days before. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 870 F.2d
1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1989). Once approved by the Secretary, the agreement is effective as of the
date it was submitted for approval. Id. at 1523.
132. See Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 585; Cotton Petroleum, 870 F.2d at 1516.
133. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 586. The district court found that the lease provi-
sion "constituted a blanket consent to future communitization agreements" and therefore held
that a lack of tribal consent to the specific agreement did not invalidate it once the Secretary had
approved it. Id. The circuits disagree as to whether secretarial approval of lease terms inconsis-
tent with Interior Department regulations suspends or supersedes the regulations. Compare
Hallam v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 49 F.2d 103, 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
643 (1931); Whitebird v. Eagle-Picher Co., 258 F. Supp. 308, 311 (N.D. Okla. 1966) (inconsistent
regulations superseded) with Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Watt, 707 F.2d 1072, 1076 n.5 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983) (stating that "an agency normally is bound by its own
regulations"). On appeal in the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes case, the Tenth Circuit did not reach
the issue of tribal consent. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 587.
The proposed new regulations for 1938 Act leases provide that "[t]he consent of the Indian
mineral owner to such unit or communitization agreement shall not be required unless such
consent is specifically required in the lease." 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734, 58,741 (1991) (to be codified at
25 C.F.R. § 211.28(b)).
134. United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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surface mining process: first, once a tribe consents to leasing, the Sec-
retary must approve the lease; second, the company prepares an ex-
ploration plan which must be approved before exploration begins; and
third, the company must subsequently prepare a mining plan which
must be approved before operations begin. 35
United Nuclear received a uranium lease of Navajo lands in 1971.
Over the next six years, pursuant to an approved lease and explora-
tion plan, it paid approximately $300,000 to the Navajo Nation in bo-
nus, rents, and minimum royalties, spent over $5 million in
exploration and related costs, and discovered more than 20 million
pounds of uranium with a potential for an additional 20 million
pounds on unexplored portions of the lease. 36 It then submitted a
mining plan that satisfied all the regulatory requirements of the Inte-
rior Department. Nonetheless, Interior refused to approve the mining
plan without the consent of the tribe, and the Navajo Nation refused
to consent to the plan.137 In 1981, the lease expired due to United
Nuclear's failure to begin mining within the initial 10 year term.138
United Nuclear brought suit claiming that the Secretary's refusal
to approve its mining plan was an uncompensated taking in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that tri-
bal approval of mining plans had not been adopted as an Interior De-
partment regulation,' 39 and held that the tribal approval requirement
caused a substantial economic impact on the company, was not a fu-
ture regulation that United Nuclear could reasonably have antici-
pated, and was contrary to the concept of tribal self-government. 4 °
In a passage that echoed disturbingly of the long-discredited allotment
era, the court spoke of the assimilationist goal of "mak[ing] the Indi-
ans more responsible citizens".' 4' To that end, the court believed, tri-
bal self-government would be furthered by forcing the tribe "to live
135. Id. See 25 C.F.R. § 216.6 (1993) (approval of exploration plan) and § 216.7 (approval of
mining plan).
136. United Nuclear, 912 F.2d at 1434.
137. Id. at 1434-35.
138. Id. at 1435. Many leases for minerals other than oil and gas have a clause similar to the
commence drilling clause, see supra note 131, which extends the initial 10 year term if mining
operations have commenced during that time. Apparently the United Nuclear lease contained
this clause.
139. The regulations have not been subsequently amended to require tribal consent, and
there is no indication in the proposed new rules for 1938 Act leases that tribal consent will be
required at the various stages of the mining process. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734, 58,737-44 (1991).
140. United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432, 1435-37 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
141. The court stated:
It is difficult to understand, however, how encouraging the Indians not to live up to
their contractual obligations, which they entered into freely and with the Secretary's
1994]
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up to [its] contractual commitments"142 rather than permitting the
tribe to reassess the value and the impact of the proposed mining at
each stage of the mining process. Accordingly, the court held that
Interior's refusal to approve the mining plan without tribal approval
constituted a taking of United Nuclear's leasehold interest in the
minerals.143
In addition to the limitations on tribal consent, a tribe's ability to
cancel or rescind a lease is also restricted. While a tribe has standing
to sue a lessee for damages for breach of contract, 44 a tribe has no
authority to unilaterally cancel a lease for breach of the lease terms. 45
Instead, the authority to terminate a lease rests with the Secretary of
the Interior 46 or with the courts,147 although in neither case is cancel-
lation a mandatory remedy for breach.
The Secretary is empowered to cancel a lease, upon notice to the
lessee, when the Secretary determines that the lessee has violated any
term or condition of the lease or of the Department's regulations. 48
The Secretary may also cancel a lease which was entered into in er-
ror. 49 Nothing in the regulations, however, requires the Secretary to
order cancellation. While the Secretary has the right to cancel for
breach, other remedies, such as damages, may be ordered instead. 50
approval, could be said to encourage self-determination. To the contrary, one would
think that the best way to make the Indians more responsible citizens would be to
require them to live up to their contractual commitments.
Id. at 1437.
Mineral development on tribal lands is not designdd "to make the Indians more responsible
citizens" - a classic justification of the assimilation era. Instead, mineral development policy is
oriented today toward promoting tribal control and economic development.
142. Id. at 1437. While United Nuclear may have been entitled to damages based on its
reliance interest in the lease, compelling the tribe to accept the uranium mining is inconsistent
with both tribal sovereignty and the trend of federal policy towards tribal control of mineral
development. By reducing "self-determination" to nothing more than the landowner's right to
refuse to lease in the first instance, the court demonstrated a profound misunderstanding of the
sovereign status of tribes.
143. Id. at 1438.
144. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 376 (1968). A tribe can also, in appropriate
circumstances, sue the Secretary for breach of trust. See infra section II.B.3.b.
145. Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Watt, 707 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1017 (1983) (commercial lease).
146. 25 C.F.R. § 211.27(a) (1993).
147. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982).
148. 25 C.F.R. § 211.27(a) (1993). If the lessee requests a hearing within 30 days of receiving
notice, the hearing must be held prior to a cancellation order. Id.
149. Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533,537 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968) (agricul-
tural lease) ("[T]he execution of the lease was an administrative error which the Secretary can
correct by cancellation of the lease.").
150. The high court has stated:
[T]here is no justification for concluding that the severe sanction of cancellation of the
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Similarly, while a tribe may maintain an action against the lessee for
breach, cancellation is not automatic, but an equitable remedy which
the court may order in its discretion. 151 Where the lessees have spent
a number of years and substantial amounts of money in exploration
and development activities, courts are within their discretion to refuse
to order cancellation of the lease.' 52 Damages or an adjustment of
bonuses, rents or royalties may be the judicially preferred remedy.153
The 1938 Act thus accorded tribes a limited, but crucial, ability to
exercise their powers of self-government. Tribes had no say in the
mining process once they authorized the leasing of their lands, and no
right to certain cancellation if the lessee breached the terms and con-
ditions. However, they did have the key right to consent before leas-
ing could occur. As a consequence, although the 1938 Act kept tribes
largely in the position of passive lessors, the tribal consent provisions
were of great "tangible and symbolic importance". 4
3. Economic Development
The third goal of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act was to ensure
that tribes received "the greatest return from their property.' 55 The
federal policy of reorganization and tribal self-government ushered in
by the IRA in 1934 "rested on a foundation of economic well-being
for the Indians."' 56 In keeping with that general policy of promoting
tribal economic development, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act pro-
vided for the enhancement and protection of tribal revenue generated
by the mineral estate. First, the Interior Department established a
lease is the only relief for all breaches of the lease term or for any failure to pay royal-
ties. Both the lessor and the lessee may wish to resolve their disagreement by the
payment of damages and not by the cancellation of a basically satisfactory lease.
Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 374 (1968).
Under the proposed new regulations, the Secretary, upon a determination that the lessee is
in breach of the lease, federal regulations, or other laws, may issue either a notice of proposed
cancellation or a notice of noncompliance specifying the actions that must be taken to achieve
compliance. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734, 58,743 (1991) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 211.54(a)). The
regulations provide, however, that "[tihis section does not limit any other remedies of the Indian
mineral owner as set forth in the lease or permit." Id. § 211.54(g) (proposed). In addition, the
proposed new regulations provide for civil penalties, not to exceed $1,000 per day per violation,
for violations of lease terms or federal regulations or for failure to comply with a notice of
noncompliance or a cancellation order. Id. § 211.56 (proposed).
151. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 698 F.2d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 1982).
152. Id
153. Id at 1334.
154. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 53.
155. S. REP. No. 985,75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1872,75th Cong., 3d Sess.
2 (1938).
156. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 985.
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system of bonuses, rents, and royalties to ensure an income stream.
Second, courts interpreted the Act to include an enforceable trust re-
sponsibility to the tribes; the Act and its regulations required the Inte-
rior Department to act in the best interests of the tribes in approving
and administering leases of Indian lands. And third, the Act did not
include an express authorization for state taxation of mineral
production.
a. Income Guarantees
The primary means to ensure tribal returns from the mineral es-
tate was to ensure tribal income. The 1938 Act required all lessees to
post a surety bond guaranteeing compliance with the terms of their
leases,'57 and the implementing regulations established a system of
bonuses, rents, and royalties. All mineral leases awarded through
competitive bidding were "offered to the highest responsible bidder
for a bonus consideration, in addition to stipulated rentals and royal-
ties."' 8 Rents and royalties were uniform, with rates specified by reg-
ulation. 5 9  The three types of payments were intended as a
comprehensive income scheme: 60 the bonus bids were intended to be
consistent with market forces, regardless of whether Interior or the
tribes knew the full value of the minerals. In addition to the bonus,
tribes received specified rents whether minerals were produced or not.
And if minerals were found, the tribes were paid royalties on the
production.
Despite the intent to provide the "greatest return" on tribal min-
erals, however, the system in fact provided "only minimal levels of
income.' 161 Most of the problems arose in implementation. Bonus
bids were often not consistent with market forces, due largely to inad-
equate advertising, minimal geological information, and poor selec-
tion of those tracts offered for bids. 62 Rents and royalties were also
157. 25 U.S.C. § 396c (1988); 25 C.F.R. § 211.6 (1993).
158. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3(a) (1993) (sale of oil and gas leases), § 211.2 (providing that leases of
other minerals be advertised in accordance with § 211.3 unless Interior grants written permission
to the tribe to bypass the competitive bidding process).
159. Id. §§ 211.13-211.15.
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set lower than warranted by the market,163 and advance rent pay-
ments could be deducted from the royalties due.164
In addition, royalty mismanagement, inadequate accounting prac-
tices, and mineral theft reduced the already low royalty payments to
tribes. 165 Reports of problems began to surface in the 1950S, 166 but
the royalty issue did not receive national attention until the early
1980s. In 1982, the Linowes Commission, appointed by the Secretary
of the Interior, identified a number of specific problems leading to
severe royalty losses: 167 "serious inadequacies" in royalty manage-
ment collection practices, resulting in underpayment of as much as 10
percent;168 theft and fraud;169 and a lack of enforcement capabili-
ties. 70 Of particular importance were errors in reporting both quan-
tity and quality of mineral production, difficulty in determining the
fair market value of the minerals, and theft and fraud.171 The federal
government had operated royalty collection and management on an
industry "honor system,"' 72 and that system had failed. 73 Thus, de-
spite the intent to create a system supporting economic growth for
Indian tribes, implementation of that system left tribes with signifi-
cantly less than "the greatest return" on their mineral resources.
163. Id.
164. 25 C.F.R. § 211.12(b) (1993). The economic impact on the tribe was alleviated some-
what by provisions that no refund is owed the lessee if the rents exceed the royalties due or if the
lease is cancelled or surrendered. Id.
165. Russell Davis, et al., Oil and Gas Royalty Recovery Policy on Federal and Indian Lands,
23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 391, 393-94 (1983). On royalty issues generally, see AMBLER, supra note
4, at 118-44.
166. In 1951, the Navajo Tribal Council requested an investigation of whether proper ura-
nium royalties were being paid. In 1959, the U.S. General Accounting Office reported serious
problems in accounting for federal and Indian oil. Id. at 120-21. Other GAO reports critical of
federal royalty management were issued in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. See Barbara N.
McLennan, Federal Policy with Respect to Collection of Royalties from Oil and Gas Leases on
Federal and Indian Lands, 31 OIL & GAS TAx Q. 87, 92 n.12 (1982).
167. FISCAL AccOuNTABILITY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION 13-39 (1982) [hereafter LiNowEs COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission was
popularly named for its chair, David E. Linowes.
168. Id. at 13, 16.
169. Id. at 26-33.
170. Id. at 33-38. "It is remarkable that USGS [Geological Survey] royalty collection func-
tions at all, considering that there are virtually no teeth to the system." Id. at 37.
171. Davis, supra note 165, at 396-400.
172. LINOWES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 15.
173. See AMBLER, supra note 4, at 129 (the U.S. Geological Survey, the agency responsible
for mineral management, "did not verify data, did not know which companies had paid, rarely
conducted audits, and did not impose penalties for nonpayment or underpayments.")
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b. Trust Relationship
To some extent, the federal government's responsibility to ade-
quately monitor and protect tribal mineral income was enforceable
through actions for breach of trust. The federal trust obligation to the
Indian tribes arises from the legal status of tribes in American juris-
prudence. Tribes possess the unique status of "domestic dependent
nations" whose relationship with the federal government "resembles"
that of wards to their guardian. 174 One critical aspect of that trust
relationship is the trust status of tribal lands and resources. 175 An-
other, equally crucial aspect is the requirement that, in administering
the federal statutes and regulations governing mineral leasing, the
Secretary of the Interior act in the best interests of the tribes. While
that obligation traces back at least to the 1919 leasing act,176 a pair of
Supreme Court cases in the early 1980s gave new importance to the
federal trust responsibility.
As recently as 1975, it was "premature" to say that tribes pos-
sessed a definitive right to sue the government for breach of trust.177
But in United States v. Mitchell I in 1983, the Supreme Court recog-
nized a tribal cause of action against the federal government for dam-
ages for breach of trust for federal mismanagement of timber
resources. 17  In United States v. Mitchell I in 1980, the Court refused
to allow a breach of trust action based on the General Allotment Act,
holding that the GAA created only a "limited trust -relationship. ' 179
Because the GAA did not place full management responsibility for
allotted lands with the United States, the Court ruled, the GAA did
not impose any duty on the federal government to properly manage
174. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16, 17 (1831). Whether this guardian/
ward analogy is the cause or the result of the trust relationship has never been clear.
[T]he exact source of this special relationship remains uncertain. Ownership of Indian
land, the helplessness of Indian tribes in the face of a superior culture, higher law, and
the entire course of dealings between the government and Indian tribes, treaties, and
'hundreds of cases and... a bulging volume of the U.S. Code' have all been cited as the
source.
Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH.
U.L. REV. 635, 637-38 (1982). See also Ball, supra note 18, at 63 ("The likely origin of the trust
doctrine is not Marshall's notion of wardship but the later ethnocentrism that also produced the
notion of superiority and unrestrained plenary power.").
175. This aspect of the trust relationship is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 17-19.
176. See supra text accompanying note 82.
177. Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,
27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1247 (1975).
178. United States v. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
179. United States v. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
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Indian resources.'8 0 But the federal statutory and regulatory scheme
for timber management, by contrast, did place comprehensive, liter-
ally day-to-day management responsibility with the Interior Depart-
ment.""' Where statutes and regulations give full responsibility for
management of Indian resources to the federal government, the Court
held in Mitchell HI, those statutes and regulations create and define
enforceable fiduciary obligations.'82 If the government breaches
those obligations, it can be sued by the beneficiary tribe for breach of
trust.'8 3
In 1986, an en banc Tenth Circuit held that the 1938 Indian Min-
eral Leasing Act and its implementing regulations, like the timber
management statutes and regulations at issue in Mitchell II, created
enforceable trust responsibilities."s The federal government's role in
mineral leasing, like its role in timber management, "is pervasive and
its responsibilities comprehensive."'81 5 The Secretary is charged with
ensuring tribes the maximum benefits from their mineral resources
and must act at all times in the best interests of the tribes.'8 6 In partic-
ular, the Secretary "is responsible for overseeing the economic inter-
ests of Indian lessors, and has a duty to maximize lease revenues."' 8 7
The Secretary's fiduciary duties to the tribes extend to approval of
leases, monitoring of lessees' compliance with lease terms and federal
regulations, determination of the method of royalty calculations, and
approval of communitization agreements for oil and gas.
180. Id.
181. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 222.
182. Id. at 224. The theory of an enforceable trust obligation is, of course, "tautological: the
United States controls tribal resources because of a claimed trust obligation, and the United
States has this trust obligation because it controls tribal resources." Ball, supra note 18, at 64.
183. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226. Nonetheless, "Indian tribes have been remarkably unsuc-
cessful in breach of trust claims in the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit," the courts with
trial and appellate jurisdiction over money damages claims. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims
in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U.L. REv. 753,789 (1992). Tribes prevailed in only two
of 20 cases filed in the 1980s, and the claimants in the Mitchell cases have yet to recover. Id. at
789-91. On post-Mitchell II claims for money damages for breach of trust, see id. at 789-817.
184. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855, 857 (10th Cir. 1986),
adopting as modified the dissent in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d
1555, 1563-69 (10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., dissenting). The 1986 modification of Judge Sey-
mour's dissent does not affect her discussion or conclusions on the trust issue. Other federal
courts have subsequently agreed. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Bd. of Oil and Gas Conserva-
tion, 792 F.2d 782, 794 (9th Cir. 1986); Youngbull v. United States, No. 31-88 L, 1990 U.S. Cl. Ct.
LEXIS 3, at *19-*23 (Jan. 4, 1990). See also Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 191 (Fed.
Cir.), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1987) (agreeing with Supron in the context of the 1909 allot-
ment leasing act); Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 565,576-77 (1990).
185. Supron, 728 F.2d at 1564.
186. Id. at 1565. See also Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 386 (10th
Cir. 1982).
187. Kenai Oil & Gas, 671 F.2d at 386.
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The 1938 Act and the implementing regulations require the Sec-
retary to approve all mineral leases, and to reject all bids for mineral
development of Indian lands if rejection is in the interest of the
tribe.'88 Taken together, these mandates create a fiduciary "obliga-
tion to approve or reject leases according to the best interests of the
Indians."'89 As a part of this obligation, the Secretary has a duty to
approve or disapprove leases within a reasonable time in order to
avoid "the economic hardship occasioned by unreasonable delays." 190
The Secretary is also obligated, once a lease is approved, to moni-
tor the lessees' performance in order to protect the tribe's mineral
estate and its economic potential. The duty to monitor includes over-
sight of activities mandated by the lease terms and federal regulations,
such as diligent development of the mineral resource and protection
of the land from drainage.' 91 Even when the lessee has in fact com-
plied with the terms of the lease and the regulations, the Secretary's
failure to adequately monitor the lessee to ensure compliance consti-
tutes a breach of trust. 9
The Secretary similarly has a trust duty to safeguard tribal returns
from mineral leasing by choosing a royalty accounting method that
best protects the tribe's interests. 93 Where the Secretary has a choice
between two or more reasonable alternative methods of determining
royalties, the trust relationship requires the Secretary to choose the
method that results in the greatest return for the tribes.1 94
188. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396b (1988); 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.3(a), 211.10 (1993).
189. Youngbull v. U.S. No. 31-88L, 1990 U.S. CI. Ct. LEXIS at *27. The proposed new
regulations for the 1938 Act define "in the best interest of the Indian mineral owner" as refer-
ring to the standards to be applied to administrative actions affecting mineral leasing.
In considering whether it is "in the best interest of the Indian mineral owner" to take a
certain action (such as approval of a lease, permit, unitization or communitization
agreement), the Bureau may consider any relevant factor, including, but not limited to,
economic considerations such as the date of the lease expiration, probable financial
effect on the Indian owner, leasability of land concerned, need for change in the terms
of the existing lease, marketability and potential environmental, social, and cultural
effects.
56 Fed. Reg. 58,734, 58,738 (1991) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 211.3).
190. Youngbull, 1990 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS at *27-*28.
191. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron, 728 F.2d 1555, 1569 (10th Cir. 1980). The federal
regulations requiring diligence and prevention of waste are found at 25 C.F.R. § 211.19 (1993).
192. Supron, 728 F.2d at 1569. This type of breach would be unlikely to give rise to a claim
for damages, and consequently would not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims. But a tribe may seek declaratory and equitable relief for breach of trust in the federal
district courts. See id. at 1565 n.3; Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct.
565, 576 n.7 (1990). See also Newton, supra note 183, at 774-75.
193. Supron, 728 F.2d at 1567.
194. Id. at 1567, 1569.
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Finally, the Secretary has additional fiduciary obligations with re-
spect to oil and gas leasing. The Secretary is required to undertake an
independent review of applications regarding the spacing and location
of oil and gas wells, and may not delegate that authority to the
states.195 Moreover, the Secretary must act in the tribe's best interest
in determining whether to approve an oil and gas communitization
agreement, 196 a duty which takes on added importance if tribal con-
sent to individual agreements is not required.' 97 In deciding whether
to approve a communitization agreement, the Secretary is charged
with considering all factors relevant to the tribe's best interests: con-
servation of the resources, production issues, engineering and geologi-
cal aspects, and the short- and long-term economic effects on the
tribe.198 Both a failure to consider the tribe's economic interests, 199
and consideration only of economic factors,2' violate the trust re-
sponsibilities imposed by the 1938 Act and its regulations.
The fiduciary duties of the Secretary, and the creation of a judi-
cial action to enforce those duties or to recover damages for their
breach, offer increased protection for tribal mineral resources and
greater opportunities to ensure that tribes receive "the greatest re-
turn" from those resources. Nonetheless, the breach of trust action is
a fairly recent approach, and the appropriate judicial standards, par-
ticularly in actions for money damages in the Court of Federal Claims,
are far from certain.20 '
195. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Bd. of Oil and Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782,794-95
(9th Cir. 1986). Some limited subdelegation to the state - for example, fact-gathering functions
- may be permissible if it would be in the tribe's best interest. Id. at 796-97.
196. Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982); Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States, 966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom., Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 113 S.Ct. 1642 (1993). Communi-
tization agreements are discussed supra at text accompanying notes 130-132.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 132-133.
198. Kenai Oil & Gas, 671 F.2d at 386-87; Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior,
870 F.2d 1515, 1525-26 (10th Cir. 1989); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 589.
199. Kenai Oil & Gas, 671 F.2d at 387; Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 589-90.
200. Cotton Petroleum, 870 F.2d at 1526-28; see also Woods Petroleum Corp. v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 18 F.3d 854 (10th Cir. 1994). The court in Cotton Petroleum held that the
Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously in disapproving a communitization agreement which
was fair and proper and under which the Indian lessors would receive the "economic benefits...
for which they had bargained." Cotton Petroleum, 870 F.2d at 1528. The court also ruled that if
the Indian lessor agreed in a lease to be bound by any approved communitization agreement,
and if the Secretary approved that lease as in the best interests of the Indians, then the Secretary
could not disapprove an agreement for the "sole purpose of causing the underlying lease-which
the Secretary had previously approved-to expire." Id. at 1528-29 (emphasis in original). In the
1992 Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes case, however, the court stated that its refusal to defer to the
Secretary in Cotton Petroleum was based on the Secretary's consideration of "only economic
factors, rather than all relevant factors." Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 591 n.14.
201. See Newton, supra note 183, at 810-15.
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c. State Taxation
Unlike the 1924 and 1927 leasing amendments, the 1938 Act did
not contain an express authorization for states to tax mineral produc-
tion on Indian lands. Despite this lack of express authority, state taxa-
tion of mineral leases continued as a matter of course for some 40
years.2 2 In 1977, the Interior Department Solicitor belatedly deter-
mined that states were not authorized by the 1938 Act to tax mineral
leases,1°3 and that opinion set in motion a challenge to state taxation
that culminated in the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians.2"
The Blackfeet Tribe challenged the application of four state oil
and gas taxes to production on tribal lands under a 1938 Act lease.20 5
In accordance with the provisions of the 1924 leasing amendments,
these taxes were paid by the lessees and then deducted from the roy-
alty payments to the tribe.20°  As a result, the Court treated the case as
one involving state taxation of Indians rather than state taxation of
the non-Indian lessees.2 7 The distinction was crucial, since state taxa-
tion of Indians must pass a far stricter analysis than state taxation of
non-Indians. °s
The Court thus began its analysis with the long-established prop-
osition that absent an "unmistakably clear" intent of Congress, states
may not tax Indian interests inside Indian country.209 The Court
202. Peter F. Carroll, Note, Drumming Out the Intent of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of
1938, 7 PUB. LAND L. REv. 135, 138-40 (1986).
203. 84 Int. Dec. 905 (1977). The decision overruled or superseded five prior Solicitor's
opinions, issued between 1943 and 1966, finding in favor of state taxation under the 1938 Act.
Those decisions had primarily issued during the termination era of federal Indian policy, when
the government had again turned to a drive to assimilate the Indians and terminate the tribes.
By the time of the 1977 opinion, federal policy had shifted back to encouragement and promo-
tion of tribal self-government. See infra text accompanying notes 261-266.
204. 471 U.S. 759 (1985). For more detailed looks at the Montana case, see Carroll, supra
note 202; Linda P. Reppert, State Taxation of Indian Oil and Gas Leases: Montana v. Blackfeet
Tribe of Indians, 40 TAX LAw. 459 (1987).
205. These taxes were the oil and gas severance, net proceeds, and conservation taxes and
the resource indemnity trust tax. Montana, 471 U.S. at 761 n.1.
206. Id. at 761. The taxing provisions of the 1924 amendments are discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 91-95.
207. Montana, 471 U.S. at 761.
208. Compare the discussions infra of Montana (state taxation of Indian royalties under 1938
Act lease), text accompanying notes 209-215, and Cotton Petroleum (state taxation of non-Indian
lessees' interests under 1938 Act lease), text accompanying notes 226-254.
209. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1985); see also McClana-
han v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). The doctrine was recognized at least as
early as 1867. See cases cited supra at note 90. As noted earlier, the taxing provisions of the
1924 and 1927 amendments represented an instance of unmistakably clear congressional intent
to permit state taxation of Indian interests.
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found nothing in the 1938 Act or its legislative history to suggest that
Congress intended to authorize state taxation of mineral production
on Indian lands.210 Moreover, the Court rejected the notion that the
1938 Act implicitly incorporated the 1924 authorization to tax.21' On
the contrary, the Court noted that state taxation of Indian royalties
would undermine the purposes of the 1938 Act.21 2 Thus, interpreting
the 1938 Act in favor of the tribes,21 3 the Court found no clear con-
gressional authorization for states to tax mineral production under
leases issued pursuant to the Act.21 4 Absent that authorization, the
Court held, the states could not tax Indians or Indian tribes on the
mineral production from Indian lands.315
But the Montana decision affected only the authority of the states
to tax Indian tribes and Indian interests; it did not address the issue of
state taxation of the non-Indian mineral lessees. Yet state taxation of
lessees can have significant negative impacts on tribal economic devel-
opment. First, mineral production is the economy for many tribes,21 6
and the existence of a state tax burden necessarily impacts non-Indian
corporate decisions concerning development on Indian lands.217 Af-
ter the Court's decision in Montana, lessees could no longer automati-
cally deduct state taxes from royalty payments to the tribes, since the
Court viewed that as a direct state tax on the tribal interest. Instead,
the burden of state production taxes now fell directly on the lessee,
adding a cost of doing business that had not previously existed.
210. Montana, 471 U.S. at 766.
211. Id. at 767.
212. Id. at 767 n-5.
213. The Court applied the canons of construction developed by the federal courts for the
interpretation of Indian treaties, and subsequently applied to legislation enacted for the benefit
of the tribes. The canons are detailed supra at note 27.
214. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 767 (1985).
215. Id. at 768. Indian tribes also do not pay federal tax on mineral income because the IRS
has ruled that an Indian tribe is not a taxable entity. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55. In
addition, tribes are expressly exempt from certain other federal taxes that may affect mineral
development, such as the manufacturer's excise tax. Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act
of 1982, 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (1988).
Under limited circumstances, individual Indians are exempt from federal income tax as well.
The exemption is available only to allottees whose income is derived directly from trust allot-
ments. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956). Thus, allottees' income from bonuses, rents, and
royalties from mineral development on the allottees' own land is not taxable. Big Eagle v.
United States, 300 F.2d 765 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (royalty income); United States v. Daney, 370 F.2d 791
(10th Cir. 1966) (oil and gas lease bonus).
216. For the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, for example, oil and gas royalties account for 90% of
tribal income. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,209 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
217. See white Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 149 (1980) (noting that
state taxes would "diminish[ ] the profitability of the enterprise for potential contractors").
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Moreover, tribal taxes on non-Indian lessees represent a major
source of tribal revenues for mineral-owning tribes.218 To the extent
that lessees are subject to dual taxation by both the state and the
tribe,219 tribes have two choices, both economically disadvantageous.
One option for the tribes is to reduce or eliminate tribal taxation in
order to make mineral leasing competitive with off-reservation devel-
opment. However, that not only reduces or eliminates a critical
source of revenue, but creates a negative impact on tax-funded serv-
ices within the tribe's territory.220 Tax revenues collected by the state
go into state coffers and may or may not be returned as services to
Indian country.22' Second, tribes can continue to tax, making tribal
leases less attractive than off-reservation leases with a lower tax bur-
den, thus reducing the marketability of the tribe's more expensive
minerals. 2 In either case, state taxation of the lessees carries at least
the potential to disrupt tribal economic development.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, non-Indian
lessees were protected from state taxation by the federal instrumental-
ity doctrine.21 Congress overrode that protection in the leasing
amendments of 1924 and 1927, expressly authorizing state taxation of
mineral production. That permission to tax, however, did not extend
to leases issued under the 1938 Act.224 But in the intervening decades,
non-Indian lessees had also lost the benefit of the federal instrumen-
tality doctrine. In a series of cases in the 1930s and 1940s, the
218. Tribal taxation of mineral production is discussed infra at section IV.A.
219. See the discussion of Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, infra at text accompanying
notes 226-254.
.220. One court stated:
By taking revenue that would otherwise go towards supporting the Tribe and its pro-
grams, and by limiting the Tribe's ability to regulate the development of its coal re-
sources, the state-tax threatens Congress' overriding objective of encouraging tribal
self-government and economic development.
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 484 U.S. 997
(1988) (Crow 1)
221. While states must provide services to justify taxation, there is no requirement that serv-
ices be proportional to the amount of the tax. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.
163, 185 (1989).
222. See, e.g., Crow 11, 819 F.2d at 900 (noting the non-negligible impact of Montana's sever-
ance taxes on the marketability of Crow coal).
223. See supra text accompanying note 90.
224. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 768 (1985) ("[I]f the tax proviso
survives at all, it reaches only those leases" awarded under the 1924 and 1927 amendments.).
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Supreme Court rejected the idea that the federal instrumentality doc-
trine immunized non-Indian lessees from state taxes.2' With the de-
mise of the federal instrumentality doctrine, and the Court's ruling in
Montana that the tax provisions of the 1924 and 1927 amendments did
not apply to leases issued under the 1938 Act, the states' authority to
tax non-Indian mineral lessees was uncertain.
In 1989, in Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico,226 the
Supreme Court ruled that the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act did
not bar state taxation of non-Indian lessees. One year earlier, the
Court had affirmed without opinion a decision holding that state taxes
on lessees would be preempted if the tribe could show that the taxes
interfered with the purposes of the 1938 Act.227 One stated purpose
of the Act was to ensure tribes "the greatest return from their prop-
erty, ' 228 and in Montana the Court had recognized that taxation of
Indian interests would certainly frustrate that purpose.2 29 Nonethe-
less, the Court ruled in Cotton Petroleum that the phrase should have
no "talismanic effect."" 0  While the 1938 Act was certainly intended
to provide the tribes with badly needed revenue, the Court stated, it
was not intended "to remove all barriers to profit maximization."' 31
Moreover, the Court held that New Mexico's oil and gas taxes
were not preempted by general principles of federal Indian law,232
thus authorizing unprecedented concurrent state and tribal taxation of
mineral lessees.33 Prior to Cotton Petroleum, the Court had found
225. See cases cited supra note 91. On the rise and fall of the federal instrumentality doc-
trine, see Russel L. Barsh, Issues in Federal State, and Tribal Taxation of Reservation Wealth. A
Survey and Economic Critique, 54 WAsH. L. REv. 531, 560-64 (1979).
226. 490 U.S. 163, 177-83 (1989). For more detailed analyses of the case, see Katherine B.
Crawford, Note, State Authority to Tax Non-Indian Oil & Gas Production on Reservations: Cot-
ton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 2 UTAH L. REv. 495 (1989); Charley Carpenter, Note,
Preempting Indian Preemption: Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 39 CATH. U.L. REv.
639 (1990); Charles Breer, Note, Indian Law-Mineral Taxation-Are State Severance Taxes
Preempted When Imposed on Non-Indian Lessees Extracting Oil and Gas from Indian Reserva-
tions [sic] Land?, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 435 (1990); Kristina Bogardus, Note, Court Picks
New Test in Cotton Petroleum, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 919 (1990).
227. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 484
U.S. 997 (1988) (Crow H1).
228. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 178 (quoting S. REP. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1937); H.R. REP. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938)).
229. Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 179 (1989) (referencing
Montana, 471 U.S. at 767 n.5).
230. Id. at 179.
231. Id. at 180.
232. Id. at 183-87.
233. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe imposed oil and gas severance and privilege taxes, which
amounted to approximately six percent of the value of the lessee's production. New Mexico
imposed five oil and gas taxes, which amounted to approximately eight percent of the value of
the lessee's production. Id. at 168.
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state taxes on non-Indian companies doing business with tribes in In-
dian country to be uniformly preempted. 4
Indian law preemption bars state taxation of non-Indian lessees if
the state tax places too great a burden on the tribe or represents too
great a state intrusion into tribal and federal affairs. One of the key
factors invalidating a state tax on non-Indian lessees is interference
with a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing the activ-
ity being taxed.3 5 In addition, the preemption analysis may depend
upon whether the state plays some role in Indian country such as reg-
ulation or the provision of services that would justify the tax.236 A
general state desire to raise revenue or to assess taxes for services
provided the lessees outside Indian country, however, is not sufficient
to support the tax.237 State taxes on non-Indian lessees are also likely
to be preempted if the economic burden of the tax falls on the tribe.3 8
Moreover, a state tax may not be so excessive that it has a negative
effect upon tribal revenue from and regulation of the mineral
resource.
239
While the Supreme Court acknowledged this analytical frame-
work in Cotton Petroleum, it manipulated existing doctrine to find that
234. Cotton Petroleum was the first time the Court directly addressed the preemption analy-
sis as applied to state taxes on mineral lessees, as opposed to other types of non-Indian compa-
nies operating in Indian country, although the Court had summarily affirmed a mineral taxation
case the year before. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 484 U.S. 997 (1988). Nonetheless,
the Court in Cotton Petroleum employed essentially the same analysis as it had used in the non-
mineral cases.
235. This aspect of Indian law preemption was articulated in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona
Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 689-92 (1965), and has formed the cornerstone of the preemption
analysis for state taxes on non-Indians operating in Indian country. See Central Machinery Co.
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 163-66 (1980) (Indian trader statute); White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145-48 (1980) (timber harvesting regulations);
Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 840-42 (1982) (regulations for
construction and financing of Indian schools). In one case, the Court was willing to preempt
state taxes on the basis of a comprehensive federal scheme alone, see Central Machinery, 448
U.S. 160, but in the remaining cases the Court has cited as well to several or all of the other
preemption factors noted infra at text accompanying notes 236-239.
236. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 148-49; Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U.S. at 843-44.
237. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 150; Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U.S. at 843-44.
238. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151; Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U.S. at 844. This factor, by
itself, would not be sufficient to justify federal preemption of state taxes on non-Indians.
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151 n.15.
The "economic burden" of the tax refers to the practical or actual burden, rather than its
legal incidence. See Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 n.8. If the tax is imposed directly
on the tribe, then it would be invalid absent clear congressional intent to permit it. See Montana
v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
239. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 900,902-03 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem.,
484 U.S. 997 (1988) (Crow 11). See also Bracker, 448 U.S. at 149. For a detailed look at Crow II,
see James R. Bellis, Note, Crow Tribe v. Montana. New Limits on State Intrusion into Reserva-
tion Rights, New Lessons for State and Tribal Cooperation, 50 MoNrr. L. RFv. 133 (1989).
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none of the factors favoring preemption was present in that case. The
Court's most notable reworking of the preemption analysis was its
finding that the federal regulatory scheme for mineral leasing was not
"exclusive" because the state regulated the spacing and mechanical
integrity of wells located on the reservation.24 Prior to Cotton Petro-
leum, the preemption analysis had never inquired whether the federal
scheme was exclusive, but had always required only a "pervasive" or
"comprehenisve" federal scheme 241 Had the Court adhered to that
formulation, it should have found the mineral leasing scheme at least
as comprehensive as the other federal regulatory schemes it had con-
sidered.242 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit had already held, in the context
of a breach of trust action, that "the federal government's role in min-
eral leasing [under the 1938 Act] is pervasive and its responsibilities
comprehensive. "243
Moreover, the reason the Court found the federal mineral leasing
scheme not exclusive was the fact that the state regulated the mechan-
ical integrity and spacing of oil and gas wells. But the source of the
state's authority to regulate these matters on Indian lands was not ex-
plained. As a general proposition, states have no authority over min-
eral development on tribal lands.' 4 While Interior Department
regulations permit the Secretary, on a case by case basis, to adopt or
make applicable state law if that is "in the best interest" of the
tribe,245 incorporation of any state law is definitively not in the tribe's
best interest if it permits the extension of state taxing authority over
tribal leases. Moreover, there was no indication in Cotton Petroleum
that Interior had authorized state regulation of Jicarilla Apache oil
and gas wells. In sum, to justify its holding that the federal mineral
240. Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 185-86 (1989).
241. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 148 (1980).
242. See the preemption cases discussed supra at note 235.
243. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(adopting as modified the dissent of Seymour, J., in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy
Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1563, 1564-65 (10th Cir. 1984)). See the discussion supra at text accompa-
nying notes 184-187. The Supron case involved the same tribe and the same mineral resources as
the Cotton Petroleum dispute.
244. States have a "clear lack of jurisdiction over tribal leases." Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes v. Bd. of Oil and Gas, 792 F.2d 782, 796 (9th Cir. 1986) (tribal challenge to Interior
Department's delegation of authority to State of Montana over location and spacing of oil and
gas wells on Indian lands). See also 25 C.F.R. § 1.4(a) (1993).
245. Interior Department regulations provide that: "Any [oil and gas] well drilled on re-
stricted Indian land shall be subject to the location restrictions specified in the lease and/or Title
25 of the CFR." 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(b) (1992). Regulations in Title 25, in turn, permit the
Secretary, on a case by case basis, to adopt or make applicable state laws if that is "in the best
interest of the Indian owner or owners in achieving the highest and best use of such property."
25 C.F.R. § 1.4(b) (1993).
1994]
37
Royster: Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Co
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
leasing scheme was not exclusive, the Court relied on state regulation
which rested, at best, on questionable legal grounds.
The Court's reformulation of the federal-scheme component of
the preemption analysis was not its only manipulation of that doctrine.
The Court also found, for example, that New Mexico provided sub-
stantial services to both the tribe and the company.246 There was no
indication in the opinion, however, that New Mexico provided any
services to the taxpaying lessees on the reservation. As a general
proposition, services provided to the taxpayer outside Indian country
are not sufficient to justify a state tax on activities inside Indian
country.247
In addition, the Court found that the primary burden of the
state's taxes fell on the non-Indian lessee,2 48 and that the state taxes
had no substantial negative effect upon development of the tribe's oil
and gas resources. 2 49 The Court contrasted these factors to those giv-
ing rise to its summary affirmance one year earlier of a lower court
decision that Montana taxes on coal production on Crow lands were
preempted 0 The nearly 33 percent taxes imposed by Montana defi-
nitely had a negative impact on the value of the Crow coal, the Court
noted,' 1 whereas the mere eight percent New Mexico taxes at issue in
Cotton Petroleum were not so "unusually large" as to impose any
"substantial burden" on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe.- 2 While the
Court was willing to concede that the concurrent state taxation would
have "at least a marginal effect on the demand for on-reservation
leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the ability of the
Tribe to increase its tax rate,"'" the Court nonetheless concluded that
there was "simply no evidence in the record that the tax has had an
246. Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 185 (1989). During the
period 1981-1985, New Mexico provided almost $90,000 in services to Cotton Petroleum's opera-
tions, and $10.7 million in services to the reservation as a whole. Id. at 170 n.6.
247. See supra text accompanying note 237.
248. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185 and 187 n.18.
249. Id. at 185.
250. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 484 U.S.
997 (1988) (Crow 11).
251. In Crow II, the state taxes at issue were "extraordinarily high," having a combined ef-
fective rate of 32.9 percent, and the Ninth Circuit expressly held that the state taxes "had at least
some negative impact on the coal's marketability." Crow II, 819 F.2d at 900. See Cotton Petro-
leum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 n.17 (1989).
252. Id. at 186. However, "[t]he Court failed to explain how at some undetermined point
between 8% and 32.9% a state tax becomes impermissibly burdensome." Breer, supra note 226,
at 443.
253. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186-87.
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adverse effect on the Tribe's ability to attract oil and gas leases. ''254
The Court's affirmance of the tax may thus have resulted more from a
failure of proof on the part of Cotton Petroleum than from a shift in
legal doctrine.
Read broadly, the Court's decision in Cotton Petroleum could
dramatically increase the economic burden on tribes and lessees pur-
suing mineral development. The lower federal courts, however, have
described the decision in Cotton Petroleum as "reaffirm[ing] the basic
principles" of Indian law preemption of state taxes.255 The decisions
on state taxation since Cotton Petroleum have distinguished that case
on its facts and continued to find state taxes preempted where there is
a comprehensive federal scheme that leaves no room for state regula-
tion or state services." 6 Although the cases have not involved state
taxation of mineral lessees,257 the lower courts' adherence to the tradi-
tional preemption analysis is promising. At a minimum, tribes and
lessees able to demonstrate that the taxing state does not regulate
mining in Indian country and that the taxes have some actual negative
impact on the tribe should prevail in challenges to state taxation of
non-Indian lessees operating under the 1938 Act.
This result would be consistent with the economic development
purpose of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act. 5 s Prohibiting states from
taxing mineral lessees on production from Indian lands would en-
hance tribal revenues, increase the attractiveness of tribal minerals for
non-Indian companies, and ensure that tribal minerals are competitive
in the market. Along with the prohibition against state taxation of
Indian royalties and other interests in mineral production, and the sta-
ble rents and royalties income scheme, the bar to state taxation of
254. Id. at 191. Earlier in the opinion, the Court had also noted that "Cotton did not, how-
ever, attempt to prove that the state taxes imposed any burden on the Tribe." Id. at 170.
255. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657,660 (9th Cir. 1989); Quinault Indian Nation
v. Grays Harbor County, 19 Indian L. Rep. 3176, 3178 (W.D. Wash. 1989) [1992].
256. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 881 F.2d at 660-61; Quinault Indian Nation, 19 Indian L. Rep. at
3177-79. See also Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell, 967 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (re-
versing trial court's dismissal of tribe's suit to enjoin state taxes). Where state taxes have been
upheld, the taxes have imposed no economic burden on the tribe and the state has engaged in
extensive regulation of the activity. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. California, 788 F.Supp.
1513, 1518-20 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
257. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 881 F.2d at 658 (timber yield tax on the value of the timber at the
time of harvest); Quinault Indian Nation, 19 Indian L. Rep. at 3176 (compensating tax on the
sale of forest lands to a tax-exempt entity); Gila River, 967 F.2d at 1407 (transaction privilege tax
on ticket revenues); Cabazon Band, 788 F.Supp. at 1514 (license fee on on-reservation betting
facilities for simulcast horse racing).
258. It would also be consistent with the purpose of aiding in the revitalization of tribal
governments, see supra section II.B.2, by providing greater opportunities for raising tribal reve-
nues and increasing tribal services.
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lessees would complete Congress' intent of ensuring tribes "the great-
est return" on their mineral estate.259
4. Conclusion
The 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act represented a major ad-
vance for mineral-owning tribes. It provided uniformity in leasing re-
quirements, mandated tribal consent for all mineral leases on tribal
lands, and protected tribal interests by creating enforceable fiduciary
duties on the part of the Department of the Interior. On the eco-
nomic side, the 1938 Act eliminated state taxation of tribal mineral
income and established a scheme of bonuses, rents and royalties that
guaranteed some income from leases whether minerals were produced
or not.
Nonetheless, the 1938 Act fell short of its avowed goals of pro-
moting tribal self-government and economic development. Royalty
management was critically inadequate, and the Act failed to bar state
taxation of non-Indian producers on tribal lands. Moreover, in large
part because the 1938 Act permitted mineral development only
through leasing, tribes were still relegated to an essentially passive
role in the process. Tribal dissatisfaction with that lack of control
under the 1938 Act led eventually to the Indian Mineral Development
Act of 1982.
IV. TRIBES AS PARTICIPANTS:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINERAL ESTATE
The 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act was a response to the then-
new federal policy of promoting tribal self-government and economic
development. In line with that policy, the 1938 Act increased tribal
control over the leasing process and guaranteed a greater share of the
returns to the tribal owners. But during the decades in which the 1938
Act controlled mineral development of tribal lands, federal Indian
policy underwent drastic changes.
After a brief but destructive fling in the 1950s and 1960s with
259. S. REP. No. 985,75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1872,75th Cong., 3d Sess.
2 (1938). To that end, in 1992 Congress charged the newly-created Indian Energy Resource
Commission with developing proposals to address the dual taxation issue. 25 U.S.C.
§ 3505(k)(1) (1992). In giving the Commission that mandate, Congress stated its belief that Cot-
ton Petroleum was wrongly decided. H.R. REP. No. 474, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 8, at 96 (1992)
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assimilation and termination of tribes,260 federal policy swung back to
promotion of tribal self-determination and economic self-sufficiency.
President Johnson signaled the change in 1968, calling for a policy of
"self-help, self-development, [and] self-determination" for Indians. 261
'Iwo years later, President Nixon built on that approach, proposing a
federal policy of tribal self-determination, tribal sovereignty, and tri-
bal control over Indian country and its resources2 62 As a cornerstone
of the policy, Nixon advocated increased economic development of
Indian lands, particularly through long-term leasing of lands and re-
sources.2 63 During the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, Congress
embarked on a legislative agenda designed to carry the self-determi-
nation policy into effect.26 Then in January of 1983, President Rea-
gan continued the push for increased tribal control by declaring a
"government-to-government" relationship between the tribes and the
United States and reiterating the primary role of tribes in the develop-
ment and management of reservation resources. 265 Throughout the
1970s, and culminating in Reagan's 1983 statement, federal Indian
policy concentrated on two aspects: increased tribal control over pro-
grams and resources, and the governmental status of the tribes.266
During those same years, changes in tribal outlook and activities
corresponded to the changes in federal policy. In particular, many
tribes were taking an increasingly active role in economic develop-
ment concerns. But in the mineral development arena, increased tri-
bal control clashed with the limitations imposed by the 1938 Indian
Mineral Leasing Act. While the 1938 Act had represented a giant
260. While the termination era adversely affected or even eliminated the terminated tribes'
control of their mineral estates, see AmBLER, supra note 4, at 53-54, no new general mineral
leasing laws were enacted between 1938 and 1982.
261. "The Forgotten American". The President's Message to the Congress on Goals and Pro-
grams for the American Indians, PUB. PAPERS 335 (1968-69).
262. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564 (1970). Nixon is
generally credited as the architect of the federal policy of tribal self-determination.
263. With respect to that policy, Professor Clinton noted:
The potential inconsistency between the tribal sovereignty and control over the Indian
reservation and the impacts caused by extensive leasing of Indian lands for non-Indian
controlled economic development was not noted, although this tension became a major
theme in Indian economic development during the decade.
CLINTON, supra note 16, at 160.
264. See, eg., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988) (promoting tribal re-
sponsibility "for the utilization and management of their own resources"); Indian Self-Determi-
nation and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (1988) (declaring Congress'
"commitment to... the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy").
265. Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96 (1983).
266. The philosophy of tribal self-determination and the government-to-government rela-
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stride forward for tribes from the assimilationist-era leasing laws, its
narrow range of options ultimately proved too restrictive in the heady
atmosphere of the 1970s.
A. Dissatisfaction with Mineral Leasing
The core problem with mineral leasing under the 1938 Act was its
lack of flexibility. The standard lease term - 10 years and as long
thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities - introduced
uniformity but was not necessarily compatible with the needs of the
tribes or the lessees. For example, if production of the mineral had
not begun by the end of the 10-year term, the lease would expire; with
many leases, however, 10 years was too short a period of time for the
necessary preparation and exploration work. 67 Where production
was sustained, cyclical fluctuations in the market could cause produc-
tion to fall below the "paying quantities" threshold, and the lease
would terminate despite the wishes of the parties and the presence of
significant remaining mineral deposits.268
On the other hand, the "in paying quantities" clause also locked
in leases that were not advantageous to the tribes. So long as the
lessee was producing minerals in paying quantities, the lease contin-
ued under its original terms.269 Tribes had no opportunity to renegoti-
ate lease terms to take account of changing economic conditions or
changing environmental concerns. Rents and royalties were set far
lower than justified by the market, in large part because they were
established as a flat rate rather than a percentage. 270 Even the com-
petitive bidding process for awarding leases did not necessarily result
in the best possible financial return for the tribes.271 Moreover, while
267. H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465,
3466.
268. Id. The "in paying quantities" concept, applied by the 1938 Act to all minerals, was
borrowed from oil and gas law. See, e.g., text supra accompanying note 88 for a discussion of the
1924 and 1927 oil and gas leasing amendments. The "in paying quantities" provision caused
particular problems in the mining of hardrock minerals, which are subject to "considerable fluc-
tuations" in their markets. H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
269. The result could be a de facto "perpetual lease." S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1982).
270. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 56,238. For example, Ambler notes that the standard royalty
rate on Indian coal leases was 17.5 cents per ton; when coal increased 237 percent in value
between the 1950s and 1974, Indian royalties, based on this flat rate, increased by only 35 per-
cent. Id. at 66, 56. In another example, two large coal producers on the Navajo reservation
mined approximately 18 million tons of coal in 1977. The market value of the coal was between
$4 and $14 per ton; the Navajo received between 25 and 37.5 cents per ton. Lorraine Ruffing,
Fighting the Substandard Lease, 6 AM. INDIAN J. 2, 3 n.5 (1980).
271. H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
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leases provided a steady income from the rents-and-royalties scheme,
they provided no mechanism for a tribal share in the profits.272 The
lessees rather than the tribes were reaping the bulk of the profits gen-
erated by tribal minerals.
Beyond the economic issues, the 1938 Act relegated tribes to an
essentially passive role in the development of their own mineral re-
sources. Tribes had virtually no opportunity to participate in develop-
ment and management decisions,27 3 to ensure environmental or
cultural protection,27 4 or to bargain for such favorable terms as tribal
employment preferences. Consequently, as Indian tribes gained expe-
rience with self-government, and the energy boom of the 1970s fo-
cused attention and activity on Indian reservations, the provisions of
the 1938 Act offered tribes insufficient control and revenues. Tribes
began to search for alternatives to the standard mineral lease.
As one means of asserting increased control, several of the en-
ergy tribes called a hiatus on mineral development in the early 1970s
to gain time for planned development.275 Other tribes continued min-
eral development, but began to negotiate mineral agreements that
provided them with greater decision-making and profit-making
roles.2 76 To sidestep the leasing requirements of the 1938 Act, tribes
relied on statutory authority that permitted them, with secretarial ap-
proval, to enter into service contracts "relative to their lands".27 7 Ini-
tially, the Department of the Interior approved a number of these
272. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 237.
273. H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
274. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT. TASK FORCE SEVEN:
RESERVATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECION 49 (1976) [hereafter TASK
FORCE SEVEN REPORT] (noting that without the opportunity to bargain effectively, tribes can
neither impose environmental controls nor extract higher royalty rates in return for not imposing
controls).
275. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 62, 72. The Northern Cheyenne and Crow Tribes and the
Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold "succeeded in stopping coal development on their reser-
vation, with the sole exception of the Westmoreland lease on the Crow ceded strip." Id. at 67.
See also NRG Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 51 (1991) (describing the Northern Cheyenne
efforts and their aftermath).
276. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 85-86. See also H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1982) ("Certain tribes which have been able to negotiate oil and gas development agreements
appear to have received greater compensation than they had been receiving under competitive
bidding.").
In addition, in 1975, 25 of the mineral producing tribes formed the Council for Energy
Resources Tribes (CERT), primarily to provide information, technical expertise, and other ad-
vice designed to assist tribes in taking control of mineral development on their lands. See gener-
ally AMBLER, supra note 4, at 91-117.
277. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1991).
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negotiated agreements,278 but it became increasingly reluctant to con-
tinue without clear statutory authority.279 Then in 1980 the Depart-
ment determined that it had no authority to approve an oil and gas
agreement between the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and ARCO, calling
into question the legality of existing negotiated agreements.280  The
uncertainty engendered by Interior's determination was a key factor
in the passage of the Indian Mineral Development Act two years
later.
B. Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982
In 1982, Congress resolved the legal uncertainty by enacting the
Indian Mineral Development Act.2 1 The IMDA, part of the spate of
self-determination legislation of the 1970s and 1980s, was intended
"first, to further the policy of self-determination and second, to maxi-
mize the financial return tribes can expect for their valuable mineral
resources." 2 To achieve those purposes, the IMDA focused on rem-
edying the major restraints of the 1938 Leasing Act: the lack of tribal
control and economic benefits.
278. Between 1975 and 1981, the Department of Interior approved seven agreements, and
three more were pending approval in early 1982. Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra
note 112, at 169 (detailing the ten agreements). Before an agreement could be approved, DOI
was required to undertake "a rather cumbersome case-by-case analysis" to determine whether
the agreement was a lease under the 1938 Act or a service contract under § 81. H.R. REP. No.
746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
279. Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra note 112, at 71-72 (statement of Kenneth
L. Smith, Ass't See'y for Indian Affairs, Dept. of the Interior). See also H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
280. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 87.
281. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1991). Although the IMDA called for the Secretary to promul-
gate implementing regulations within 180 days, see id. § 2107, final regulations were not promul-
gated until March 30, 1994, and did not become effective until April 29, 1994. 59 Fed. Reg.
14,960 (1994) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 225). Revised rules for the 1938 Indian Mineral
Leasing Act were proposed at the same time as the rules for the IMDA, see 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734
(1991), but the comment period on the 1938 Act rules was reopened in September 1992, for 60
days. 57 Fed. Reg. 40,298 (1992). The Bureau of Indian Affairs subsequently issued the IMDA
rules separately. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960, 14,961 (1994). The revised 1938 Act regulations are ex-
pected in October 1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 20,478, 20,257 (1994).
282. S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982); see also Quantum Exploration, Inc. v.
Clark, 780 F.2d 1457,1458 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the primary purposes of the IMDA were to
benefit the tribes, a further impetus for the legislation was the national goal, established during
the 1973 oil embargo, of energy independence by 1980, coupled with a presidential call for a
doubling of coal production by 1985. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTINO OFFICE, INDIAN NATURAL
RESOURCES-PART II: COAL, OIL AND GAS: BETrER MANAGEMENT CAN IMPROVE DEVELOP.
MENT AND INCREASE INDIAN INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 1 (1977). Several sponsors of the
IMDA noted that the Act could benefit the nation generally by increasing domestic energy pro-
duction and reducing American dependence on foreign sources. See 128 CoNe. REC. 29400-01
(1982) (remarks of Sen. Melcher), 21332 (remarks of Rep. Udall), and 21334 (remarks of Rep.
Bereuter).
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The means chosen by Congress was to expand tribal options be-
yond the standard mineral lease, authorizing all tribes to enter into
negotiated mineral development agreements. The IMDA applies to a
broader spectrum of lands than the 1938 Act, covers every mineral
resource, permits mineral development arrangements of all types, and
accords tribes increased control over, and potentially increased reve-
nue from, mineral development on Indian lands. In the interest of
maximum flexibility, the IMDA retained intact the leasing rights of
IRA tribes,283 and the right of tribes to continue leasing under the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938.284 Those options, however, are
little used. By 1988 there were few standard lease sales, and most of
those involved allotted lands.'-
1. Mineral Agreements
The core of the IMDA is the provision authorizing tribes to enter
into mineral agreements." 6 Any Indian tribe, subject to secretarial
approval, "may enter into any joint venture, operating, production
sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement" for mining ac-
tivities. 8  Mineral agreements are available for all mineral re-
sources288 in which the tribe "owns a beneficial or restricted
283. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
284. 25 U.S.C. § 2105 (1988). Congress intended to leave the 1938 Act intact, "so that tribes
that prefer to use the existing competitive leasing process can do so." S. REP No. 472, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982).
285. AmBLER, supra note 4, at 241; M. Julia Hook & Britt D. Banks, The Indian Mineral
Development Act of 1982, 7(4) NAT. REs. & ENV'T 11, 52 (1993).
286. The Act also provided a form of retroactive authorization for existing non-lease ar-
rangements. The Secretary was directed to review the terms of all agreements approved as ser-
vice contracts, see supra text accompanying notes 277-79, and determine if modifications were
necessary to bring the agreements into compliance with the IMDA. 25 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1988).
If the terms of an agreement were in compliance, or were brought into compliance, then it would
be treated as a valid mineral agreement under that Act. Id.
287. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1988). Agreements may be negotiated for exploration, extraction,
processing, "other development," or sale or other disposition of the production or products of
mineral resources. Id. Neither the Act nor the proposed regulations define the various types of
possible agreements; that omission may be deliberate, since the point is to accord tribes maxi-
mum flexibility. Detailed descriptions of the most common types of agreements are available at
AMBLER, supra note 4, at 241-43; Lipton, supra note 125, at 7-10; Peter F. Carroll, The Dawning
of a New Era: Tribal Self-Determination in Indian Mineral Production, 9 PuB. LAND L. REv. 81,
88-89 (1988); Alvin J. Ziontz, Indian Self-Determination: New Patterns for Mineral Develop-
ment, INST. ON INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENT-OIL, GAS, COAL AND OTHER MINERALS 13-1,
13-8 - 13-16 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1976).
288. Mineral resources are defined in the IMDA as "oil, gas, uranium, coal, geothermal, or
other energy or nonenergy mineral resources." 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1991). The regulations con-
tain a more detailed list: "Minerals includes both metalliferous and non-metalliferous minerals;
all hydrocarbons including oil and gas, coal and lignite of all ranks; geothermal resources; and
includes but is not limited to sand, gravel, pumice, cinders, granite, building stone, limestone,
clay, silt, or any other energy or non-energy mineral." 56 Fed. Reg. 14,960, 14,972 (1994) (25
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interest";8 9 the Act thus reaches the tribal mineral estate reserved
under allotted or off-reservation lands. Moreover, mineral resources
belonging to allottees may be included in a tribal agreement, subject
to the concurrence of the parties and a finding by the Secretary of the
Interior that participation in the tribal agreement is in the best interest
of the allottee. 9 °
While the various types of mineral agreements all offer increased
tribal control over standard 1938 Act leases, they vary in the degree of
control, and consequently in the degree of risk. Negotiated leases are
the least risky approach, although they offer tribes no ownership in-
terest in the development.291 Joint ventures place tribes in the role of
partners in the development, but are riskier since the tribe shares in
both the costs and the profits.292 Where there are no profits, the tribe
would share in the losses. The risk of loss can be reduced by a mineral
agreement which provides that the tribe can acquire a joint venture
interest after exploration has revealed that minerals are available in
sufficient quantities to justify the risk.293 That arrangement leaves
tribes without an ownership interest during the early phases of the
development.
Production sharing arrangements are similar to joint ventures ex-
cept that the tribe receives a share of the minerals produced rather
than a share of the profits.2 94 In a production sharing agreement,
however, unlike a joint venture, the mining company controls the
early phases of development, pays all costs, and recoups its costs from
a stipulated percentage of the production.295 But like the joint ven-
ture, the production sharing agreement places a risk of loss on the
tribe; in consequence, production sharing is not recommended where
the relationship between costs of production and prices is unstable or
C.F.R. § 225.3). Under the proposed rules, a similar definition would apply to the 1938 Act. 59
Fed. Reg. 58,734 58,738 (1991) (25 C.F.R. § 211.3).
289. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1988).
290. Id. § 2102(b). Although the IMDA does not call for tribal consent or consultation for
development of allottees' mineral resources, the provision for bringing allotted minerals into a
mineral agreement represents a significant recognition of the tribe's interest in mineral develop-
ment throughout its territory. The provision recognizes, if only partially, that tribes are govern-
ments and not simply mineral owners. Maxfield, supra note 113, at 70.
291. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 243.
292. d at 242; Lipton, supra note 125, at 7.
293. Lipton, supra note 125, at 8.
294. Id. at 9 ("The production sharing agreement differs basically from the joint venture in









The riskiest approach for tribes, but the approach which provides
the greatest control, is the service contract. Under a service contract,
the tribe hires an operator to carry out the mining activities, but main-
tains total control, pays all costs, and takes all the risks of loss.2 Few
tribes can afford either the capital or the risk attendant upon a service
contract arrangement.
Tribes are not bound by the parameters of each type of agree-
ment, but can enter into any mineral development arrangement agree-
able to the parties and approved by the Secretary.2 98 Besides the
crucial opportunity for a tribal ownership interest in mineral develop-
ment, the great advantage of mineral agreements is flexibility. Eco-
nomic flexibility is key. Smaller companies can participate in mineral
development on Indian lands by offering little or no bonus in ex-
change for a larger share of the profits.299 Tribes can forego royalties
in exchange for a share of net profits, or provide for escalating royalty
payments over the life of the agreement.3°
In addition to flexibility in revenue provisions, mineral agree-
ments can be structured to include other types of provisions not avail-
able under 1938 Act leases.3 0 1 The term of an agreement can be
extended or limited.3 0 2 The agreement can provide for enhanced en-
vironmental controls303 or tribal employment preferences, education
and job-training programs, contracting of tribal businesses for related
services such as road maintenance and security, and acquisition of
296. ld.; AMBLER, supra note 4, at 243.
297. Lipton, supra note 125, at 10; AMBLER, supra note 4, at 242.
298. As the regulations provide, "No particular form of agreement is prescribed." 59 Fed.
Reg. 14,960, 14,973 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.21(b)). Many of the existing mineral agreements
have been hybrids. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 242.
299. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 240.
300. Id. at 240, 243; Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra note 112, at 27 (statement
of Terry Knight, Chairman, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe).
301. Total flexibility is not available. The regulations specify 21 provisions that "shall, if
applicable" be addressed in the agreement. These requirements are primarily necessary to en-
sure the legality and operation of the agreement, and include dressed in the agreement. These
requirements are primarily necessary to ensure the legality and operation of the agreement, and
include such matters as the parties, the land involved, the duration of the agreement, bond and
insurance requirements, auditing and accounting procedures, and the like. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960,
14,973 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.21(b)).
302. Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra note 112, at 27 (statement of Terry Knight,
Chairman, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe). See also the IMDA regulations at 25 C.F.R.
§ 225.21(b)(2), requiring only that the agreement set forth the duration. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960,
14,973 (1994).
303. Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra note 112, at 27 (statement of Terry Knight,
Chairman, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe). See also the discussion of tribal environmental authority,
infra at section IV.B.
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equipment once production is completed.3 4 Mineral agreements can
also be structured to take advantage of tribal exemptions from state
taxation. °5
By 1988, tribes had negotiated 67 alternative mineral agreements,
primarily for oil and gas.3 °6 Of these agreements, about half were ne-
gotiated leases containing provisions not available under the standard
1938 Act mineral lease, and the remainder were hybrids of the various
other options available under the IMDA. °7
Despite widespread use, however, mineral agreements under the
1982 Act were not the perfect solution. By the time the IMDA was
enacted in 1982, the energy boom of the 1970s had waned and the
mining industry was in a "depressed condition. ' 30 8 Many tribes found
that "the companies were no longer lined up at the tribes' doors in
such numbers. '30 9 Flexible arrangements that would have permitted
tribes to take full advantage of the energy boom were not always ad-
vantageous during poor markets. Negotiated agreements take time,
expertise, and information: commodities not always available to tribes
new to minerals management.310 Moreover, since alternative agree-
ments require a greater investment of tribal resources and a higher
degree of risk, some tribes during the 1980s saw mineral leases as pro-
viding a stable and dependable, if more modest, source of tribal in-
come.311  Nonetheless, mineral agreements, with their greater
flexibility and opportunity for tribal control, remained the preferred
route for tribes undertaking mineral development activities.
304. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 243; Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra note 112, at
27 (statement of Terry Knight, Chairman, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe).
305. Id.; AMBLER, supra note 4, at 241; see also discussion of state taxation of non-Indian
mineral companies under the 1982 Act, infra at section III.B.3.
306. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 241.
307. Id. at 241-43.
308. By the mid-1980s, "[floreign competition, lower prices, and a diminished demand for
minerals have spelled trouble for the entire industry." SMrrH, supra note 1, at 163.
309. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 89.
310. Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra note 112, at 127 (statement of Marvin J.
Sonosky, arguing that the IMDA "would match uninformed and uneducated Indians against
highly sophisticated, informed and educated geologists, petroleum and mineral engineers and
lawyers specializing in oil, gas and minerals."); Lorraine Ruffing, Agenda for Action, 6 AM. IN-
DIAN J. 14, 16 (July 1980) ("[T]he corporations have had a monopoly on geological data since it
was they who did the exploration."). See also Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra at
93-94 (statement of members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe); AMBLER, supra note 4, at 260;
U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON MINERAL LEASING ON INDIAN LANDS 95
(1975).
311. "For tribes, leasing is the easiest way in which to do business. It requires relatively little
management responsibility and it does not expose the tribe to the risk of loss," Daniel H. Israel,
The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and its Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47
U. COLO. L. REv. 617, 644 (1976). See also AMBLER, supra note 4, at 260.
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Mineral agreements under the 1982 Act, like leases under the
1938 Act, require the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. As
trustee for tribal resources, the Secretary must determine that the pro-
posed mineral agreement is "in the best interest of the Indian
tribe".312 In making that determination, the Secretary is directed to
consider a variety of factors, which were derived from the "all rele-
vant factors" standard which the federal courts mandated for trust de-
cisions under the 1938 Act.313 Specifically, the Act requires the
Secretary to consider the potential economic return, the potential "en-
vironmental, social, and cultural effects" on the tribe, and the provi-
sions in the agreement for resolving disputes between the parties.314
The regulations expand the Secretary's duty to consider all relevant
factors beyond the initial decision to approve or disapprove the agree-
ment, and extend that duty to any administrative action which affects
the interests of the tribe as mineral owner.315
In the interest of tribal control over resource development, the
Act also provides that once the Secretary has made an initial decision
to approve or disapprove a mineral agreement, the Secretary must
provide at least 30 days written notice to the tribe along with the Sec-
retary's findings.316 The purposes of the notice requirement are to
ensure that tribes are fully aware of both the potential benefits and
the potential risks of the agreement, and to accord tribes an opportu-
nity to reconsider their decisions before the Secretary's action be-
comes final.31 7 The opportunity to reconsider includes the right of the
tribe unilaterally to rescind the agreement during the notice period.318
Once the agreement is approved, however, tribal control over
further stages of development may be more limited. For example, the
312. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (1988).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 198-200.
314. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (1988).
315. In making those determinations, the regulations direct the Secretary to consider "any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to: economic considerations, such as date of lease or
minerals agreement expiration; probable financial effects on the Indian mineral owner; need for
change in the terms of the existing minerals agreement; marketability of mineral products; and
potential environmental, social and cultural effects." 56 Fed. Reg. 14,960, 14,972 (1994) (25
C.F.R. § 225.3)).
316. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(c) (1988).
317. S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982). See also Quantum Exploration, Inc. v.
Clark, 780 F.2d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1986).
318. Quantum Exploration, 780 F.2d at 1460. The non-Indian party to the agreement has no
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regulations provide that, unless specified otherwise in the agreement,
tribal consent is not required before the Secretary may approve an
assignment of a mineral agreement. 1 Similarly, the right to issue no-
tice of noncompliance or cancellation rests with the Secretary rather
than with the tribe.320 Tribes that wish to retain control throughout
the development process, therefore, should build those protections
into the agreement itself.3 21
In addition to the statutory duty to act in the tribe's best interest,
the Secretary is charged with providing advice, assistance, and infor-
mation during the negotiations for a mineral agreement. 322 Because
that duty arises only upon the request of the tribe and then only "to
the extent of [the Secretary's] available resources, ' 3z the Secretary's
failure to provide advice, assistance, or information may not give rise
to an action for breach of trust. Nonetheless, the duty to provide ad-
vice and assistance is consistent with the Secretary's role as trustee of
Indian resources, and would serve to ensure that mineral agreements
are in fact in the best interest of the tribe. Congress, however, has
provided the Interior Department with neither the funds nor the staff
necessary to provide this assistance. 24
The specific statutory duties imposed by the IMDA are aspects of
the Secretary's general trust obligation for the management of tribal
mineral resources. Under the judicially developed trust doctrine, the
central element of an enforceable trust relationship is the Secretary's
comprehensive management and control of the tribal resources.
Where control over the development of the resources rests with the
tribe rather than the Secretary, the Secretary may have no enforceable
trust obligation.3 26 Nonetheless, despite the fact that the IMDA is
319. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960, 14,976 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.33).
320. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960 14,976 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.36).
321. For example, Interior suggests that mineral agreements include a provision "describing
the rights of the parties to terminate or suspend the minerals agreement." 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960,
14,973 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.21 (15)).
322. 25 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988). The negotiation period during which this duty exists runs from
the time the developer first contacts the tribe until the Secretary's final decision on approval of
the agreement. Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark; 780 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1986).
323. 25 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988).
324. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 239. The unavailability of resources to meet these obligations
was anticipated by the Department, which described the provision as "unwieldy and potentially
very costly." H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3465, 3475 (report of the Department of the Interior).
325. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). See also the discussion supra at
text accompanying notes 178-183.
326. Sankey v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 743, 747-48, aff'd, 951 F.2d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(ruling that the Secretary has no enforceable trust obligation to exercise allottees' rights to royal-
ties in kind when regulations specifically place exercise of that right with the lessor allottee).
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designed to accord tribes greater control over mineral development,
the fiduciary responsibilities established in cases arising under the
1938 Leasing Act3 27 apply as well to mineral agreements under the
1982 Act. The IMDA expressly extends the trust doctrine to cover
"the rights of a tribe.. .in the event of a violation of the terms of any
Minerals Agreement by any other party to such agreement. '328 Con-
gress specifically intended that the trust obligations of the Secretary
for tribal mineral resources would remain intact, unaltered by enact-
ment of the IMDA.329 Accordingly, the Secretary should be liable for
breach of trust for failure to adequately monitor the developer's per-
formance of the agreement, for royalty mismanagement, for approv-
ing communitization agreements without consideration of all relevant
factors, and the like.330
Nonetheless, despite its express recognition of the Secretary's
trust responsibilities to the tribes, the IMDA also provides that "the
United States shall not be liable for losses sustained by a tribe or indi-
vidual Indian" under a mineral agreement.33 ' The purpose of this
hold-harmless provision is to ensure that the Secretary, once a mineral
agreement has been approved as in the best interest of the tribe, is not
held to be a guarantor or insurer that the tribe will actually profit from
the agreement.332  Mineral agreements, particularly non-lease ar-
rangements, are riskier than standard 1938 Act leases, with the poten-
tial for greater economic returns but also for economic loss. The intent
of the hold-harmless provision is that if tribes wish to become partners
in development, then tribes must take the risk of loss. Both the tribe
by entering into an agreement, and the Secretary by approving it, will
327. See supra text accompanying notes 186-200.
328. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e) (1988). The Act also extends that trust protection to allottees
whose minerals are included in a tribal mineral agreement. Id.
329. S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1982) ("The Secretary's trust responsibility
would remain intact."); 128 CONG. REc. 29400 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Melcher) ("The trust
responsibility of the Federal Government with respect to tribal mineral resources remains unal-
tered by the bill. In fact, the Secretary of the Interior has an obligation to assist tribes from the
very inception of agreements and his responsibility to protect their interests will continue for the
duration of the agreement.").
330. For discussion of these duties of the Secretary under the 1938 Act, see supra text accom-
panying notes 186-200. See also H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465, 3470 (noting as an example the Secretary's trust obligation to monitor
royalty reporting). The Secretary's fiduciary obligation for royalty management also now arises
under the 1983 Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act, discussed infra at text accompa-
nying note 351.
331. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e) (1988).
332. H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3465, 3469-70; S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982).
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exercise their best business judgment, but the Secretary is not respon-
sible in a suit for breach of trust if the agreement ultimately proves
unwise.333
3. State Taxation
One substantial advantage of mineral agreements under the
IMDA is the potential to structure the agreements to avoid state taxa-
tion of mineral production.334 State mineral taxes are generally im-
posed on the producer of the minerals, and the IMDA offers tribes
increased opportunities to become mineral producers. In addition,
the structure and purposes of the IMDA strengthen the argument that
state taxes on non-Indian producers are preempted.
Absent express congressional consent to state taxation, Indian in-
terests within Indian country are exempt from state taxes.335 More
specifically, states may not tax tribal interests in mineral produc-
tion.336 In their passive role of lessors, tribes are thus exempt from
state taxes on their bonuses, rents, and royalties from mineral les-
sees. 337 Most state mineral taxes, however, are imposed directly on
the producer of the minerals, and under lease arrangements the pro-
ducer is the non-Indian lessee.
Mineral agreements, on the other hand, often place the tribe in
the role of mineral producer. Joint ventures and production sharing
contracts accord tribes a percentage ownership interest in the produc-
tion, and service contracts, when full ownership remains with the
tribe, make the tribe the sole producer. To the extent that state taxes
on mineral production are imposed on the tribe as producer, the taxes
are invalid. State mineral taxes should thus be invalid where a service
contract is employed, and invalid on the tribe's percentage of a joint
333. Breach of trust is still an option if the Secretary failed to act in the tribe's best interest in
approving the agreement in the first place. The hold-harmless provision:
[S]imply restates the law as it exists today. If the Secretary, acting as trustee, approves
a lease or an agreement or otherwise acts in relation to the trust resources of an Indian
tribe and acts responsibly and within his discretion in doing so, the United States would
not be liable for any loss or impairment of the trust resources. On the other hand, if
the Secretary acts recklessly and in abuse of his discretion as trustee, the United States
cannot avoid liability.
H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465, 3469-
70.
334. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 200.
335. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Indian Nation, 113 S.Ct. 1985 (1993); McClana-
han v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
336. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). See the discussion of Mon-
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venture or production sharing agreement.338
Mineral agreements do not, however, shield non-Indian produ-
cers from state mineral taxes. Instead, the taxability of the non-Indian
producer's share depends upon whether the state taxes are barred by
federal statute or preempted by principles of federal Indian law.339 In
its most recent decision on the issue, the Supreme Court held in Cot-
ton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico that state oil and gas taxes on the
lessor under a 1938 Act lease were neither barred by the 1938 Act nor
preempted.34 ° Several of the factors crucial to the outcome in Cotton
Petroleum, however, are not present in 1982 Act mineral agreements.
First, the Court in Cotton Petroleum ruled that state taxation of
mineral lessees was not barred by the 1938 Act because the state taxes
would not frustrate the purposes of that statute.341 The 1938 Act, the
Court stated, was intended to provide tribal revenue, but not "to re-
move all barriers to profit maximization. ' '342 The 1982 Act, by con-
trast, is expressly intended "to maximize the financial return" from
the tribal mineral estate.343 Accordingly, since state taxes on non-In-
dian producers represent a barrier to profit maximization,34 those
taxes frustrate the purposes of the 1982 Act and consequently should
be barred by the statute.
In addition, the Court in Cotton Petroleum, in holding that the
state taxes were not preempted, relied in part on a finding that the
state production taxes had no negative impact on tribal mineral devel-
opment.345 The negative impact of state taxes on non-Indian produ-
cers under mineral agreements, however, is more readily apparent.
The success of mineral agreements of all kinds, and consequently the
success of the IMDA itself, depends upon the tribe's ability to negoti-
ate the best possible terms. State mineral taxes directly impede that
ability by introducing a financial burden on the non-Indian party that
338. Israel, supra note 311, at 650; Lipton, supra note 125, at 8-10. But see Lipton, supra note
125, at 8 (arguing that a joint venture operating as a separate corporation would not be exempt
from state mineral taxes).
339. The preemption analysis for state taxation of non-Indian companies doing business in
Indian country is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 235-239.
340. 490 U.S. 163, 182-87 (1989). See the discussion of Cotton Petroleum supra at text accom-
panying notes 226-254.
341. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 179-80.
342. Id. at 180.
343. S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982). In fact, a proposed amendment to the
IMDA to authorize state taxation of the non-Indian producer's share was rejected. H.R. REp.
No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465, 3470.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 216-222.
345. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187-91.
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must be taken into account in reaching an agreement. The financial
impact from state taxes could have considerably more than "a margi-
nal effect"3"6 on the value of mineral agreements to the tribes. Based
on the adverse effect on tribal mineral development under the 1982
Act, then, state production taxes on the non-Indian parties should be
preempted. 47
4. Conclusion
The Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 thus represents sig-
nificant progress for tribes in their drive to take control of mineral
development on Indian lands. The Act eliminates many of the restric-
tions of standard mineral leasing, increasing the opportunities for tri-
bal participation and revenue enhancement, while maintaining the
fiduciary obligations of the federal government. Nonetheless, the Act
contains pitfalls for unwary tribes. Under the proposed regulations,
tribal consent and control of certain activities beyond approval of the
agreement will be lost if not written into the agreement itself. Crucial
information concerning the mineral resources and their markets is not
yet fully available to tribal negotiators, making informed decision-
making difficult. And the ability of the states to tax the non-Indian
parties' share of production, with its consequent burden on the tribes'
ability to negotiate terms, is at present uncertain. Nonetheless, for the
most part tribes have been able to use the Indian Mineral Develop-
ment Act to gain greater control over the development and manage-
ment of tribal mineral resources.
C. Federal Oil & Gas Royalty Management Act
Although tribes moved away from the standard mineral lease in
the 1980s, many mineral agreements negotiated under the 1982 In-
dian Mineral Development Act, as well as all leases entered into
under the 1938 Act, provided for royalty payments. Despite the intent
of the 1982 Act to maximize tribal returns from mineral development,
however, federal royalty management remained inadequate, resulting
in continuing and substantial financial losses for the tribes.
In early 1982, as the Linowes Commission issued its report on the
346. ld. at 187.
347. The issue may be mooted before the courts rule on it. Congress has directed the newly-
created Indian Energy Resource Commission to make recommendations concerning state and
tribal taxation of non-Indian mineral companies. See infra text accompanying notes 389-393.
Congress' charge to the Commission was based on its understanding that Cotton Petroleum was
wrongly decided. H.R. REP. No. 474 pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96 (1992).
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sorry state of federal royalty management,34 the Department of the
Interior created a new branch with authority for royalty management,
the Minerals Management Service.349 One year later, Congress en-
acted the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act (FOGRMA)
to improve royalty collection, management, and enforcement.
FOGRMA also was intended to meet the federal trust responsibility
to the tribes,351  and to increase tribal control over royalty
management. 2
To those ends, FOGRMA defined the duties of the Interior De-
partment and the lessees, strengthened information gathering and dis-
semination, and provided for inspections, interest on late or deficient
payments, and civil and criminal penalties.353 The Act also authorized
the Secretary to enter into cooperative agreements with tribes, under
which the tribe could have access to royalty information and carry out
inspections, audits, investigations, and other enforcement activities
other than the collection of payments or penalties. 4
Despite the apparent promise of FOGRMA and the newly cre-
ated Minerals Management Service, however, little changed. First, the
provision for tribal cooperative agreements was not drafted with
tribes and their needs and limitations in mind.355 Interior assumed
that tribes could provide staffing, technical expertise, and funding at
the same levels as the states, an assumption unwarranted for many
tribes.35 6 Moreover, the Minerals Management Service did not imple-
ment the cooperative program.3 5' By 1989, only four tribes had en-
tered into cooperative agreements;358 even then, the federal
348. See supra text accompanying notes 167-173.
349. Davis, supra note 165, at 395.
350. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (1988).
351. 30 U.S.C. § 1701(b)(4) (1988). See also Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 189-90
(Fed. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1987) (holding that FOGRMA creates enforceable
trust obligations).
352. 30 U.S.C. § 1701(b)(5) (1988).
353. Id. §§ 1711-1723.
354. Id. § 1732(a)-(b).
355. AmBLER, supra note 4, at 133.
356. Id. at 135.
357. S. REP. No. 216, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1989). This report, submitted by the Special
Committee on Investigations of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, was a scathing
indictment of the three Interior agencies - Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, and Minerals Management Service - responsible for oversight and management of min-
eral development on Indian lands. Of the three agencies, however, the report found MMS the
least to blame: "The problem at MMS is not institutional incompetence as at BIA, or direct
antagonism towards Indian interests as demonstrated by the callousness of BLM, but lack of a
clear direction and mandate concerning Indians." Id. at 122.
358. The Navajo Nation and the Ute Tribe of Utah had entered into cooperative auditing
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government retained control of enforcement and ultimate authority to
determine which leases would be audited.35 9
Other royalty management improvements were similarly slow
and insufficient. Some aspects of royalty management did improve
during the 1980s: reporting errors were reduced, audits and inspec-
tions were conducted more regularly, and millions of dollars in royal-
ties and penalties were collected." 6 Nonetheless, by 1989 severe
problems with theft and accounting errors remained.361 In 1992, Con-
gress concluded that "little has changed to improve the process" of
federal royalty management since the enactment of FOGRMA nearly
a decade earlier.3 62 Accordingly, Congress determined once again to
attempt a statutory solution to royalty management problems, and en-
acted the Indian Energy Resources Act of 1992.
D. Indian Energy Resources Act of 1992
Since the advent of the self-determination era of federal Indian
policy in the 1960s, the federal government's stance toward the Indian
nations has stabilized. The government-to-government relationship
announced by President Reagan in 1983 has survived, as has the fed-
eral emphasis on increased tribal control and economic develop-
ment2 63 That continuing federal policy of tribal self-government is
reflected in mineral development legislation.
In 1992, as part of the massive Energy Policy Act,3 64 Congress
agreements under which funds were distributed to the tribes, while the Southern Ute and Ji-
carilla Apache Tribes had entered into agreements under which MMS provided staff resources
rather than funds. Id. at 124. See also AMBLER, supra note 4, at 137.
359. S. RP. No. 216, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1989).
360. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 132.
361. S. REP. No. 216, at 105-21. The report was particularly harsh on the Bureau of Land
Management, the Interior Department agency charged with detecting and preventing the theft
of oil and gas from Indian lands. The report noted that while Committee investigators found oil
theft at six of the eight lease sites they staked out in Oklahoma, id. at 107, BLM inspectors had
recorded only nine isolated incidents of theft in eight years, and those reports were all called in
by lease operators. Id. at 114. Moreover, BLM had failed to report the thefts to law enforce-
ment authorities and "expressed little concern about the theft of Indian oil by fraudulent mea-
surement." Id. at 115, 117.
362. H.R. REP. No. 474 pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1992). An earlier 1992 congressional
study similarly stated: "Despite MMS's promises that longstanding issues are being addressed,
the Program has progressed with glacial speed while serious program and system deficiencies
continue." STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 102D CoNG., 2D
Sass., FEDERAL MINERALS ROYALTY MANAGEMENT 3 (Comm. Print 1992).
363. See Statement Reaffirming the Government-to-Government Relationship Between the
Federal Government and Indian Tribal Governments, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 783 (June
14, 1991). See also the discussion of tribes-as-states under amendments to federal environmental
laws during the 1980s and 1990s, infra at text accompanying notes 533-552.
364. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
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enacted the Indian Energy Resources Act (IERA).365 In essence, the
IERA continues and expands the policy objectives of the Indian Min-
eral Development Act of 1982. The purposes of the IERA are to pro-
mote tribal economic self-sufficiency through energy development
and to further tribal control of mineral development on Indian
lands.3 6 To achieve these purposes, the Act establishes three energy
resource programs consisting of demonstration projects, grants, and
technical assistance for the development of energy resources and
projects in Indian country.
First, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary
of the Interior, is charged with establishing and implementing demon-
stration projects to increase development of energy resources on In-
dian reservations. 67 The aim of these demonstration projects is to
promote direct tribal control of mineral development through im-
proved tribal management and technical capabilities.3 68 Accordingly,
the Act calls for the Secretary of Energy to provide technical assist-
ance as well as two types of grants: development grants to assist tribes
in obtaining managerial and technical capacity for energy resource de-
velopment, and grants for vertical integration projects.369
Vertical integration is a concept designed to ensure that tribes
receive more of the economic benefits of mineral production and take
more control over that process.370 At present, few tribal energy re-
sources are processed or refined within Indian country.37 1 Instead, In-
dian energy minerals are taken off-reservation for processing, with the
result that tribes receive little or none of the economic benefits of
processing activities.372 Vertical integration projects, which promote
the use or processing of tribal energy resources in Indian country, 37 3
365. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506 (1992 Supp.).
366. H.R. REP. No. 474 pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1992).
367. 25 U.S.C. § 3503 (Supp. IV 1992).
368. H.R. REP. No. 474 pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1992).
369. 25 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (Supp. IV 1992). In addition to the grants, the Secretary is also
charged with making low interest loans available to tribes for the promotion of energy resource
development and vertical integration. 25 U.S.C. § 3503(b) (Supp. IV 1992). The Act authorizes
appropriations of $10 million each year for fiscal years 1994 through 1997 for each of the three
financial programs: the two grant programs and the low interest loan program. 25 U.S.C.
§ 3503(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
370. H.R. REP. No. 474 pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 93, 94 (1992).
371. Id.
372. Id
373. 25 U.S.C. § 3503(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). Sample vertical integration projects include
"solar and wind energy, oil refineries, the generation and transmission of electricity, hydroelec-
tricity, cogeneration, natural gas distribution, and clean, innovative uses of coal." Id. Grants
may also be available for transportation and marketing of energy resources. H.R. REP. No. 474
pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 93, 94 (1992).
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are intended to return to the tribal mineral owners such economic
benefits as employment and management training opportunities, as
well as greater direct economic returns on development.37 4 Along
with increased economic effects, however, will come increased envi-
ronmental effects. While the economic effects are presumably benefi-
cial, the environmental effects of refining and processing activities can
be severe.3 75 The Indian Energy Resources Act makes no provision
for financial or technical assistance to tribes to counter the potential
for environmental harm.
In addition to the grants for vertical integration and other dem-
onstration projects, the Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior to
make grants, and the Secretaries of Interior and Energy to provide
technical assistance and data, to tribes for the purpose of developing
tribal regulation of energy resources and participation in energy de-
velopment activities.376 To those ends, funds can be used for em-
ployee training and education, development of tribal energy
databases, development of tribal laws and regulations, development of
tribal legal and governmental structures for environmental regulation,
and enforcement and monitoring activities.377
Finally, the Act authorizes the Secretary of Energy to provide fi-
nancial assistance to tribes, or the private sector in cooperation with
tribes, for projects concerning energy efficiency and renewable en-
ergy.378 Funds are available for projects "to evaluate the feasibility of,
develop options for, and encourage the adoption of energy efficiency
and renewable energy projects on Indian reservations. '379
In implementing the Act and its programs, the Secretary of En-
ergy is directed to consult with tribes "in a manner that is consistent
374. Id.
375. See the discussion of the environmental effects of processing and refining activities, in-
fra at text accompanying notes 480-483.
376. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (Supp. IV 1992). Specifically, the Secretaries are authorized to as-
sist tribes "in the development, administration, implementation, and enforcement of tribal laws
and regulations governing the development of energy resources on Indian reservations." An
additional $10 million for each of fiscal years 1994 through 1997 is authorized for this program.
25 U.S.C. § 3504(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
377. Id. § 3504(b).
378. Id. § 3506.
379. Id. § 3506(a). The applicant "must evidence coordination and cooperation with, and
support from, local educational institutions and the affected local energy institutions." Id.
§ 3506(b). The extent of involvement by these institutions is one of the factors the Secretary is
to consider in determining the amount of financial assistance. Id. § 3506(c)(1). For the most
part, funds are available only on a cost-sharing basis. Id. § 3506(d). No appropriation amount
was authorized; rather, "sums as are necessary" are authorized. Id. § 3506(e).
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with the Federal trust and the Government-to-Government relation-
ships".38  While this statutory mandate is vague at best, Congress
stated that it intended the Act and its consultation provision to re-
quire "the full participation" of tribes in developing regulations and
policy initiatives.38' The Act itself provides only that the Secretary
"shall involve and consult with Indian tribes to the maximum extent
possible and where appropriate, 382 but all aspects of the implementa-
tion of the IERA would seem to be "appropriate" for tribal involve-
ment and tribal involvement in all aspects would seem necessary to
the "full participation" envisioned by Congress. Nonetheless, the con-
sultation requirement is sufficiently ambiguous that complete tribal
involvement in the Act's implementation is not assured.
In addition to the programs for furthering tribal control of and
involvement in energy development, the Indian Energy Resources
Act also establishes the Indian Energy Resource Commission.383 The
Commission is composed of 18 members appointed by the Secretary
of the Interior plus the Secretaries of the Interior and Energy or their
designees.A Only eight of the appointed members are chosen from
tribal recommendations;385 six of the remaining members are ap-
pointed from the private sector, while three are state representatives
and one is chosen from recommendations by national environmental
organizations.386 Given the Commission's mandate, its composition is
problematic. Not only do Indian interests represent less than a major-
ity of the Commission membership, but eight individuals will speak
for dozens of tribes, including tribes with a stake in the Commission's
recommendations but without the "developable energy resources"
necessary to be included.3 7
380. Id. § 3502.
381. H.R. RaP. No. 474 pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1992).
382. 25 U.S.C. § 3502 (Supp. IV 1992).
383. Id. § 3505.
384. Id. § 3505(b).
385. Id. 3505(b)(1). These eight members are appointed "from recommendations submitted
by Indian tribes with developable energy resources, at least 4 of whom shall be elected tribal
leaders."
386. Id. 3505(b)(2)-(6). The private sector representatives include two each with expertise in
"tribal and State taxation of energy resources," "oil and gas royalty management administration,
including auditing and accounting," and "energy development". The three state representatives
are appointed from "recommendations submitted by the Governors of States that have Indian
reservations with developable energy resources."
387. As noted, only tribes with developable energy resources are authorized to make recom-
mendations to the Interior Secretary regarding potential Commission members. And yet the
Commission's statutory mandate includes making proposals regarding issues - such as dual
state-tribal taxation - that potentially affect all tribes. On the difficulties inherent in federal
appointment of a small number of individuals to speak for hundreds of tribes, see generally Nell
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The Commission is charged with developing proposals on a
number of aspects of mineral development, including two that have
been troublesome under the 1938 and 1982 Acts.388 First, the Com-
mission is to develop recommendations on dual tribal-state taxation of
mineral lessees.3 89 This mandate is a direct reaction to the Supreme
Court's 1989 decision in Cotton Petroleum, which validated concurrent
state taxation of oil and gas lessees already taxed by the tribe.390 In
charging the Commission with investigating the dual taxation issue,
Congress made clear its belief that Cotton Petroleum was wrongly de-
cided.39' If the Commission gives proper weight to tribal sovereignty
and the tribal need for governmental revenue, as well as to federal
policies promoting tribal self-government and economic development,
it should recommend that concurrent state taxing authority be abol-
ished. Dual taxation forces tribes into a choice of intolerable alterna-
tives: to impose a tribal tax on top of a state tax and thus reduce the
market value of tribal minerals, or to forego a tribal tax and thus lose
both the revenue and the regulatory control that a tax affords.392 Any
state tax, regardless of the percentage amount, imposes untenable
burdens on tribal control over the development of mineral resources
in Indian country, and should be expressly prohibited.393
Jessup Newton, Let a Thousand Policy-Flowers Bloom: Making Indian Policy in the Twenty-First
Century, 46 ARK. L. REv. 25 (1993). As Professor Newton notes, many proposals "that appear
to be designed to open up the consultative process to more tribes are much more likely to in-
crease the appearance of consensus in Indian country and the ease with which Congress may
obtain tribal input on legislation." Id. at 32.
388. The Commission is charged with seven specific duties, four of which focus on energy
resource development. See 25 U.S.C. § 3505(k)(4)-(7) (Supp. IV 1992). Those four are designed
to carry out the IERA. The Commission is mandated to develop proposals on incentives, includ-
ing tax incentives, to promote the development of Indian energy resources; identify "barriers or
obstacles" to energy resource development; and develop proposals for vertical integration in
Indian country.
389. 25 U.S.C. § 3505(k)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). The Commission's recommendations are to
cover dual taxation of all mineral resources, not just energy resources.
390. See the discussion of Cotton Petroleum supra at text accompanying notes 226-254 (1938
Act leases) and 340-347 (1982 Act agreements).
391. According to one report:
The Committee [on Interior and Insular Affairs] is concerned about the disincentive
the Cotton case has created for oil and gas companies who wish to locate on Indian
land. ... The Committee strongly questions the Court's reasoning and views the allow-
ance of this state severance tax as potentially contrary to the fundamental principles of
tribal sovereignty and the Congressional policy to create economic development on
reservations.
H.R. RaP. No. 474 pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 93, 95-96 (1992).
392. See the discussion infra at notes 451-452.
393. To the extent that the state provides services to the lessees within Indian country, and
thus has a valid economic argument, there are means other than taxation available to address it.
It may be that the services presently provided by the state could be provided instead by the tribe
or the federal government, thus obviating the state's interest in taxation. Alternatively, either
60
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss3/3
TRIBAL MINERAL RESOURCES
Second, the Commission is directed to develop proposals on oil
and gas royalty management.394 Despite royalty management reforms
in 1982, 39 Congress recently recognized the "disturbing truth" that
"little has changed to improve the process" in the intervening dec-
ade.396 Instead, the industry remains on the honor system, underpay-
ment of royalties continues to cost tribes millions every year, and
there is still no method of tracing royalties from the source payment
to the tribal owner.397 Having failed to effect any significant changes
in the system with passage of the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Man-
agement Act, Congress is offering the Commission an opportunity to
do what Congress apparently cannot: develop real reforms of the pres-
ent system.
The ultimate value of the IERA remains to be seen. Certainly
the Act's promised technical and financial assistance should benefit
tribes struggling to control mineral development with inadequate in-
formation, staffing, and funding. Beyond those aspects, however, the
Act's assurances of tribal control are vague and the statutory language
equivocal. The proof of Congress' worthy intentions may lie in the
Commission's eventual recommendations and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, in congressional implementation of true reform. The Supreme
Court's authorization of dual mineral taxation in Cotton Petroleum is
overdue for congressional repudiation, and effective reforms of roy-
alty management have eluded Congress for over a decade. If Con-
gress is finally able to resolve taxation and royalty issues in favor of
tribal self-government, tribes should benefit through increased tribal
revenues as well as increased tribal control over mineral development
in Indian country.
E. Conclusion
The past two decades have seen greatly increased tribal control
the lessee or the tribe could agree to payments in lieu of taxes, payments that would be narrowly
tailored to the actual costs incurred by the states in providing the services. In this manner, the
legitimate economic interests of the states could be adequately addressed without the present
burdens on tribal self-government and economic development.
394. 25 U.S.C. § 3505(k)(2)-(3) (Supp. IV 1992). Specifically, the Commission is mandated
to "make recommendations to improve the management, administration, accounting and audit-
ing of royalties associated with the production of oil and gas on Indian reservations" and to
"develop alternatives for the collection and distribution of royalties associated with production
of oil and gas on Indian reservations." Although the Commission's mandate is written in terms
of oil and gas, reforms in the royalty management system should extend to all minerals.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 350-354.
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over mineral development of Indian lands. Tribal control over the ini-
tial decision to develop tribal minerals has been expanded; tribes not
only must consent to the development agreement, but they are also
accorded a 30-day right to reconsider before secretarial approval be-
comes final. In negotiating mineral agreements, tribes have gained
the opportunity for ownership interests in mineral development, for
enhanced economic benefits, and for secondary benefits such as em-
ployment preferences and training programs. Congress has promised
funds for demonstration projects and grants to stimulate energy pro-
duction, processing, and use on Indian lands, and has appointed a
commission to address two of the major remaining problem areas:
royalty management and state taxation of non-Indian producers.
Nonetheless, problems remain. Mineral agreements place tribes
at greater risk than leases, and tribes too often negotiate without ade-
quate information, expertise, or advice. While tribes have increased
power over the initial decision whether to enter into a mineral agree-
ment, tribal control over, or even consent to, later steps in the mineral
development process is still limited. And the potential economic ben-
efits of mineral development remain circumscribed by possible state
taxation of the non-Indian producers and by the continuing failure of
the federal government to institute a workable royalty management
system.
These limitations on tribal control over mineral development and
its economic impacts are inconsistent with modem federal policies
promoting tribal self-government and economic self-sufficiency. In
keeping with those federal policies, however, tribes have begun in the
last decade or two to assert sovereign rights over certain aspects of
mineral development. Acting as regulators, particularly in the fields
of taxation and environmental protection, tribes are taking govern-
mental control of resource development in Indian country.
V. TRIBES AS REGULATORS: CONTROL OF THE MINERAL ESTATE
The final role of Indian tribes in the development and manage-
ment of the mineral estate is that of government. Indian tribes are not
only beneficial owners of the mineral resources, not only lessors and
now developers of the minerals, but also sovereign entities with gov-
ernmental powers of regulation and taxation.
Since the onset of the federal policy of self-government and the
enactment of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, federal policy
[Vol. 29:541
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regarding mineral development on Indian lands has ostensibly pro-
moted tribal self-government. Tribal governmental rights, however,
were generally limited to the power to consent to mineral leasing, a
power essentially indistinguishable from the right of any landowner to
consent to mineral development of the land. True federal recognition
of Indian tribes as governments rather than mineral owners was all
but nonexistent.3 9 8 Mineral development legislation in the 1980s and
1990s offers greater recognition of the role of tribes as governments,
and greater opportunities for tribes to act as sovereigns as well as min-
eral owners and developers. Nonetheless, tribal regulatory control
over mineral resources developed outside the federal scheme for min-
eral activities in Indian country.
The late 1960s and 1970s saw the "reemergence of tribal national-
ism."39 9 As federal policy emerged from the termination years, and
focused on tribal self-determination and economic self-sufficiency,
tribes increasingly began to assert dormant governmental powers.
The self-government promise of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 finally began to find expression more than three decades later.400
Since the founding of the nation, federal law has recognized
tribes as "distinct, independent political communities" retaining inher-
ent sovereign rights.40 ' In particular, tribes retain the right to control
internal tribal matters, "to make their own laws and be ruled by
them. '4 2  In consequence, Indian tribes have inherent, and virtually
plenary, sovereign power to regulate Indian conduct and Indian lands
Within reservation boundaries.403
398. The prime example is the lack of tribal authority over mineral development on allot-
ments. Allotments are lands held in trust by members (citizens) of the tribe, within the tribe's
territorial jurisdiction. Nonetheless, mineral leasing of allotted lands is controlled by the federal
government, with tribes having no right to control or even consult in leasing decisions. See
Maxfield, supra note 113, at 70; Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra note 112, at 172
(statement of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation).
399. The phrase was coined by Israel, supra note 311.
400. As Israel notes, "No single occurrence or event brought about the reawakening of tribal
sovereignty." Id. at 624. Israel chronicles, however, three series of events that combined to
create the great surge of tribal sovereignty during those years: increased protection of Indian
rights, increased federal funding to tribes, and successful actions by tribes asserting their legal
rights. Id. at 624-34.
401. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
402. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
403. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,332 (1983); Brendale v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 444 (1989) (Stevens, J.).
Tribal regulation of Indians and Indian lands is subject to the plenary power of the federal
government. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("Congress has
plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate" tribal governmental powers.). See also Nell Jes-
sup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians. Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 124 U. PA. L.
REv. 195 (1984). By contrast, states are permitted to regulate Indian conduct or Indian lands
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Tribal authority over non-Indians and non-Indian lands, however,
may be more limited. As a general proposition, tribes retain all gov-
ernmental powers that have not been ceded by treaty, divested by act
of Congress, or lost under the judicial doctrine of implied divesti-
ture.4°4 Under Supreme Court doctrine, Indian tribes are impliedly
divested of certain sovereign powers that are deemed inconsistent
with their status as dependent sovereigns.4 °5 The powers lost to tribes
in this manner were initially limited to certain rights of the tribes vis-
a-vis other nations,4 °6 but in the late 1970s and early 1980s the Court
extended the doctrine to encompass areas of the relations between
tribes as governments and non-Indians.40 7
Under this expanded theory of implied divestiture, tribes are pre-
sumed to have lost regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-
Indian fee land within Indian country.408 That presumption, however,
is riddled with crucial qualifications. First, it applies only to non-In-
dian activity on fee land; non-Indian activity on Indian land remains
subject to tribal regulation.40 9 Second, Indian tribes retain inherent
governmental authority to regulate the activities of non-Indians who
inside Indian country only in "exceptional circumstances." California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 (1987). The Supreme Court has confined those circumstances to
two situations: liquor regulation and conservation of species. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713
(1983); Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
404. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
405. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). See also Brendale v.
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 424-25 (1989) (White, J.). The ill-reasoned and ahistorical
Oliphant decision unleashed massive and continuing criticism. See, e.g., Russel L. Barsh & James
Y. Henderson, The Betraya" Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark,
63 MrNN. L. Rv. 609 (1979); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis.
L. REv. 219, 267-274; Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater
than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CoN-rEMP. L. 391 (1993).
406. In the early 1800s, Chief Justice John Marshall determined, under the relations between
the United States and the tribes, that tribes had lost the powers to freely alienate land and to
enter into foreign relations. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587-88 (1823); Worces-
ter v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). The doctrine then remained essentially dormant
for 150 years, until revived and modified by Justice Rehnquist in Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208-10.
407. Id. at 210 (criminal jurisdiction); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981)
(regulatory jurisdiction).
408. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. Most recently, the Supreme Court has formulated the pre-
sumption as follows: "when an Indian tribe conveys ownership of its tribal lands to non-Indians,
it loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands.
The abrogation of this greater right ... implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of
the land by others." South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1993). Nonetheless, the
Court in Bourland reaffirmed the Montana exceptions to the general proposition. Id. at 2320.
The Montana exceptions are listed infra at text accompanying notes 410-412.
409. Non-Indians' "presence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations
the tribe may choose to impose." Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982).
See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1983); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
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enter into consensual business relationships with the tribe.41 0 In par-
ticular, the Supreme Court recognized tribal regulatory powers of
"taxation, licensing, or other means" over those non-Indians who
enter into "commercial dealing[s], contracts, leases, or other arrange-
ments" in Indian country.41' And third, Indian tribes retain govern-
mental powers to regulate non-Indian conduct on fee land which will
have a substantial effect on the tribe. In its initial formulation of this
standard, the Court recognized tribal regulatory power over non-In-
dian conduct "when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or wel-
fare of the tribe." '412 Under that "direct effects" rubric, lower courts
upheld assertions of tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians in
such areas as building, health, and safety codes, sewer hook-up re-
quirements, and in particular, zoning laws.413 When the issue of tribal
power to zone non-Indian fee land reached the Supreme Court, how-
ever, the Court cut back significantly on tribal regulatory authority.
In Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation,4 14 the Court ruled that
tribes could zone non-Indian fee land only where the reservation, or
an area of the reservation, had retained its "essential character" as
Indian land.415 If the essential Indian character of the region had
been lost through significant non-Indian ownership of the land, how-
ever, zoning power belonged to the state.416 Although the outcome in
Brendale was an aggregate of three separate non-majority deci-
sions, 417 a majority of the justices attempted some reformulation of
410. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 566.
413. See Cardin v. DeLaCruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982)
(building, health and safety codes); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep. 3025
(W.D. Wash. 1982) (sewer hook-ups); Knight v. Shoshone & Arapaho Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d
900 (10th Cir. 1982) (zoning); Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Community v. Mendocino
County, 684 F.Supp. 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (zoning); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Cavenham
Forest Industries, 14 Indian L. Rep. 6043 (Colv. Tr. Ct. 1987) (zoning).
414. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). See generally Craighton Goeppele, Note, Solutions for Uneasy
Neighbors: Regulating the Reservation Environment After Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 65 WAsH. L. Rnv. 417 (1990).
415. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 440-43 (Stevens, J.).
416. Id. at 446-47.
417. The Court split 4-2-3. Four justices, led by white, argued that tribes had no authority to
zone non-Indian fee land within Indian country, regardless of the character of the region, absent
"serious injury" to tribal interests. Three justices, led by Blackmun, argued that tribes had full
authority to zone non-Indian fee land within Indian country, regardless of the character of the
region. And the two swing justices, led by Stevens, argued that the character of the region was
controlling. The result was that tribes retain authority to zone where the region is of an essential
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the "direct effects" test for tribal regulatory authority over non-Indian
conduct. Justice White, writing for himself and three other justices,
focused on the fact that the direct effects test stated only that tribes
"may" have regulatory authority over non-Indians.418 Accordingly,
White argued, tribes do not retain regulatory authority in every in-
stance of a direct effect on the tribe, but only where the impact of the
non-Indian conduct on the tribe is "demonstrably serious" and "im-
peril[s]" the interests of the tribe.419 Justice Blackmun, writing for
three justices, would, if anything, have broadened the direct effects
test. He argued that tribes have the authority to regulate non-Indian
conduct on non-Indian fee land whenever that conduct "implicate[s] a
significant tribal interest."420
The effects of Brendale on tribal regulatory authority over non-
Indians are difficult to calculate. Although the "direct effects" stan-
dard has likely been modified, exactly what that modification is, or
what the new standard might be, is elusive. Regardless of the precise
standard, however, the Brendale decision reaffirms tribal regulatory
authority over Indians and Indian lands,421 as well as over non-Indians
and non-Indian lands in many circumstances. While the regulatory
powers of tribal governments encompass the full range of police pow-
ers,422 two aspects of tribal sovereign authority crucial to mineral de-
velopment - taxation and environmental regulation - will be the
focus of this section.
A. Taxation of Mineral Production
Taxation of mineral extraction and production is a common gov-
ernmental response to mining. Natural resources taxes provide gov-
ernmental revenue, compensate the sovereign for the loss of the
resource, internalize the social and environmental costs of mineral de-
velopment, and help regulate the growth of mineral development and
418. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,566 (1981)).
419. Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 429-31 (1989).
420. l at 449-51. Blackmun then concluded that no power was more central to the tribes'
interests than the power to zone. Id. at 457-58.
421. Id at 443-45 (Stevens, J.) (noting that the Yakima Nation "of course, retains authority
to regulate the use of trust land, and the county does not contend otherwise").
422. Other police powers relevant to mineral development include the powers to regulate
health and safety, building standards, water use, zoning, and labor. See Walter E. Stem, Envi-
ronmental Compliance Considerations for Developers of Indian Lands, 28 LAND & WATER L.
Rv. 77, 92-96, 101-02 (1993).
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related activities.4' Through the use of severance, income, and prop-
erty taxes,424 governments assert control over mineral development
activities and impacts within their territories.
With the renewed emphasis on tribal self-government and eco-
nomic development in the late 1960s and 1970s came renewed interest
in the tribal power to tax. Long before the self-determination era, the
tribal power of taxation was well established. The inherent right of
tribes, as sovereigns, to tax both members and nonmembers engaged
in activities in Indian country had been recognized by the federal
courts since the late nineteenth century,4' and by the Department of
the Interior since the self-government days of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act.426 By 1976, when the American Indian Policy Review Com-
mission reported to Congress that the taxing power of Indian tribes
was an essential attribute of their sovereign status,427 the proposition
seemed beyond question.
In the early self-determination era of the 1970s, however, tribes
began exercising their taxing authority at an unprecedented rate.
These new assertions of tribal powers, in turn, generated challenges by
the taxed and regulated parties. During those years, many of the min-
eral-owning tribes enacted tax laws applicable to mineral lessees of
Indian lands. Their primary reasons for taxation were those of any
government: revenue and regulation. First, rents and royalties were
set by the federal government at low rates, and the ability of tribes to
renegotiate leases to enhance tribal income was severely limited. Tax-
ation thus provided an additional and stable source of tribal reve-
nue.428 Moreover, taxation as a form of regulation could be used to
discourage pollution and, through tax credits, to encourage employ-
ment of tribal members and use of tribal products and services.429
423. Ronald A. Kaiser & James E. Fletcher, State Policies and Practices in Coal Severance
Taxation, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 591, 595-97 (1987).
424. These are the most common forms of natural resources taxation. For explanations of
the various types of natural resources taxes, see Denise DiPasquale, et a]., Natural Resource
Taxation, 29 AMER. U.L. REV. 281, 284-89 (1980); Rita Neumann, Taxation of Natural Resource
Production on Tribal Lands, 63 TAXES 813, 816-18 (1985).
425. See, e.g., Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384,393 (1904); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,
231 F.2d 89, 99 (8th Cir. 1956); Crabtree v. Madden, 54 Fed. 426, 429 (8th Cir. Indian Terr. 1893).
426. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Int. Dec. 14, 46-48 (1934), reprinted in I Op. Sol. Dep't of
Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974 445, 465-66.
427. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT TASK FORCE Two:
TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 310 (1976).
428. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 196.
429. Id. at 196-99.
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Despite the benefits of these taxes for the tribes, however, min-
eral lessees challenged their application. Initially, taxation became a
bargaining point in negotiated mineral agreements. During the 1970s,
as tribes moved away from standard leasing and toward negotiated
agreements, producers bargained to prevent tribes from exercising
their right to tax. Some tribes during the post-energy boom years
were forced to offer "blanket tax holidays" in exchange for other con-
cessions from mining companies. 430 Nonetheless, most tribes involved
in mineral development retained their sovereign power to tax the
companies involved in extracting the mineral wealth.
In addition to challenging tribal taxes at the bargaining table,
mineral lessees also challenged tribal taxes in court. Oil and gas les-
sees on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation brought suit to enjoin a tribal
severance tax enacted in 1976, arguing that the Tribe was without au-
thority to impose a tax after the lease terms were finalized. In Mer-
rion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,431 the Supreme Court upheld the tribal
tax as a valid exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereign power to gov-
ern. 432 The lessees' argument, the Court noted, confused the tribe's
dual roles as mineral owner and government.433 While a lessor has no
right unilaterally to alter the terms of a lease, sovereign powers are
another matter. The sovereign does not abandon its powers by failing
to reserve them in a commercial contract, and the contract remains
430. Id. at 255. One example is the 1975 oil and gas agreement between Damson Oil Corpo-
ration and the Blackfeet Tribe, in which the Tribe agreed that it "shall never tax in any way
whatsoever, whether directly or indirectly, the operations contemplated hereunder." Ziontz,
supra note 287, at 13-21 (quoting Damson-Blackfeet contract).
431. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The Merrion decision spawned considerable scholarly comment.
See Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., The Taxation of Natural Resources by Indian Tribes: Merrion, a Com-
ment, 22 NAT. REsOURCEs J. 649 (1982); Russel L. Barsh, Merrion: False Hope for Clear Think-
ing, 8 AMER. INDiAN J. 6 (1982); Samuel Febbraio, Jr., Note, Tribal Severance Taxes: The
Uncertain Sovereign Function: Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 4 U. BRiDGEPORT L. REv. 133
(1982); David. B. Wiles, Note, Taxation: Tribal Taxation, Secretarial Approval, and State Taxa-
tion-Merrion and Beyond, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 167 (1982); Note, Indian Tribe's Taxing
Authority Extends over Nonmembers of Tribe: Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 36 TAX LAW.
431 (1983); Stuart R. Day, Note, Indian Law-Tribal Authority to Levy a Mineral Severance Tax
on Non-Indian Lessees, 18 LAND & WATER L. Rlv. 539 (1983); David Goldstein, Note, Indian
Law-Indian Taxation of Non-Indian Mineral Lessees, 50 TENN. L. REv. 403 (1983); Anne M.
Ryan, Note, Tribal Taxation of Mineral Resource Development: An Analysis of Merrion v. Ji-
carilla Apache Tribe, 25 ARiz. L. REv. 220 (1983); Raymond E. Cantor, Comment, Indian Sov-
ereignty-Commerce Clause-Taxation, 28 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1079 (1984). On the special
issues of tribal taxation in Oklahoma, see Bradley S. Bridgewater, Note, Taxation: Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe: Wine or Vinegar for Oklahoma Tribes?, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 369 (1984).
432. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
433. Id. at 145.
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subject to subsequent governmental action.434 Thus, tribes as sover-
eign governments retain the power to tax nonmembers to the extent
that the nonmembers enjoy the privileges of activities in Indian coun-
try.435 Since the non-Indian mineral developers availed themselves of
the privilege of doing business on Indian lands, and benefited from
the provision of tribal services funded by governmental revenues, they
were subject to tribal taxation.436
Three years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the tribal
power to tax is an inherent sovereign power, and does not depend
upon the form of the tribal government. In Kerr-McGee Corporation
v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,43 7 a mineral lessee sought to differentiate
taxes imposed by the Navajo Nation from the taxes upheld in Mer-
rion. The Jicarilla Apache tribal government was organized under the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,438 and its constitution, like those
of most IRA tribes, called for secretarial approval of tax laws.439 The
Navajo Nation, by contrast, was not an IRA government and its taxes
were not approved by the Secretary of the Interior.440  In Kerr-Mc-
Gee, the Supreme Court rejected any notion that secretarial approval
of tribal taxes was a prerequisite to valid tax laws. The Court again
stressed that the tribal power to tax derives from inherent sover-
eignty.441 Absent a provision in the tribe's constitution or some other
law mandating secretarial approval, no such approval is required." 2
434. Id. at 146-47. If, however, the sovereign expressly bargains away its sovereign power to
tax, the lease term would be binding.
435. ld. at 137-38, 141-42. The Merrion decision was not the first time the Court had stated
that principle. In a pair of cases in the early 1980s, the Court expressly affirmed a tribe's inher-
ent sovereign right to tax non-Indians who did business in Indian country. Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reser-
vation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980). See also Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe,
924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3013 (1992). The Supreme Court of the
Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes recently extended this principle to uphold tribal severance taxes
on oil and gas development on allotted lands held in trust for members of the tribes. Mustang
Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tax Comm'n, No. CNA-SC-91-02 (Chey-Arap. S.Ct. 1994).
436. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-38, 140-42.
437. 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
438. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
439. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 135 (1982). In upholding the Jicarilla
Apache tax, the Supreme Court noted that any non-Indian concerns about unfair or unprinci-
pled taxation were addressed by the requirement of prior secretarial approval. 1d. at 141.
440. Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1985).
441. Ld. at 198-201.
442. Id. at 198-99. The Court noted, in fact, that IRA tribes are free to amend their constitu-
tions, with secretarial approval, to eliminate the requirement of secretarial approval of tribal
laws. Id. at 199.
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As federal policy settled more firmly behind tribal self-govern-
ment and economic development, and as tribes took increasing con-
trol over mineral development activities on Indian lands, tribal
mineral taxation expanded. Mineral taxes brought much-needed tri-
bal revenue, which in turn helped fund much-needed tribal govern-
mental services. The enactment of tax laws avoided the need for
tribes to negotiate taxes in each agreement for development of tribal
resources,443 and provided developers with advance information on
their tax obligations.
In the early 1980s, then, non-Indian mineral producers generally
submitted to paying tribal mineral taxes. State mineral taxes were
also imposed on the producers, but under a long-standing practice
were passed along to the tribes .by deducting the taxes from royalties
due.444 In 1985, however, the same year that Kerr-McGee was de-
cided, the Supreme Court held that the pass-along practice constituted
state taxation of Indians, and was therefore barred.445 Suddenly, non-
Indian mineral companies were facing dual taxation.
Unable to escape the tribal taxes, the mineral lessees focused on
the additional burden of state mineral taxes. Initially the challenges
were successful: Montana's 30 percent severance tax on coal mined on
Crow lands was held invalid." 6 In Cotton Petroleum Corporation v.
New Mexico,' 7 however, the Supreme Court held that state taxation
on top of tribal taxation was not barred by the 1938 Indian Mineral
Leasing Act,448 was not (under the circumstances of that case) pre-
empted by principles of federal Indian law,449 and did not constitute
an unlawful multiple tax burden under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.45 ° Accordingly, the Court stated, non-Indian mineral lessees
were subject to both tribal and state taxes on mineral production.
443. Ziontz, supra note 287, at 13-32.
444. See supra text accompanying note 206.
445. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). See the discussion of Mon-
tana supra at text accompanying notes 204-215.
446. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 484 U.S.
997 (1988).
447. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
448. See supra text accompanying notes 226-231.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 232-254.
450. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187-91. The Court determined that the obvious burden of
dual taxation "is entirely attributable to the fact that the leases are located in an area where two
governmental entities share jurisdiction [to tax]." Id. at 163. The Court also rejected any need
-to apportion the state and tribal taxes under the Interstate Commerce Clause, noting that the
Interstate Commerce Clause has never been held applicable to Indian tribes. Id. at 191-93.
"'Tribal reservations are not States.'" Id. at 192 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980)).
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But dual taxation places tribes in an untenable position. The dual
tax burden renders tribal mineral development considerably less at-
tractive than development of off-reservation minerals, reducing the
value of the mineral resource. To the extent that companies continue
to develop tribal minerals, dual taxation will result in higher market
prices for tribal resources, decreasing their marketability. Either ef-
fect diminishes tribal control of mineral development on Indian lands
and undercuts tribal economic development, in direct opposition to
current federal Indian policy. The alternative, however, impacts the
tribe not only as mineral owner and developer, but also as sovereign
government. In order to attract mineral development in a dual tax
situation, tribes may be forced to lower their tax rates or negotiate tax
immunities in exchange for continued mineral development.451 Like
full dual taxation, that alternative also diminishes tribal control and
undercuts economic development, since tribes lose considerable reve-
nues and can no longer use taxation as a form of regulation. But it
also cedes a sovereign power, again in direct opposition to the federal
approach to tribes as governmental entities. While tax incentives for
economic development are an increasingly common governmental
tool, the concern is that tribes, like other governments desperate for
jobs and industry, "are apt to bargain away their right to tax for
nothing. 452
The newly-created Indian Energy Resource Commission is
charged with developing proposals to address the dual tribal-state tax-
ation of mineral development,453 based on Congress' understanding
that the Supreme Court's decision in Cotton Petroleum was contrary
to tribal self-government and the federal policy of economic develop-
ment.454 The Commission is also mandated to develop proposals for
tax incentives for mineral development in Indian country.455 If the
Commission properly considers not only the needs of the tribes as
owners and developers, but also the sovereign rights of the tribes as
governments, it should propose to lift the dual tax burden on tribal
mineral development by barring concurrent state taxation of non-In-
dian producers.456
451. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 200, 255.
452. DiPasquale, supra note 424, at 297.
453. 25 U.S.C. § 3505(k)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). See supra text accompanying notes 374-377.
454. H.R. REP. No. 474 pt. 8, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96 (1992).
455. 25 U.S.C. § 3505(k)(7) (Supp. IV 1992). The proposals may include, but are not limited
to, such tax incentives as investment tax credits and enterprise zone credits.
456. State taxes should be barred, of course, even if the tribe does not impose a tax on the
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B. Environmental Controls
Environmental regulation in Indian country, as elsewhere in the
nation, was rudimentary at best before the middle of the twentieth
century. By the late 1960s, however, national attention focused on
environmental preservation, culminating in the landmark enactment
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969.457 Based
on NEPA's recognition of "the critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality,"458 state and federal legislatures
responded to public awareness with comprehensive pollution control
and remediation programs. 5 9
Environmental protection in Indian country lagged behind. Dur-
ing the years of growing environmental consciousness and concern,
tribes were asserting increased control over their mineral resources
and federal policy was encouraging tribal self-government.460  Both
the tribal and federal governments, however, concentrated on devel-
opment of the mineral resources rather than the environmental im-
pacts of development. 461 Nonetheless, recognition of the adverse
environmental effects of mineral development, particularly uranium
mining in the Southwest,462 was growing.
With increased awareness of environmental harm and increased
national attention to the environment, tribal governments began to
assert regulatory control over environmental matters. Tribal control
over the environmental aspects of mineral development can arise in a
producers. The decision not to tax an activity, like the decision to tax, is a sovereign prerogative
with which a state tax interferes.
457. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1988). NEPA is discussed infra at text accompanying notes
487-490.
458. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1988).
459. Environmental legislation was by no means new. For example, the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, precursor to the Clean Water Act, was first enacted in 1948, Act of June 30,
1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155, although it was amended frequently and substantially reworked in
1972. The Refuse Act, part of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, also addressed water pollu-
tion, though enforcement of the Act's provision was non-existent until the 1960s. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401 etseq. (1988). But the scope and extent of environmental legislation ushered in by NEPA
was unprecedented.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 261-266.
461. In fact, one of the benefits of Indian minerals for mining companies was the possible
shelter from state environmental laws, with tribes "agreeing to lower air and water quality stan-
dards than typically are required elsewhere." Indian Mineral Development Hearings, supra note
112, at 178 (statement of Russel L. Barsh). Although one factor in the decision of some tribes to
impose a moratorium on development in the early 1970s was the lack of environmental protec-
tion measures, most tribes were forced by economic pressures to develop their mineral re-
sources. AMBLER, supra note 4, at 72.
462. See, e.g., Robert Hilgendort, Black Mesa: Economic Development or Ecological Disas-
terfor the Navajo?, 30 NLADA BRmFCASE 171 (1972); Sandra E. Bregman, Uranium Mining on
Indian Lands: Blessing or Curse? 24 ENv'T 6 (Sept. 1982).
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number of ways. Tribes are free, in negotiating mineral agreements,
to include environmental protection provisions in the agreement. As
with tax provisions in agreements, however, it may not benefit the
tribe to circumscribe its governmental powers by delimiting them in
contract clauses. In the absence of an express contract provision limit-
ing governmental authority, Indian tribes have inherent sovereign
powers to regulate Indian conduct and Indian lands within reservation
boundaries, to regulate the activities of non-Indians who enter into
consensual business relationships with the tribe, and to regulate non-
Indian conduct on fee land which will have a substantial effect on the
tribe.4 63 Under these powers, tribes exercise general police power
over environmentally harmful activities.
Nonetheless, most future tribal environmental regulation will
likely result from delegated authority under federal environmental
laws. 4" Federal environmental law has occupied the field in such ar-
eas as clean air, clean water, and waste management, establishing fed-
eral minimum standards and programs applicable nationwide.465 For
the most part, the federal laws contemplate that all states will assume
program authority in the state and that some tribes will assume pro-
gram authority in Indian country, but that until that time, the appro-
priate federal agency will regulate environmental matters. Thus, in
the absence of a federally-approved state or tribal program, the fed-
eral government will administer those federal standards and programs
in state and tribal territories.466
The following sections describe the environmental impacts of
mineral development and related activities, and explore the environ-
mental protection options available to tribes to control the environ-
mental aspects of mining in Indian country.
463. See supra text accompanying notes 403-413.
464. As governments possessing independent powers to regulate environmental matters,
tribes are capable of assuming federally delegated regulatory powers. See United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975) (liquor regulation); see also Judith V. Royster & Rory
SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment. Tribal Primacy, Federal Delega-
tion, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REv. 581, 596-97 (1989).
465. Under the federal acts, states and tribes are generally permitted to enact standards
more stringent than the federal minimums, and may exercise their police powers to regulate
environmental matters not covered by the federal programs, but may not choose to regulate less
stringently than federal law requires.
466. See infra text accompanying notes 535-542.
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1. Environmental Effects of Mining
Despite the severe environmental effects of mining, its impor-
tance to national growth and the economy historically outweighed en-
vironmental concerns.467 The industry made some effort at
reclamation of surface mines in the early twentieth century, largely as
a public relations effort due to the obvious nature of the environmen-
tal damage,468 but widespread recognition of the pollution effects of
mining, and the need to control those effects, was slow to arrive. The
most obvious damage caused by mining - unreclaimed lands, waste
piles, and polluted waters - "was only the tip of a huge mining ice-
berg; like its cold counterpart, most of mining's destructive potential
lay hidden and uncomprehended at the time. '46 9
The environmental impacts of mineral development fall into
three categories: the direct effects of mining operations; the secondary
effects of mining-related activities; and the effects of mineral refining
and processing.
Perhaps the most serious direct environmental impact of mining
operations is water pollution. Surface water pollution results from the
dumping or release of mining wastes directly into streams or, more
commonly, from acid mine drainage.470 Acid mine drainage occurs
when water mixes with sulfur-bearing minerals, forming sulfuric acid.
The sulfuric acid, in turn, dissolves heavy metals such as lead, zinc,
and copper, and the resulting solution is carried downstream in the
surface waters.47 ' Acid mine drainage is considerably more acidic
than acid rain and, when substantial, can destroy aquatic life.472
Groundwater pollution is also a primary concern. Some portion
of acid mine drainage seeps back into the groundwater. Rainwater
and runoff also seep into the ground through exposed ore or waste
467. Smith refers to the "keystone conviction that mining and the success of America
marched inseparably, hand in hand, and the industry bestowed only benefits." SMrrH, supra
note 1, at 33-34. During the 1870s and 1880s, in fact, the mining industry claimed that mining
pollution was actually beneficial: smelter smoke destroyed disease-causing "microbes," arsenic
contributed to beautiful complexions, and sediment in mining waste water enriched the soil. Id.
at 45, 71.
468. Id. at 110-12.
469. Id. at 9.
470. Id.
471. CHARLES F. vILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FutruR OF THE WESr 49 (1992).
472. Id.; see also SMrrn, supra note 1, at 15. Acid mine drainage may be 20 to 300 times as
acidic as acid rain. WILKINSON, supra note 471, at 49.
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piles, carrying pollutants into the aquifers. Injection wells for oil re-
covery or solution mining of uranium can introduce significant con-
taminants into groundwater supplies.473 Use of water in the mining
processes, and in particular pumping of water for mine dewatering,
can cause substantial drops in the water table. Nearby wells may dry
up, and the reduced volume of groundwater is less able to dilute intro-
duced pollutants. 474
Air pollution is another direct consequence of mining. Wind-
blown dust from mining operations and waste piles can carry a variety
of pollutants. Exploratory boreholes through uranium-bearing ores
can, if not plugged, release radon gas into the air.47
Two types of mineral development emphasize these common di-
rect impacts and cause additional environmental problems. First, strip
mining, which exposes vast amounts of coal to the air, exacerbates the
problems with air-borne pollution and seepage into groundwater sup-
plies. Strip mining also devastates the land. Unless strip mined areas
are reclaimed, the land is scarred and'unsightly, unusable for agricul-
ture or grazing, and subject to erosion and floods.4 76 And second, ura-
nium mining, which boomed in the Southwest in the 1940s and 1950s,
adds the impact of radioactive contamination of the air and the
water.477
The secondary environmental effects of mineral development
arise not from the mining itself, but from related activities. Mineral
473. Lise Young, What Price Progress? Uranium Production on Indian Lands in the San Juan
Basin, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1981) (uranium solution mining); see also S. REP. No. 216,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1989) (detailing the irreparable destruction of the groundwater sup-
plies of the Sac and Fox Nation by a 30-year practice of injecting saltwater into oil reservoirs to
force the oil into production wells).
474. SMrri, supra note 1, at 14; Young, supra note 473, at 9-12.
475. Young, supra note 473, at 7.
476. SMrrH, supra note 1, at 113, 126.
477. For an excellent and detailed look at the environmental consequences of all phases of
uranium mining, see Young, supra note 473, at 4-23. Young also describes the health, socioeco-
nomic, and sociocultural effects on Indian communities.. Id. at 23-36.
The environmental dangers of uranium mining are particularly well illustrated by the UNC
Resources spill into waters of the Navajo Nation. In 1979, a uranium mill tailings pond operated
by LINC Resources at Church Rock, New Mexico (outside the Navajo Reservation), broke and
released millions of gallons of radioactive wastes into surface waters. The spill travelled through
the stream system into the Rio Puerco, a primary water supply for a portion of the Navajo
Reservation. Residents were warned not to drink the water or eat livestock that had drunk the
water, but Navajo sheepherders are dependent upon the stream for water and their sheep for
their food and livelihood. Accounts of the UNC spill can be found at Young, supra note 473, at
21-23; Winifred T. Gross, Tribal Resources: Federal Trust Responsibility: United States Energy
Development Versus Trust Responsibilities to Indian Tribes, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 309, 331-34
(1981). See also Mill Tailings Dam Break at Church Rock, New Mexico: Oversight Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
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development in remote areas requires construction of access roads.
Drilling operations may require the land to be "flattened and de-
nuded".478 The effects of these operations on the land can cause ero-
sion and even floods during spring runoff and heavy rains.479
Finally, where minerals are not transported to a remote location
for processing, there are the environmental impacts of refining and
processing activities. In situations where the costs of transporting ore
are too high, either because of remote or difficult terrain or simply the
enormous volume of ore extracted, mills, smelters, refineries, and
other processing facilities are located close to the mines.480 Smoke
from smelters may include sulfur, copper, and arsenic fumes.481 Mills
and processing plants produce wastes - in the case of uranium
processing, radioactive wastes482 - that must be disposed of or
stored. Liquid wastes can seep into the groundwater or be released
into surface streams; dried wastes may result in contaminated dust or
seepage into groundwater during rains.483
Because few energy resources extracted from Indian lands are
currently processed there,4 4 Indian country may thus far have es-
caped most of the environmental impacts of processing and refining
minerals. But in order to keep the economic benefits of mineral de-
velopment with the tribes, the Indian Energy Resources Act of 1992
promotes vertical integration projects, including the processing of en-
ergy minerals within Indian country.4s5 With the economic benefits of
vertical integration comes the potential for environmental harms.
Tribes today have a number of avenues available to control these
environmental effects of mineral development. Since the early 1970s,
the National Environmental Policy Act has mandated the considera-
tion of environmental impacts for mineral leases of Indian lands, pro-
viding tribes with badly-needed information on the effects of mining
activities. In 1977, Congress established environmental controls for
surface mining activities, although tribal participation under the sur-
face mining legislation has been limited by Interior's unnecessarily
crabbed interpretation of the statute. Beginning in the mid-1980s,
however, tribal participation in environmental protection programs
478. Young, supra note 473, at 6.
479. SMrrH, supra note 1, at 14.
480. See Young, supra note 473, at 19.
481. SMrrH, supra note 1, at 76.
482. Young, supra note 473, at 18-19.
483. Id. at 19-20.
484. HR. REP. No. 474, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 8, at 94 (1992).
485. 25 U.S.C. § 3503(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). See supra text accompanying notes 369-375.
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under other federal statutes burgeoned. Under the auspices of the
Environmental Protection Agency, tribes are increasingly taking con-
trol over the protection of their air and water resources, as well as
over the remediation of environmental harm. The following sections
explore these avenues available to tribes.
2. Environmental Impact Assessment
Some environmental controls on mineral development of Indian
lands are built into the leasing or agreement procedures.486 In partic-
ular, mineral development of Indian lands is subject to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),4 87 which mandates that an
environmental impact statement must be prepared for all "major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment. ' 4 8  Secretarial approval of leases of Indian lands constitutes
major federal action, and therefore the Secretary of Interior must
comply with NEPA in the approval process.489 Nonetheless, the re-
quirements of NEPA are procedural, not substantive. If an agency has
complied with NEPA's procedures, it may determine that "other val-
ues outweigh the environmental costs" and proceed with an environ-
mentally harmful action.490
Substantive requirements have been introduced into the mineral
development process by the regulations for the 1982 Indian Mineral
486. Until the mid-1980s, these controls were virtually the only means of environmental pro-
tection in Indian country. See TASK FORCE SEVEN REPORT, supra note 274, at 49 (as of 1976,
"Indians are unable to prevent environmental degradation resulting from development except
through the very cumbersome mechanism of the National Environmental Protection [sic] Act.").
487. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1988). On NEPA in Indian country generally, see Dean B.
Suagee, The Application of the National Environmental Policy Act to "Development" in Indian
Country, 16 Am. IINiA L. REv. 377 (1991); James P. Boggs, NEPA in the Domain of Federal
Indian Policy: Social Knowledge and the Negotiation of Meaning, 19 ENvr'L AFFAIRS 31 (1991).
488. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988).
489. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593,597 (10th Cir. 1972). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734,58,738
(1991) (25 C.F.R. § 211.7 (1993). The same requirement extends to secretarial approval of min-
eral agreements under the 1982 Act. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960, 14,974 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.24(a)).
Not every approval of a lease or agreement will necessarily trigger the preparation of an
environmental impact statement, although every approval will be subject to the requirements of
NEPA. On the implementation of NEPA in Indian country, see Suagee, supra note 487, at 420-
24. On the issue of when NEPA requires the preparation of a statement for mineral develop-
ment on federal lands, see generally Maria E. Mansfield, Through the Forest of the Onshore Oil
and Gas Leasing Controversy Toward a Paradigm of Meaningftl NEPA Compliance, 24 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 85 (1989); George C. Coggins & Jane E. Van Dyke, NEPA and Private Rights in
Public Mineral Resources: The Fee Complex Relative?, 20 ENv'rL L. 649 (1990).
490. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) ("NEPA itself
does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process."); see also
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989).
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Development Act. Those regulations provide that before the Secre-
tary can approve a mineral agreement, the Secretary must determine
that the agreement does not have an adverse environmental impact
"sufficient to outweigh its expected benefits to the Indian mineral
owners."491 These regulations should offer tribes greater protection
than the EIS requirement under NEPA. Not only must the Secretary
comply with the procedural requirements of NEPA, but also with the
substantive requirement that the benefits of a mineral agreement must
outweigh any adverse environmental effects. The Secretary's failure
to properly consider environmental impacts should be remediable by
an action for breach of trust.
These requirements, however, are mandates on the federal gov-
ernment and provide the tribes with little environmental control over
mineral development activities. Some measure of control may be pro-
vided by the environmental information uncovered by the environ-
mental impact statement process. To the extent that tribes are
provided with a fuller picture of the environmental impacts of pro-
posed mineral development, tribal consent to development will be
better informed.492 In particular, environmental information may be
useful to tribes entering into mineral agreements during the 30-day
reconsideration period before secretarial approval becomes final.493
In other ways, however, the NEPA requirements may undercut tribal
control, since any affected citizen may challenge the adequacy of an
environmental impact statement in court. Tribal members or non-In-
dians can potentially delay or disrupt the mineral development pro-
cess by court challenges on procedural grounds. 494
Despite its potential usefulness to tribes, however, NEPA serves
only to focus awareness on the environmental impacts of mineral de-
velopment. It offers tribes no direct control over environmental mat-
ters in Indian country. The first attempt to bring tribes within the
federal environmental protection programs, and thus to offer some
measure of control over environmental issues, occurred in 1977 with
enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
491. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960, 14,974 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.22(c)(2)).
492. See Suagee, supra note 487, at 427 (noting that "tribes can use the NEPA process to
reach better decisions, at least in the environmental sense").
493. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(c) (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 316-318.
494. On the other hand, tribes may sometimes find it useful to delay the mineral develop-
ment process by challenging the Secretary's compliance with NEPA. See TASK FORCE SEVEN
REPORT, supra note 274, at 49 (noting that as an environmental tool for tribes, "NEPA's main
contribution is to cause delay").
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3. Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act
Although the environmental impacts of surface mining have been
the most obvious, by the dawning of the modem environmental move-
ment in the late 1960s only 14 states had enacted laws to regulate sur-
face mining.495 As a result of state reluctance to control surface
mining and its effects, the focus turned to federal regulation. After
nine years and two presidential vetoes,496 the federal government
obliged by enacting the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977 (SMCRA).497
SMCRA established two major programs, designed to compre-
hensively regulate the environmental effects of surface mining. The
abandoned mine reclamation program reached mines abandoned
prior to the effective date of the Act.498 For surface mining occurring
after that date, SMCRA established a permit program for the explora-
tion and development of mines, including environmental protection
performance standards and reclamation plans.4 99 States may, with
federal approval, take regulatory control over the issuance of permits
for surface coal mining operations on lands within the state, expressly
excluding Indian lands. 50 If a state has an approved permit program,
it may also seek approval for a state abandoned mine reclamation
program.501
For tribes, SMCRA regulates the environmental aspects of sur-
face exploration, mining, and reclamation on Indian lands.50 "Indian
495. SmrrH, supra note 1, at 146.
496. The first bills were introduced in 1968. Surface mining acts were passed by Congress in
1974 and 1975, but both were vetoed by President Ford. Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 749
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985).
497. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
498. Id. §§ 1231-1243. The effective date was August 3, 1977. Clean-up or control of aban-
doned mines is crucial; as much as 90 percent of acid mine drainage is discharged from aban-
doned, rather than operating, mines. SMrrH, supra note 1, at 146.
499. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1279 (1988).
500. Id. § 1253. Lands within the state are defined in SMCRA as "all lands within a State
other than Federal lands and Indian lands." Id. § 1291(11).
501. Id. § 1235(c).
502. Accordingly, Interior Department regulations provide that all coal leases for Indian
lands under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act must include a provision that the lessee will
comply with the applicable provisions of SMCRA. 25 C.F.R. § 200.11 (1993). The IMDA regu-
lations also provide that SMCRA applies to mineral agreements under that Act. 59 Fed. Reg.
14,960, 14,973 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.5). SMCRA regulations for Indian lands are found at 25
C.F.R. pt. 216 (1993), although Interior has proposed eliminating the initial program perform-
ance standards at part 216, subpart B, and amending the general standards found at 30 C.F.R. ch.
VII, subch. B (1993), to make them applicable to Indian lands. 58 Fed. Reg. 15,404 (1993). The
primary purpose of the proposed change is to eliminate inconsistencies between the programs.
Id. On SMCRA programs on Indian lands, see Lynn H. Slade, Coal Surface Mining on Indian
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lands" are defined in SMCRA as all lands within the exterior bounda-
ries of an Indian reservation, regardless of ownership, plus any off-
reservation lands in which the tribe owns either the mineral estate or
the surface estate.503 In large part because of the expansive definition
of Indian lands, however, tribal jurisdiction under SMCRA to regulate
surface coal mining on Indian lands is severely limited.
During the long legislative battle to enact SMCRA, the extent of
tribal authority to carry out surface mining regulatory activities was a
subject of disagreement in Congress.-5 At various times, one house
favored full tribal regulatory control over SMCRA programs on In-
dian lands, while the other house ,believed that jurisdiction over In-
dian lands was too uncertain to justify that approach.50 5 As enacted,
SMCRA embodied the cautious approach. 6 Rather than accord
tribes regulatory authority over Indian lands, SMCRA called for the
Department of the Interior to study "the question of the regulation of
surface mining on Indian lands" and make recommendations for
legislation.50 7
Nonetheless, the conference committee, "entirely without expla-
nation or comment, '50 8 added a provision treating tribes as states for
purposes of the abandoned mine reclamation program.50 9 Tribes have
Lands From Checkerboard to Crazy Quilt, in MNEmRAL DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 10-1,
10-9 - 10-20 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn 1989).
503. 30 U.S.C. § 1291(9) (1988). Specifically, Indian lands mean "all lands, including mineral
interests, within the exterior boundaries of any Federal Indian reservation, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way, and all lands including mineral interests held
in trust for or supervised by an Indian tribe." Id. This last phrase has been interpreted as includ-
ing any off-reservation lands owned by an Indian tribe. Valencia Energy Co., 96 Int. Dec. 239,
254 (1989). Thus, "Indian lands" under SMCRA include, for example, the prime coal lands of
the Crow Tribe's ceded strip. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
504. See generally Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740,749-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 919 (1985).
505. ld. The two houses switched roles over the course of the legislative history. In 1974, the
House was in favor of tribal authority and the Senate was uncertain, while in 1977, it was the
Senate version which accorded regulatory authority to tribes and the House version which called
for study of the jurisdictional issues.
506. S. REP. No. 337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1977). The reason given by the Conference
Committee for choosing the House over the Senate approach was that it "did not want to change
the status quo with respect to jurisdiction over Indian lands both within reservations and outside
reservation boundaries." Id.
507. 30 U.S.C. § 1300 (a)-(b), (h) (1988). See also S. REP. No. 337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 114(1977).
508. Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985).
509. 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Treatment as a state is available to tribes
with lands "from which coal is produced" or with "eligible lands". Id. Eligible lands are defined
as those "which were mined for coal or which were affected by such mining, wastebanks, coal
processing, or other coal mining processes, and abandoned or left in an inadequate reclamation
status prior to August 3, 1977, and for which there is no continuing reclamation responsibility
under State or other Federal laws." Id. at § 1234.
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been unable to take regulatory authority over abandoned mines, how-
ever, because tribes have been delegated no authority to assume the
surface mining permit program. And without the permit program,
there is no authority for a state, or a tribe treated as a state, to seek
authority to operate an abandoned mine reclamation program.5 10
Congress' legislative oversight effectively blocked most tribal regula-
tion of, and consequently most tribal control over, surface mining in
Indian country.
At the time, however, the oversight seemed of little importance.
Interior's study and recommendations were due to Congress no later
than January 1, 1978,5" and expectations were that SMCRA would
shortly be amended to accord program authority to tribes.51 The De-
partment of Interior's study, however, was not submitted until Febru-
ary of 1984.' 13  When it was submitted, it was unsatisfactory; the
report did not meet the needs of the tribes or adequately mesh strip
mining on Indian lands into the framework of SMCRA 14 In conse-
quence, a bill was introduced in the Senate that would essentially have
treated tribes as states for purposes of the SMCRA programs by turn-
ing regulatory control of those programs over to the tribes.5 15 The
bill, however, was not reported out of committee before the Senate
adjourned. 16
510. See 30 U.S.C. § 1235(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
511. 30 U.S.C. § 1300(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
512. Congress expressly directed Interior to include in the study "proposed legislation
designed to allow Indian tribes to elect to assume full regulatory authority over the administra-
tion and enforcement of regulation of surface mining of coal on Indian lands." 30 U.S.C.
§ 1300(a). See also Thomas J. Lynaugh, The Responsibility for Reclamation of Surface Mining on
Indian Lands Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 26 S.D.L. REv.
547,550-60 (1981) (describing legislation proposed at that time by Interior, but not introduced in
Congress).
513. Regulation of Coal Mining on Indian Reservation Lands: Hearing on S. 2879 Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1984) (remarks of Leona Power,
Dep. Ass't Sec'y for Land and Minerals, Dep't of the Interior) [hereafter Coal Mining Hearing].
The six year delay did not escape Congress' notice. See id at 1 (remarks of Sen. Melcher);
Regulation of Surface Mining on Indian Lands: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on En-
ergy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Richardson). Although Interior took nearly seven years to pre-
pare its report, the Council of Energy Resources Tribes submitted a report, along with proposals
for remedial legislation, in 1979. COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCES TRIBES, THE CONTROL AND
RECLAMATION OF SURFACE MINING ON INDIAN LANDS (1979). That report had been commis-
sioned by Interior, and was at times presumed to meet the statutory requirement for a study
report. See Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 741 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919
(1985).
514. Coal Mining Hearing, supra note 513, at 1 (remarks of Sen. Melcher).
515. The bill is reprinted id. at 4-20. The sponsor of the bill was Senator Melcher, who also
sponsored the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982.
516. See Clark, 749 F.2d at 741 n.1.
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Control of surface mining regulation on Indian lands, therefore,
remained where it had been: with Interior's Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM).5 17 OSM is adamant that, until
Congress enacts legislation authorizing tribes to operate SMCRA pro-
grams, OSM will be the "sole regulatory authority" on Indian lands.5 18
OSM's crabbed view of SMCRA is not necessary. If OSM chose, it
could likely delegate SMCRA program authority to the Indian tribes.
At the least, OSM could delegate authority for the abandoned mine
reclamation program, which already provides that tribes are to be
treated as states.5 19 But even delegation of authority to tribes to seek
approval of surface mining permit programs should be possible. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) successfully delegated au-
thority to tribes under the Clean Air Act before that Act expressly
authorized EPA to do so.52 And EPA is presently taking the same
approach to tribal regulation under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act.52 1 Nonetheless, OSM appears unlikely to follow EPA's
expansive lead in according governmental status to tribes under envi-
ronmental statutes.
For SMCRA programs, therefore, OSM is the permitting agency
for surface mining of tribal coal. There is, however, no provision for
OSM to consult directly with the affected Indian tribes before issuing
a permit. Instead, the regulations direct that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs is responsible for tribal consultations; 522 the BIA then makes
recommendations to OSM concerning permits, and OSM determines
517. See, e.g., In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346, 1363-65 (1980).
518. 53 Fed. Reg. 3,992, 3,993 (1988). See also 30 C.F.R. § 750.6(a)(1) (1993); 59 Fed. Reg.
14,960, 14,973 (1994) (25 C.F.R. § 225.5) (IMDA regulations).
519. Slade, supra note 502, at 10-30.
520. Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
sub nom., Crow Tribe of Indians v. Environmental Protection Agency, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981). In
1974, EPA issued regulations that authorized Indian tribes to redesignate the air quality of their
reservations. In 1977, the EPA approved the redesignation request of the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe, and that approval was upheld in federal court. The Clean Air Act was not amended to
accord redesignation authority to tribes until after EPA's approval. Pub. L. No. 95-95, title I,
§ 127(a), 91 Stat 733 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1988)).
521. Although the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act does not presently treat tribes
as states for purposes of assuming program authority, EPA has announced that it will promul-
gate rules to authorize tribes to implement RCRA's hazardous waste management program. 57
Fed. Reg. 52,024 (1992). In addition, EPA's regulation-in-progress for RCRA's solid waste per-
mit program is entitled the State/Tribal Implementation Rule, clearly indicating EPA's intent to
authorize tribes to implement the solid waste permit program as well. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg.
28,960 (1993).
522. A Special Committee on Investigations of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Af-
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whether to approve or disapprove the surface mining permits for In-
dian coal.: 3 For more than a decade after SMCRA was enacted,
then, coal-producing tribes were entirely dependent upon the federal
government to carry out SMCRA programs on Indian lands, with lim-
ited opportunity for tribal input into, much less control of, the process.
In recent years, however, Congress has acted to delegate statu-
tory authority to a limited number of coal-producing tribes. In 1987,
Congress authorized the Crow, Hopi, and Navajo Tribes to develop
tribal programs for reclamation of abandoned mines, subject to ap-
proval by the Secretary of the Interior, and notwithstanding the ab-
sence of a tribal permit program as required by SMCRA 24 All three
tribes submitted plans which were approved, and now operate tribal
abandoned mine reclamation programs.-5  In 1992, moreover, Con-
gress amended SMCRA to provide that those three tribes, plus the
Northern Cheyenne, were eligible for grants to develop tribal offices
of surface mining regulation. 26 The amendment was designed to per-
mit the designated tribes to gain expertise and to assume greater con-
trol over surface mining within their territories. 27 Congress specified,
however, that the amendment should not be construed as treating the
four tribes as states for purposes of the permit program. 28
SMCRA thus still represents a rudimentary recognition of the tri-
bal regulatory interest in surface mining. Despite expectations written
into the 1977 law that tribes would eventually assume full regulatory
authority on Indian lands for SMCRA programs, 529 progress toward
that goal has been halting at best. Seventeen years after passage of
SMCRA, only three tribes are authorized to assume abandoned mine
reclamation authority. No tribes are treated as states for purposes of
the permit program, and only four are even eligible for grants for the
development of tribal surface mining expertise. OSM shows no indi-
cation of relinquishing its control over Indian lands in favor of tribal
governmental authority.
523. 30 C.F.R. §§ 750.6(d)(2) and (a)(2) (1993).
524. Pub. L. No. 100-71, title I, 101 Stat. 416 (1987) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1988)).
See also H.R. REP. No. 195, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1987).
525. 30 C.F.R. pt. 756 (1993).
526. Pub. L. No. 486, § 2514, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified at 30 U.S.C.A. § 1300(i) (1994
West Supp.)). The four tribes were chosen because of the "significant coal resources" in their
territories. H.R. REP. No. 474, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 8, at 95 (1992).
527. Id
528. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1300 (1994 West Supp.)
529. 30 U.S.C. § 1300(a) (1988).
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Despite the unfulfilled promise of SMCRA, however, tribal con-
trol over environmental matters within Indian country is increasing.
The Environmental Protection Agency, which administers the federal
environmental programs for air, water, and waste management, has
chosen to work toward, rather than against, tribal governmental con-
trol of environmental protection. Accordingly, tribal regulatory au-
thority over the air and water resources of Indian country, as well as
tribal authority over waste management and remediation, continues to
increase.
4. Federal environmental statutes
Early in 1983, President Reagan issued his Indian policy state-
ment, reaffirming the federal policy of tribal control and economic
self-sufficiency, and establishing the government-to-government
theme that continues today. 30 Building on Reagan's statement, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) became the first, and to
date the only, federal agency to issue an Indian policy of its own. 31 In
1984, EPA pledged to recognize tribal governments "as sovereign en-
tities with primary authority and responsibility" for environmental
matters in Indian country and to "work directly with Tribal Govern-
ments as the independent authority for reservation affairs".131
Beginning with the round of environmental law reauthorizations
in 1986, EPA embarked on a legislative agenda designed to put its
policy into practice. 33 Federal environmental statutes up for
reauthorization were amended to include provisions treating Indian
tribes as states for all or most of the programs authorized by the acts,
and new laws generally provided equivalent treatment of state and
tribal governments. This legislative program has to date resulted in
tribes-as-state amendments to most of the major federal pollution
control laws and similar provisions in the federal environmental
530. See supra text accompanying notes 265-266.
531. U.S. ENVT'L PROTECION AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENVI.
RONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1984).
532. Id. at 2. EPA reaffirmed its commitment to the government-to-government policy in
1991. U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, FEDERAL, TRIBAL AND STATE ROLES IN THE PROTEC-
TION AND REGULATION OF RESERVATION ENVIRONMENTS: A CONCEPT PAPER (1991) [hereafter
EPA CONCEPT PAPER].
533. EPA's attention to tribes as governments pre-dated its Indian policy by several years.
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 95-95, title I, § 127(a), 91 Stat. 733 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c)
(1988)) (making tribes the only governments with authority to redesignate air quality within
reservations) (codifying EPA regulations issued in 1974). Nonetheless, the legislative activity
from the 1986 session to the present represents a concentrated effort to bring the environmental
statutes into line with federal Indian policy.
[Vol. 29:541
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remediation statutes. 34 Unlike SMCRA, as interpreted by OSM,
these federal environmental acts contemplate that some tribes will
take full regulatory control over the reservation environment.
Between 1986 and 1990, three of the major environmental laws
were amended to treat tribes as states (TAS). These TAS provisions
were added to the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Safe
Drinking Water Act:535 those federal environmental laws that en-
courage or mandate states to take primacy for the environmental pro-
grams established in the statutes. Tribes that meet certain statutory
and regulatory criteria are delegated essentially the same authority to
administer programs as a state.
The statutory TAS requirements of the three statutes are similar.
The tribe must demonstrate to the EPA that it is a federally recog-
nized tribe with a governing body that carries out substantial govern-
mental duties and powers; that the functions it will exercise under the
delegated programs are within its governmental powers; and that it is
reasonably expected to be capable of carrying out the statutory func-
tions.536 The burden of showing that the tribe meets the TAS require-
ments is on the requesting tribe, which must affirmatively
demonstrate its regulatory authority. 37 Moreover, a tribe must qual-
ify as a state under each act or even under each program within an act
for which it seeks primacy. Because each act or program may require
specialized capabilities or authority, qualification under one act or
program does not constitute qualification as a state under all.538 EPA
has eased the tribal burden significantly, however, by providing that a
tribe need submit the basic application for TAS only once.539 If a
534. See generally Royster & Fausett, supra note 464, at 619-22; Judith V. Royster, Environ-
mental Protection and Native American Rights: Controlling Land Use Through Environmental
Regulation, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 89 (1991); Teresa A. Williams, Pollution and Hazardous
Waste on Indian Lands: Do Federal Laws Apply and Who May Enforce Them?, 17 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 269 (1992); David F. Coursen, Tribes as States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and
Enforce Federal Environmental Laws and Regulations, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10579
(1993); John Williams, The Effect of the EPA's Designation of Tribes as States on the Five Civi-
lized Tribes in Oklahoma, 29 TULSA LJ. 345 (1993).
535. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (1992 Supp.); Clean Water
Act Amendments of 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of
1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(a) (1988).
536. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1992); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e) (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b)(1) (1988). There are some
differences in wording among the acts, particularly as to the second requirement, which is gener-
ally tailored to the particular functions of the statute. Compare 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2) (Supp. IV
1992) (CAA) with 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (Supp. IV 1992) (CWA).
537. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,881 (1991); 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (1993).
538. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,883 (1991).
539. Id. Proposed simplification rules would ease the tribal burden even further. The EPA
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tribe satisfies the first two requirements - federal recognition and
governmental duties and powers - under one act or program, that
showing will generally serve for all, with supplemental information to
demonstrate the tribe's capability of carrying out the specific pro-
gram. 40 Deficient TAS applications will generally not be denied out-
right; rather, EPA will work with the tribe to resolve any problems
with the application or the tribal program. 4' In the interim, or per-
manently for those tribes which do not seek TAS, the EPA retains
authority to administer the environmental programs.5 42
Tribes that qualify as states under the federal environmental laws
will generally exercise authority over the delegated programs through-
out their territories. 43 In some cases, the federal statutes expressly
extend tribal authority to the boundaries of Indian country. 44 In all
cases, EPA has rejected the checkerboard approach to environmental
regulation in Indian country, noting the difficulties that would arise if
the tribal programs applied only to Indian lands and waters, with a
state program applicable to non-Indian lands and waters. 45 As a re-
sult, EPA will treat Indian reservations as "single administrative
has proposed to eliminate the existing requirement that a tribe seek TAS status prior to seeking
program or grant approval, and to make the TAS determination part of the process of reviewing
grant or program applications. 59 Fed. Reg. 13,814, 13,815 (1994) (tribal elegibility for financial
assistance); 59 Fed. Reg. 13,820, 13,821 (1994) (tribal eligibility for program authorization). The
EPA has also proposed that a tribe which satisfies the first two TAS requirements, see supra text
accompanying note 536, under either the Clean Water Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act will
be deemed to have met those requirements for both acts. 59 Fed. Reg. at 13,815; 59 Fed. Reg. at
13,821. In addition, the EPA has proposed to substantially simplify the review of tribal jurisdic-
tion to receive grants or carry out programs. 59 Fed. Reg. at 13,816; 59 Fed. Reg. at 13,822.
540. EPA expects that "once a Tribe has qualified for one program, the key step toward
assumption of other programs, in most cases, will be demonstrating appropriate capability." 56
Fed. Reg. 64,885.
541. ld.
542. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(4) (1992 Supp.); EPA CONC EPr PAPER,
supra note 532, at 3-4.
543. For an argument that this result is mandated by the language of the environmental stat-
utes and principles of federal Indian law, see Royster & Fausett, supra note 464, at 623-59.
544. The Clean Water Act offers TAS to a tribe regarding:
[T]he management and protection of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe,
held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if
such property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within
the borders of an Indian reservation.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1377(e)(2) (1988).
Similarly, the Clean Air Act provides that a tribal implementation plan, when approved,
"shall become applicable to all areas (except as expressly provided otherwise in the plan) located
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent and
including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (1992 Supp.).
545. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878 (1991). The agency's rejection of the checkerboard ap-
proach to environmental regulation, where the tribe would regulate on trust lands and the state
on non-Indian fee lands, was a response to the Court's decision in Brendale v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 414-420. Parceling out
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units" under the environmental programs, delegating authority in In-
dian country only where the tribe or the state can demonstrate juris-
diction over pollution sources throughout the tribe's territory.5"
Nonetheless, EPA does not view the federal TAS provisions as
manifesting clear congressional intent to extend tribal authority over
non-Indians and non-Indian lands in every instance.547 Instead, EPA
will determine tribal authority over non-Indians on a "Tribe-by-Tribe
basis," although it also believes that tribes generally will have the legal
authority to regulate all pollution sources within reservation bounda-
ries.5 48 Based on the Supreme Court's analysis in the Montana and
Brendale cases,54 9 EPA will require "a showing that the potential im-
pacts of regulated activities on the tribe are serious and substantial"
before granting tribes TAS status throughout the reservation. 550
However, EPA has stated that "the activities regulated under the vari-
ous environmental statutes generally have serious and substantial im-
pacts on human health and welfare,"55' and as a result, EPA has
determined that tribes will usually be able to make the showing neces-
sary to obtain program delegation over all pollution sources within the
tribe's territory.552
regulatory authority over water resources on the basis of land ownership, as the Court parcelled
out zoning authority in Brendale, "would ignore the difficulties of assuring compliance with [en-
vironmental] standards when two different sovereign entities are establishing standards for the
same [area]." 56 Fed. Reg. 64,878 (1991).
546. EPA CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 532, at 3. In the case of tribal jurisdiction, however,
the EPA also provided that if a tribe "cannot demonstrate jurisdiction over one or more reserva-
tion sources, the Agency will retain enforcement primacy for those sources." Id at 3-4.
547. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (1991).
548. Id. at 64,878.
549. See supra text accompanying notes 392-404. For competing views of the effects of
Brendale on tribal environmental authority, compare Royster, supra note 534, with Peter W. Sly,
EPA and Indian Reservations: Justice Stevens' Factual Approach, 20 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10429 (1990).
550. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878 (1991). EPA's position was based on the test in Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981): "A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe." EPA rejected the suggestion that Brendale had overruled or was incon-
sistent with Montana, although it did recognize that a majority of justices in Brendale had at-
tempted to reformulate the Montana test. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,877-78 (1991). EPA
interpreted those reformulations as essentially requiring some impact on tribal interests that was
more than de minimis. Id. at 64,878. On that basis, EPA developed its standard.
551. Id
552. Id. EPA's analysis also accords with its long-standing refusal to authorize state program
authority in Indian country absent a demonstration by the state of independent authority to
regulate in tribal territory. EPA generally assumes that states lack authority in Indian country
and takes the position that the federal environmental statutes do not provide the states with
authority to extend state programs onto reservations. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066, 33,378 (1980);
U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON IN-
DIAN LANDS: EPA INDIAN WORK GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER 9 (1983). See also Washington
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Consequently, tribal governmental regulation of the environmen-
tal effects of mining and related activities will generally extend be-
yond mineral development on Indian lands to reach all mineral
development within the tribe's governmental boundaries, including
mining on allotted lands and fee lands. Indian tribes that assume pro-
gram authority under the federal environmental statutes thus will be
authorized to regulate the reservation environment in a number of
ways affecting mineral development.
a. Air Pollution
Under the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA), tribes
are authorized to develop tribal implementation plans for implement-
ing, maintaining, and enforcing national ambient air quality stan-
dards." 3 The plans provide the means by which the tribes control
emissions from stationary sources of air pollutants, and thus would
allow tribes to impose regulations and control measures on mills, re-
fineries, and other sources of air pollution from mineral development.
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act also instituted a permit
program, under which major sources of air pollution must obtain a
permit from the state.5 54 While tribes are not expressly treated as
states for purposes of the permit program, the Act authorizes the EPA
to promulgate regulations specifying the CAA provisions for which
TAS is appropriate.555 Although EPA has not yet issued the regula-
tions,5 56 the agency should determine that tribes are to be treated as
states for purposes of the permit program. Since tribes are authorized
to be treated as states for purposes of implementation plans, depriving
tribes of TAS for the permit program would undermine the tribes'
ability to fully ensure Indian country compliance with national ambi-
ent air quality standards.
In addition, tribes have long had the authority under the Clean
Air Act to redesignate the reservation airshed to preserve or enhance
air quality.557 Areas of the country in which the air quality is cleaner
Dep't of Ecology v. Envt'l Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding EPA's
interpretation that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act does not grant states regula-
tory authority over Indian lands).
553. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (1992 Supp.).
554. 42 U.S.C. § 7661 etseq. (Supp. IV 1992) If the state does not develop a permit program,
EPA will administer one for that state. Id. § 7661a(d)(3).
555. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
556. EPA was to have promulgated the regulations within 18 months after November 15,
1990. 42 U.S.C, § 7601(d)(2) (Supp IV 1992).
557. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
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than the national ambient air quality standards require fall under a
program to prevent significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality.558
These PSD areas are designated Class I, II or III, depending upon
how pristine the air quality should be.559 While new sources of air
pollution are allowed in PSD areas, the additional increment of pollu-
tion allowed over the baseline is far more limited in Class I areas than
in Class II or Class 111.56 Thus, in 1976, when the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe redesignated its reservation airshed from Class II to Class I, that
action forced a three-year moratorium on construction of an on-reser-
vation power plant in order to install better pollution control devices,
and "contributed to the demise" of plans on the neighboring Crow
Reservation for a coal gasification plant and a coal-fired power
plant.561
Moreover, any new "major emitting facility" in a PSD area must
obtain a permit and meet preconstruction requirements. 562 Nonethe-
less, the PSD program does not reach all mining activities. Fugitive
dust from surface mines, for example, does not count in determining
whether the mining facility is a "major" facility requiring a precon-
struction permit.563
b. Water Pollution
For the protection of surface waters, tribes can access a variety of
programs under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA authorizes
tribes to promulgate water quality standards for all waters within the
reservation, to regulate discharges of pollutants and dredge and fill
materials into waters of the reservation, and to develop management
programs for nonpoint source pollution.5 4 Tribes may, for example,
assume authority for the national pollutant discharge elimination sys-
tem (NPDES) program,565 which requires a permit for the discharge
558. 42 U.S.C. § 7470 et seq. (Supp. IV 1992) (establishing the prevention of significant dete-
rioration (PSD) program).
559. 42 U.S.C. § 7472 (Supp. IV 1992).
560. 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. IV 1992).
561. AmBLER, supra note 4, at 183-84. See generally Nance v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), cerL denied sub nom. Crow Tribe of Indian v. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
562. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (Supp. IV 1992).
563. See NRDC v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641,649 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding EPA's rule). Fugitive
dust, which "accounts for virtually all of the air pollution generated at surface coal mines,"
reaches the atmosphere without passing through a smokestack or other centralized point. Ild. at
643 and n.1.
564. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1377(e)-(f) (1988).
565. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1377(e), 1342 (1988).
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of any pollutant566 from any "point source"567 into surface waters.
The permits specify effluent limitations on the pollutant discharge,
which reflect both technology-based limitations and limitations based
on water quality standards. 68
Any mining waste which is released into surface waters from a
discrete, discernible conveyance is a discharge from a point source
subject to the NPDES program. 569 Accordingly, tribes operating the
NPDES program can require point sources of mining discharge into
waters to obtain a tribal permit setting effluent limitations. Exceeding
permit limitations and discharging without a permit are both viola-
tions of the Clean Water Act which tribes treated as states can enforce
against the violator. 7 Mining wastes which are not discharged from
discrete points - those which result primarily from runoff and silta-
tion - are considered nonpoint sources of water pollution,571 and are
exempt from the permit program. However, tribes treated as states
566. The definition of "pollutant" under the CWA expressly excludes materials such as water
and gas injected into a well for the production of oil and gas, or oil and gas wastewater disposed
of by injection into a well, under certain circumstances. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1988). The under-
ground injection control program is carried out under the Safe Drinking Water Act, see infra
text accompanying notes 573-576.
567. A point source is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container" and the like.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
568. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). Tribes may seek approval to be treated as states for purposes
of establishing those water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1377(e), 1313 (1988).
569. The leading case is United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 370-74 (10th Cir.
1979) (overflow from sump used in gold leaching was discharge from a point source). See also
United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 978 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1844 (1993) (acid
mine drainage from collection and settling ponds); Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558
(9th Cir. 1984) (discharge water released from sluice box); Sierra Club v. Abston Construction
Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1980) (overflow of surface runoff from strip mines col-
lected in sediment basins); Residents Against Industrial Landfill Expansion v. Diversified Sys-
tems, Inc., 804 F.Supp. 1036, 1038 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (discharge from sediment ponds).
In addition, contaminated storm water discharges from both active and inactive mines are
subject to the NPDES permit requirement. EPA determined that storm water discharges from
mines, except for inactive mines reclaimed under SMCRA or certain other state or federal laws,
were not subject to the general permit moratorium on storm water discharges. 55 Fed. Reg.
47,990 (1990); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (1988). See also American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d
759 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding EPA's determination as reasonable).
570. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1377(e), 1319 (1988).
571. Nonpoint sources include "mining activities, including runoff and siltation from new,
currently operating, and abandoned surface and underground mines". 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(B)
(1988). As the courts have noted, however:
[P]oint and nonpoint sources are not distinguished by the kind of pollution they create
or by the activity causing the pollution, but rather by whether the pollution reaches the
water through a confined, discrete conveyance. Thus, when mining activities release
pollutants from a discernible conveyance, they are subject to NPDES regulation, as are
all point sources.
Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558. When mining activities release pollutants otherwise, how-
ever, the release is a nonpoint source of pollution.
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are eligible for grants to develop tribal nonpoint source management
programs.572
Groundwater protection programs are available to tribes under
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). The SDWA provides that
tribes may assume primary responsibility for drinking water quality
standards and underground injection control programs.573 Under-
ground injection wells are used in oil and gas recovery and solution
mining of uranium.5 74 Moreover, waste waters, and in particular
waste waters from oil fields, can be disposed of by injection back un-
derground through former production wells.5  Unless underground
injection is properly planned and carefully executed, the process car-
ries a threat of serious environmental damage to groundwater sup-
plies.5 76 Tribal primacy under the injection control program allows
tribes to regulate the underground injection of mining wastes.
c. Waste Management
Aside from the underground injection control program, however,
tribal control and management of wastes generated from mineral de-
velopment may be limited. The Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), which authorizes states to operate federally-approved
hazardous waste programs, is the only major federal environmental
law which does not treat Indian tribes as states.577 That obstacle ap-
pears temporary, however, since EPA has announced its intention to
issue rules authorizing tribes to implement RCRA's hazardous waste
management program. 78
The more serious obstacle to tribal regulation of mining wastes is
the 1980 Bevill amendment to RCRA, which reflects Congress' uncer-
tainty whether mining wastes should be regulated as hazardous
wastes, as solid wastes, or not at all.57 9 Under the amendment, solid
572. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1377(0 (1988).
573. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-11(a), 300h-1(e) (1988).
574. See Young, supra note 473, at 13-17; S. REP. No. 216, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1989).
575. Catherine Vandemoer, The Development of Underground Injection Control Programs
on Indian Lands: Issues, Challenges, and a Blueprint for Tribal Program Development, in MiN-
ERAL DEVELOPMENT ON INDiAN LANDS 17-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn 1989).
576. Id.
577. RCRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. At the present time, RCRA groups tribes
with municipalities. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13) (1988).
578. 57 Fed. Reg. 52,024 (1992). Moreover, the Act is currently up for reauthorization, and
all indications are that it will then include a tribes-as-states provision. The proposed Senate
reauthorization amendments in the 102d Congress, for example, contained a provision authoriz-
ing EPA to treat tribes as states. 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 247, 257 (1992).
579. John R. Jacus & Thomas E. Root, The Emerging Federal Law of Mine Waste: Adminis-
trative, Judicial and Legislative Developments, 26 LAND & WATER L. REv. 461, 466 (1991).
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waste "from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of ores and
minerals"580 was to be regulated not under the stringent hazardous
waste program of RCRA's Subtitle C, but only under other applicable
laws until a study was completed and appropriate regulations were in
place.581 After a decade of uncertainty, 8 EPA reached its final de-
termination that 20 mining wastes were subject to continued exclusion
from RCRA's hazardous waste regulations under the Bevill amend-
ment.8 3 Consequently, even when EPA authorizes tribes to be
treated as states for purposes of the Subtitle C program, those mining
wastes will not be subject to the stringent regulatory standards for
hazardous wastes.
However, some 23 mining wastes were ruled outside the Bevill
amendment, and thus subject to regulation under RCRA.58 4 If those
wastes exhibit hazardous characteristics, they are subject to regulation
under RCRA's Subtitle C hazardous waste program.58 5 If they are
not hazardous wastes, they are subject to regulation under RCRA's
Subtitle D solid waste program, as are those mining wastes which fall
under the Bevill amendment exceptions. 86 EPA has stated its intent
to develop a Subtitle D program for mineral extraction, beneficiation,
and processing wastes,5 87 but to date no mining waste program is in
place. In the absence of a federally-mandated regulatory program for
580. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(A)(ii) (1988). Beneficiation is the process of separating the de-
sired mineral from the host rock. Jacus & Root, supra note 579, at 465.
581. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(A) (1988). The EPA was to study the environmental effects of
solid wastes from active and abandoned surface and underground mines and from the extraction,
beneficiation, and processing of ores and minerals. 42 U.S.C. § 6982(0, (p) (1988).
582. The long and tortuous implementation of the Bevill amendment is detailed at Jacus &
Root, supra note 579, at 466-73. See also Solite Corp. v. U.S. Envt'l Protection Agency, 952 F.2d
473, 477-82 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
583. 56 Fed. Reg. 27,300 (1991). EPA's determinations were upheld for the most part in
Solite Corp., 952 F.2d 473. The primary criteria for determining whether mining wastes would
fall under the Bevill amendment were high volume and low hazard. 54 Fed. Reg. 36,592 (1989);
see also Solite Corp., 952 F.2d at 483-90.
The list of Bevill amendment mining wastes excepted from hazardous waste regulation
under RCRA is found at 40 C.F.R. § 261A(b)(7) (1993). In addition, a federal district court has
recently ruled that acid mine drainage is a mining waste covered by the Bevill amendment. See
24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 184 (1993) (noting an unpublished May 11, 1993 order from the Eastern
District of California. In an earlier published opinion, the court had refused to rule on whether
acid mine drainage came within the Bevill amendment on the grounds that the parties had
neither raised nor briefed the issue. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp.
1528, 1540 (E.D. Cal. 1992)).
584. Solite Corp., 952 F.2d at 481.
585. 54 Fed. Reg. 36,592, 36,595 (1989).
586. EPA has stated that it intends to address 18 of the 20 Bevill amendment wastes under
Subtitle D, and the remaining two under the Toxic Substances Control Act. See 56 Fed. Reg.
27,300 (1991).
587. 56 Fed. Reg. 27,300, 27,317 (1991).
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non-hazardous mining wastes, tribal regulation of those wastes can be
accomplished through tribal governmental police powers. 88 Many
tribes, however, will not have the funding, staff, or expertise necessary
to develop mining waste management programs of their own.
d. Remediation
Nonetheless, tribes may control remedial actions or other re-
sponse measures for contamination caused by the release of mining
wastes. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund Act),589 when a
hazardous substance or other pollutant which may cause imminent
and substantial danger is released into the environment, the federal
government is authorized to undertake appropriate remedial ac-
tion.590 Tribes are authorized to enter into contracts or cooperative
agreements with the federal government to carry out those actions in
the case of a release in Indian country.591 For tribes which do not
enter into cooperative agreements, CERCLA provides for consulta-
tion with the tribe before the federal government determines the ap-
propriate remedial action. 92
One potential snag to tribal involvement in remediation under
CERCLA is the possibility that some mining wastes are not covered
by the Superfund Act. Although CERCLA applies to any release of a
hazardous substance, the definition of hazardous substance incorpo-
rates the Bevill amendment from RCRA.593 Almost all federal courts
588. See Jana L. Walker & Kevin Gover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal
Projects on Indian Lands, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 244-45 (1993).
589. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1988).
590. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
591. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). The federal government must first deter-
mine that the tribe "has the capability to carry out any or all of such actions" in accordance with
the Superfund Act, "and to carry out related enforcement actions". Id.
592. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2) (1988). Indian tribes are to be treated as states for purposes of
that subsection. 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (Supp. IV 1992). One commentator points out that tribes
are excluded from the section providing for "substantial and meaningful involvement" by states
"in initiation, development, and selection of remedial actions to be undertaken in that State," see
42 U.S.C. § 9621(0(1) (Supp. IV 1992). Stem, supra note 422, at 99-100. That exclusion may be
mooted in part, however, by the consultation rights under § 9604(c).
In addition to treating tribes as states for consultation on remedial actions, CERCLA also
provides for TAS treatment for notification of releases, access to information, health authorities,
and most roles and responsibilities under th6 national contingency plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a)
(Supp. IV 1992). There is no requirement in CERCLA, as there is in the pollution control
statutes, that tribes first qualify as states before the TAS provisions apply.
593. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(C) (Supp. IV 1992). The Bevill amendment to RCRA is discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 579-587.
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considering whether mining wastes are therefore excluded from CER-
CLA have concluded that they are not, so long as the mining waste at
issue falls under one of the other definitions of hazardous substance in
the Superfund Act.594 Nonetheless, one federal district court recently
held that all Bevill amendment wastes, which include 20 mining
wastes,5 95 are excluded under CERCLA.5 96  Until the issue is re-
solved, tribes' ability to respond to environmental harm caused by re-
leases of mining wastes may be compromised. 97
In addition to remediation of damages caused by hazardous sub-
stances generally, tribes may also be involved in remediation of oil
spills. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) 598 provides that a tribe
may recover from the responsible party any removal costs incurred by
the tribe in response to an oil spill.5 99 Since the OPA applies to all
facilities involved in oil development,600 it offers tribes greatly in-
creased control over the remediation of any oil spill connected with
development.of oil resources in Indian country.
In addition, the OPA and CERCLA authorize tribes to recover
594. The leading case is Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Envt'l Protection Agency, 759
F.2d 922, 926-29 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 13 F.3d
1378 (9th Cir. 1994); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F.Supp. 827, 833 (D. Idaho 1987); Idaho v.
Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.Supp. 665, 673 (D. Idaho 1986); United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp.,
584 F.Supp. 1143, 1146-47 (D. Ariz. 1984).
595. See supra text accompanying note 583.
596. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 1528, 1539 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
Although the Iron Mountain holding itself has now been nullified by the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Louisiana-Pacific, 13 F.3d 1378, most federal circuits have not ruled on the issue. The possi-
bility of conflicting interpretations therefore remains.
Despite its ruling on CERCLA, the Iron Mountain decision did not relieve the mining com-
pany of liability. Following the decision, EPA ordered the company to continue clean-up under
the authority of RCRA. See 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 184 (1993). RCRA authorizes the EPA to
bring suit to force clean up whenever the storage or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a)
(1988). However, tribes are not able to act directly under RCRA and thus the loss of CERCLA
authority would impinge substantially on their ability to control environmental damage from
mining waste spills.
597. While the majority view is preferable from both the environmental and tribal perspec-
tive, tribes may be reluctant to act in the face of the legal uncertainty.
598. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1992 Supp.).
599. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)-(b)(1)(A) (1992 Supp.), permitting tribes to recover removal costs
incurred under 33 U.S.C. § 1321 of the Clean Water Act.
600. Although the OPA was enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, it applies to
oil spills into navigable waters from onshore facilities as well as offshore facilities and vessels.
The Act provides that facility includes "any structure, group of structures, equipment, or device
(other than a vessel) which is used for one or more of the following purposes: exploring for,
drilling for, producing, storing, handling, transferring, processing, or transporting oil. This term
includes any motor vehicle, rolling stock, or pipeline used for one or more of these purposes."
33 U.S.C. § 2701(9) (Supp. II 1990). The definition of onshore facility also specifies that it
reaches any motor vehicle or rolling stock "of any kind located in, on, or under, any land within
the United States other than submerged land". Id. § 2701(24).
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natural resources damages resulting from oil spills or releases of other
hazardous substances.6 ' Under both acts, the tribe may recover for
damages to natural resources "belonging to, managed by, controlled
by, or appertaining to" the tribe.60 ' Natural resources are broadly de-
fined by both acts to include the land, air, and water, and plant, fish
and wildlife resources.603 Defenses to natural resources damages ac-
tions are limited to the usual act of God, act of war, and act or omis-
sion of a third party,604 except that a responsible party under
CERCLA may raise compliance with the terms of an environmental
impact statement and a federally approved permit or lease as a de-
fense, so long as the federal actions did not violate the trust responsi-
bility to the tribe. 5
While the ability to recover damages for natural resources does
little to protect those resources from the initial damage, it does put
tribes on an equal footing with states and the federal government.0 6
And once damage occurs, tribes may recover the costs of restoring,
rehabilitating, or replacing the resources, or acquiring equivalent re-
sources; the diminution in value pending restoration; and the reason-
able costs of assessing the damages.60 7  Tribal control over
601. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), (b)(2)(A); 2706(a), (b)(4), (c)(3) (Supp. IV 1992) (OPA); 42
U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (1988) (CERCLA). See generally Rachel Jacobson & Peter Monson, Natural
Resource Damages: Tribes as Trustees, F=Im ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ON INDIAN LANDS (ABA SONREEL
1993).
602. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a)(3) (Supp. 111990) (OPA); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (Supp. IV 1992)
(CERCLA). Under CERCLA, the tribe may also recover for damages to natural resources
belonging to tribal members if those resources are subject to trust restrictions on alienation. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
603. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) (Supp. II 1990) (OPA); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (CERCLA) (Supp.
IV 1992).
604. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. II 1990) (OPA); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (CERCLA) (Supp. IV
1992).
605. CERCLA provides that a responsible party shall not be liable to a tribe for natural
resources damages:
[W]here the party sought to be charged has demonstrated that the damages to natural
resources complained of were specifically identified as an irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of natural resources in an environmental impact statement, or other com-
parable environment analysis, and the decision to grant a permit or license authorizes
such commitment of natural resources, and the facility or project was otherwise operat-
ing within the terms of its permit or license, so long as, in the case of damages to an
Indian tribe occurring pursuant to a Federal permit or license, the issuance of that
permit or license was not inconsistent with the fiduciary duty of the United States with
respect to such Indian tribe.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (1988). The environmental impact statement may be required by NEPA,
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 487-490.
606. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (Supp. II 1990) (OPA); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (Supp. IV 1992)
(CERCLA).
607. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
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remediation, combined with recovery of damages to natural resources,
enhances the tribes' ability as governments to respond to environmen-
tal harm within Indian country.
5. Conclusion
Thus, while tribal environmental control over surface coal mining
is limited under SMCRA, the tribal role in environmental regulation
under federal laws administered by EPA is expanding. Under the
tribes-as-states provisions found in most of the federal environmental
laws, tribes are potentially the regulatory authority for air quality, sur-
face water quality, and drinking water quality standards. Moreover,
the tribal role in waste management, remediation, and recovery of
damages to natural resources is growing. As tribes increasingly as-
sume authority to determine, implement, and enforce these programs,
tribal control over development of mineral resources within reserva-
tion boundaries will correspondingly increase.
Tribal regulatory powers over mineral development are a fairly
recent phenomenon. In the last two decades, tribes have asserted
their inherent governmental authority to take control of mineral de-
velopment activity in ways that the federal mineral statutes, with their
emphasis on the tribes as mineral owners, could not provide. Through
the powers of taxation and environmental regulation, tribes can assert
sovereign control over the effects of mineral development within their
territories, reaping the full economic benefits of mineral activities and
providing protection for the reservation environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Indian tribes thus play a variety of roles in the development of
mineral resources in Indian country. In the early years of mineral de-
velopment, during the allotment era of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, Indian tribes concentrated on their ownership role. Pre-
serving the mineral resources for the tribes, through leasing rather
than sale and through judicial recognition of tribal ownership, was of
primary importance.
With ownership secure, the tribal role became primarily that of
lessor. During the allotment era, the tribal role was minimal: many of
the mineral leasing acts did not provide for tribal consent but did au-
thorize state taxation. In 1938, however, as part of the resurgence of
tribal government, a new mineral leasing statute provided for stan-
dardized provisions, tribal consent and decision-making, and revenue
[Vol. 29:541
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generation through a system of bonuses, rents, and royalties. But the
narrow options available under standardized mineral leases ultimately
proved too restrictive for tribes taking control of their lands and
government.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, then, tribes moved to more active
roles in mineral development. No longer restricted to passive lessors,
tribes after 1982 had the option to participate directly in mineral de-
velopment on Indian lands as developers and owners. During the
same period, tribes also began to assert their governmental role in
mineral development, acting as regulators through the powers of envi-
ronmental regulation and taxation of mineral production.
The first general mineral leasing act for Indian lands was enacted
in 1891. In the century since, the history of mineral development on
Indian lands has been one of increasing tribal control over the mineral
resources. So long as federal Indian policy continues to foster tribal
self-government and self-sufficiency, the tribal role in mineral devel-
opment in Indian country will continue to expand.
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